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|SummaryBrief='''Larry Laudan''' is an American philosopher of science who greatly shaped the debates in the field from the late 1970s till the mid 1990s. He |Summary=Laudan wrote many works , notably, [[Laudan (1977a)|''Progress and its Problems (1977)'']], [[Laudan (19811981a)|''Science and Hypothesis (1981)'']], and importantly [[Laudan (19841984a)|''Science and Values (1984)'']] and [[Laudan (1996)|''Beyond Positivism and Relativism (1996)'']].[[CiteRef::Laudan (1977a)]][[CiteRef::Laudan (19811981a)]][[CiteRef::Laudan (1984a)]][[CiteRef::Laudan (19841996)]] Larry Laudan’s most notable contribution to the study of scientific change is his ''reticulated model'' of scientific change where [[Method|methods]] of theory evaluation change together with scientific [[Theory|theories]] and goals of scientific inquiry in a piecemeal rational fashion. He later defended his view from the criticisms made by notable colleagues like [[John Worrall]].

Laudan’s early views are best seen through his work, [[Laudan (1977a)|''Progress and its Problems (1977)'' ]] where he discusses essentially attempted to explicate the one universal and unchangeable method of science as a process , akin to the previous attempts by Popper, Lakatos, and others. The central tenet of evolution the early-Laudan is the pragmatist idea that utilizes empirically verified evidencescientists prefer theories that solve more problems - empirical or conceptual. According Similar to LaudanLakatos, comparison he accepts that scientific theories live and die in an ocean of theories anomalies and that there is no such thing as a decisive refutation of a theory by a counterexample. However, he disagrees with Popper and concepts Lakatos on the question of novel predictions. While both Popper and finding Lakatos argued that a new theory is better than the solutions old theory only if it has confirmed novel predictions (the so-called "excess corroborated empirical content"), Laudan holds that novel predictions are not given any epistemic advantage in the process of theory choice. According to theories confronted with anomalies comprise Laudan, it is not a key part theory's ability to predict novel phenomena ''per se'' that gets the changing nature theory accepted, but its ability to solve more empirical or conceptual problems (one of sciencewhich can be its ability to predict novel phenomena).[[CiteRef::Laudan (1977a)]]

In the early 1980s, Laudan comes to realize that there is no such thing as a universal and unchangeable method of science. One early indication of this transition is found in the discussion of [[Dudley Shapere]]'s [[Shapere (1980)|''The Character of Scientific Change (1980)'']]. In that paper, Shapere defended the idea that methods of science change as a result of changes in our theories about the world change. In his comment on Shapere 's paper, Laudan seems to appreciate that methods of science are changeable while still arguing that there must exist "persistent metacriteria for the choice of criteria".[[CiteRef::Shapere (1980)|p. 247]]. However, in his [[Laudan (19841984a)|''Science and Values (1984)'']], Laudan presents his '''reticulated model''' which is an attempt to explain how methods of science change in a rational fashion. At the time, this view was against the commonly held belief that some core methods of science remain unchangeable. This lead to an important debate with [[John Worrall]] (see section [[#Criticism|Criticism]]).

This model has three levels of disagreement: factual, methodological and axiological. Disagreements in the scientific community range from differences in why two scientists are studying a given scientific phenomena to what constitutes evidence of a theory. An example of a disagreement of the factual level can be found in 17th century Newtonian physics, in where Newton believed in the possible existence of a vacuum in contradiction to the prevailing view of plenism. There are also levels of resolution: Methodological for Factualfactual, Axiological axiological for Methodological methodological, and none for axiological. The axiological level is fixed. Resolution is the act of discovering which side of a disagreement is deemed correct by the scientific community. To resolve the disputes the community must look to the next level to see if the disputed claim can work in the higher level. Laudan posits that this is the structure for how scientists resolve disputes prior to his reticulated method.

Paradoxically, in the famous VPI project that resulted in [[Donovan, Laudan, and Laudan (Eds.) (1988)|''Scrutinizing Science (1988)'']], Laudan appears to be tacitly subscribing to the idea that there is after all a universal and unchangeable method of science. While not openly articulated, this tacit premise underlies the whole exercise of trying to test different methodological dicta suggested by the likes of Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, and Laudan himself against the historical record. If not restricted to any particular community, time period, or discipline, such a testing would only make sense if the criteria of theory assessment were the same in all communities, all time periods, and all disciplines. [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 18]] Since Laudan and other members of the VPI project didn't restrict themselves to a specific community, time period, or discipline, they tacitly assumed that the same method would be employed in all communities/time periods/disciplines. Clearly, this goes against Laudan's own views stated a few years prior in his [[Laudan (19841984a)|''Science and Values (1984)'']]. Interestingly, in his famous debate with [[John Worrall]] in 1988-89, he returned to his 1984 position that methods of science change through time (see section [[#Criticism|Criticism]]). This mysterious inconsistency in Laudan's position remains to be explained. |Criticism=In 1988, John Worrall responded to Laudan’s [[Laudan (1984a)|''Science and Values'']] in a paper titled [[Worrall (1988)|''The Value of a Fixed Methodology'']]. Worrall seeks to demonstrate how the reticulated model is incorrect by stating that there is after all a core unchangeable method of theory evaluation. According to Worrall, Laudan's alleged historical examples of changes in methods are all examples of changes in explicitly stated methodologies. Implicit criteria that scientists actually employ in theory assessment, according to Worrall, remain static. Thus, according to Worrall Laudan's reticulated fails as it tries to explain something that doesn't really exist, i.e. changes in the implicit method of science.[[CiteRef::Worrall (1988)]]

====The Covariance Fallacy (TODO find a proper place for this seection)====The Covariance Fallacy can be found in Science and Values. It states that it, “[…] assumes that the presence or absence of consensus with respect to factual claims can be used to infer the existence of agreement or disagreement with respect Laudan replied to cognitive aims.”Form 1: The first form of the Covariance Fallacy describes those differences between scientists beliefs that stem from the aims and goals of science. For example, Worrall’s criticism in the Kuhnian tradition, each paradigm has its own metaphysics and cognitive standards. If two scientists disagree, it stands to reason that they are 1989 in different paradigms. Furthermore Laudan believes that it is possible for scientists to share cognitive goals but have fundamental disagreements about the nature of the universe.Form 2: The second form of the Covariance Fallacy is the assumption that simply because any given scientists agree on the factual evidence and methodologies, they also share the same cognitive goals.|Criticism=In 1988 John Worrall responded to Laudan’s his [[Laudan (19841989a)|''Science and Values'']] in a paper titled [[Worrall (1988)|''The Value of Fixed MethodologyIf it Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix it'']]. Laudan points out that Worrall seeks has conceded to demonstrate how the reticulated model is incorrect by stating that there is after all a core unchangeable method of theory evaluation. According to Worrall, Laudan's alleged historical examples possibility of changes occurring in “implicit methods” and that these changeable methods are all examples of changes in explicitly stated methodologies. Implicit criteria that scientists actually employ in theory assessment, according to Worrall, remain static. Thus, according subject to Worrall Laudan's reticulated fails as it tries to explain something that doesn't really exist, i.e. changes in the implicit method bigger principles of sciencewhich are unchangeable.[[CiteRef::Worrall Laudan (19881989a)]]

Laudan replied to Worrall’s criticism in 1989 in his [[Laudan (1989)|''If it Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix it'']]. Laudan points out that Worrall has conceded to the possibility of changes occurring in “implicit methods” and that these changeable methods are all subject to bigger principles of science which are unchangeable.[[CiteRef::Laudan (1989)]] Worrall's final reply cape came in his [[Worrall (1989)|''Fix it be Damned: A Reply to Laudan'']]. Worrall claims that he and Laudan do not have a disagreement on the level of methods changing but they do at the methodological level. Worrall believes that even if some of these beliefs can be changeable there are also ones that are unrevisable. It is under the purview of this fixed element that scientists can do science.[[CiteRef::Worrall (1989)]]

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