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{{Author|First Name=Larry |Last Name=Laudan is |DOB Era=CE|DOB Year=1941|DOB Month=October|DOB Day=16|DOB Approximate=No|DOD Approximate=No|Brief=an American philosopher of science who contributed to greatly shaped the study of philosophy of science debates in the field from the late 1970s and 80s. He till the mid 1990s|Summary=Laudan wrote many works , notably, [[Laudan (1977a)|''Progress and its Problems(1977)'' ]], [[Laudan (19771981a), |''Science and Hypothesis(1981)'' ]], and importantly [[Laudan (19811984a) and |''Science and Values(1984)'']] and [[Laudan (1996)|'' Beyond Positivism and Relativism (19841996)'']]. Larry [[CiteRef::Laudan (1977a)]][[CiteRef::Laudan (1981a)]][[CiteRef::Laudan (1984a)]][[CiteRef::Laudan (1996)]] Laudan’s most notable contribution is to the idea that study of scientific methods change, representing a departure from the tradition is his ''reticulated model'' of scientific change where [[Thomas KuhnMethod|Kuhnianmethods]] “paradigms.” Laudan presents his reticulated model as an explanation for how methods can of theory evaluation change together with scientific [[Theory|theories]] and he goals of scientific inquiry in a piecemeal rational fashion. He later defended this his view from the criticisms made by notable colleagues like [[John Worrall]].|Historical Context=Prior to Laudan’s contribution to the discourse on scientific change, the Kuhnian tradition was the prevailing approach to the topic. In this preceding tradition, methods were seen as fixed to the paradigm in which they were utilized. Theories were also seemingly fixed to the paradigm in which they were discovered.|Major Contributions====Early Views===Laudan’s early views are best seen through his [[Laudan (1977a)|''Progress and its Problems (1977)'']] where he essentially attempted to explicate the one universal and unchangeable method of science, akin to the previous attempts by Popper, Lakatos, and others. The central tenet of the early-Laudan is the pragmatist idea that scientists prefer theories that solve more problems - empirical or conceptual. Similar to Lakatos, he accepts that scientific theories live and die in an ocean of anomalies and that there is no such thing as a decisive refutation of a theory by a counterexample. However, he disagrees with Popper and Lakatos on the question of novel predictions. While both Popper and Lakatos argued that a new theory is better than the old theory only if it has confirmed novel predictions (the so-called "excess corroborated empirical content"), Laudan holds that novel predictions are not given any epistemic advantage in the process of theory choice. According to Laudan, it is not a theory's ability to predict novel phenomena ''per se'' that gets the theory accepted, but its ability to solve more empirical or conceptual problems (one of which can be its ability to predict novel phenomena).[[CiteRef::Laudan (1977a)]]

== Historical Context =Later Views== <div class="mw-collapsible mw-collapsed"> Prior to Laudan’s contribution to In the discourse on scientific changeearly 1980s, the Kuhnian tradition was the prevailing approach Laudan comes to realize that there is no such thing as a universal and unchangeable method of science. One early indication of this transition is found in the topicdiscussion of [[Dudley Shapere]]'s [[Shapere (1980)|''The Character of Scientific Change (1980)'']]. In this preceding traditionthat paper, Shapere defended the idea that methods were seen of science change as fixed a result of changes in our theories about the world. In his comment on Shapere's paper, Laudan seems to appreciate that methods of science are changeable while still arguing that there must exist "persistent metacriteria for the paradigm choice of criteria".[[CiteRef::Shapere (1980)|p. 247]] However, in his [[Laudan (1984a)|''Science and Values (1984)'']], Laudan presents his '''reticulated model''' which they were utilizedis an attempt to explain how methods of science change in a rational fashion. Theories were also seemingly fixed At the time, this view was against the commonly held belief that some core methods of science remain unchangeable. This lead to the paradigm in which they were discoveredan important debate with [[John Worrall]] (see section [[#Criticism|Criticism]]).</div>

== Main Contributions In Laudan's reticulated model of scientific change, theories, methods, and aims of science are all changeable. One aspect of having changeable theories, methods, and aims is that many different cognitive goals will satisfy the model. Laudan believes this is possible because there are many different reasons or purposes for why someone would want to engage in scientific inquiry and because of this there must be many different goals for studying science. Another aspect of having multiple goals is that the Philosophy goals which meet the requirements of Science ==the model may be mutually incompatible. For instance, consider two scientists possessing different goals, Goal 1 and Goal 2. Goal 1 states that science is done to understand nature. Goal 2 states that science is done to prove nature doesn’t exist. Now Goal 2 is obviously rather extreme but Goal 2 suggests that nature is not real, where Goal 1 assumes natures existence. These two views are incompatible as they both strive to prove opposite claims. One cannot prove nature doesn’t exist if it is assumed nature does exist.

=== The model does not specify any way to determine which goal is the “right” one. Laudan suggests that “There is no single “right” goal for inquiry because it is evidently legitimate to engage in inquiry for a wide range of reasons and with a wide variety of purpose.” Furthermore the reticulated model allows for progress in science. Progress being, “a certain sequence of theories [that] move scientists closer to realizing or achieving a certain goal states.” As long as progress, relative to goals, occurs then it can be said to progressing. However, science does not have to progress. Laudan writes, “[…] there is nothing that compels us to make our judgments of the progressiveness of a theory choice depends upon our acquiescence in the aims of science held by those who forged that choice in the first place.” Laudan believed methods were changeable because they were dictated by the individual goals of those who were actually doing science, which are various. Implications that can be drawn from the ever changing goals of science are the apparent progressiveness of science is dependent on the Changeability value metric of Method ===the given scientific community in question.

==== Early views ==== Laudan’s early views are best seen through his work Progress and its Problems (1977) where he discusses science as a process of evolution that utilizes empirically verified evidence. According to Laudan, comparison of theories and concepts and finding the solutions to theories confronted with anomalies comprise a key part to the changing nature of science. ==== Later views ==== Laudan’s later views include his prescription to the changeability of methods. In his 1984 work Science and Values he describes his reticulated model, which serves as a demonstration of his belief that scientific methods change. He believed this because he viewed individual scientist’s goals as being a major contributing force to the formulation of scientific methods. This view was against the commonly held belief in the community that methods of science do not change. By 1988, his beliefs on method change became slightly less clear. In Scrutinizing Science: Empirical Studies of Scientific Change (1988), it appears as though he is defending a static method. Laudan was a co-author of a series of papers which stated belef in this static method, however, the view of unchanging methods is nonetheless present in this work. As such, one can draw two conclusions: either, he changed his view on dynamic methods or he merely did not object to the static method being assumed in the work. Judging by how closely his 1988 work is dated to Science and Values, it is in all likelihood the latter option. === Laudan on Scientific Rationality === ==== The Covariance Fallacy ==== The Covariance Fallacy can be found in Science and Values. It states that it, “[…] assumes that the presence or absence of consensus with respect to factual claims can be used to infer the existence of agreement or disagreement with respect to cognitive aims.”
Form 1: The first form of the Covariance Fallacy describes those differences between scientists beliefs that stem from the aims and goals of science. For example, in the Kuhnian tradition, each paradigm has its own metaphysics and cognitive standards. If two scientists disagree, it stands to reason that they are in different paradigms. Furthermore Laudan believes that it is possible for scientists to share cognitive goals but have fundamental disagreements about the nature of the universe.Form 2: The second form of the Covariance Fallacy is the assumption that simply because any given scientists agree on the factual evidence and methodologies, they also share the same cognitive goals.  ==== The Hierarchical Structure of Scientific Debates: A Model of Rational Consensus Formation ==== This model has three levels of disagreement: factual, methodological and axiological. Disagreements in the scientific community range from differences in why two scientists are studying a given scientific phenomena to what constitutes evidence of a theory. An example of a disagreement of the factual level can be found in 17th century Newtonian physics, in where Newton believed in the possible existence of a vacuum in contradiction to the prevailing view of plenism. There are also levels of resolution: Methodological for Factualfactual, Axiological axiological for Methodological methodological, and none for axiological. The axiological level is fixed. Resolution is the act of discovering which side of a disagreement is deemed correct by the scientific community. To resolve the disputes the community must look to the next level to see if the disputed claim can work in the higher level. Laudan posits that this is the structure for how scientists resolve disputes prior to his reticulated method.  ==== Goal Evaluation ====

=== Laudan's Reticulated Model in the VPI project=== The reticulated model of scientific change is a system where methodsParadoxically, in the famous VPI project that resulted in [[Donovan, Laudan, theories and aims of science are all changeableLaudan (Eds. One aspect of having changeable; theories) (1988)|''Scrutinizing Science (1988)'']], methods and aims is Laudan appears to be tacitly subscribing to the idea that many different cognitive goals will satisfy the model. Laudan believes this there is possible because there are many different reasons or purposes for why someone would want to engage in scientific inquiry after all a universal and because unchangeable method of this there must be many different goals for studying science. Another aspect While not openly articulated, this tacit premise underlies the whole exercise of having multiple goals is that the goals which meet trying to test different methodological dicta suggested by the requirements likes of the model may be mutually incompatible.  To demonstrate the incompatibility that two goals can have letPopper, Kuhn, consider two scientists possessing different goalsLakatos, Goal 1 and Goal 2Laudan himself against the historical record. Goal 1 states that science is done If not restricted to understand nature. Goal 2 states that science is done to prove nature doesn’t exist. Now Goal 2 is obviously rather extreme but Goal 2 suggests that nature is not realany particular community, time period, or discipline, where Goal 1 assumes natures existence. These two views are incompatible as they both strive to prove opposite claims. One cannot prove nature doesn’t exist such a testing would only make sense if it is assumed nature does exist.  The model does not specify any way to determine which goal is the “right” one. Laudan suggests that “There is no single “right” goal for inquiry because it is evidently legitimate to engage in inquiry for a wide range criteria of reasons and with a wide variety of purpose.” Furthermore theory assessment were the reticulated model allows for progress same in scienceall communities, all time periods, and all disciplines. Progress being, “a certain sequence of theories [that[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 18]] move scientists closer Since Laudan and other members of the VPI project didn't restrict themselves to realizing or achieving a certain goal states.” As long as progressspecific community, time period, relative to goalsor discipline, occurs then it can they tacitly assumed that the same method would be said to progressingemployed in all communities/time periods/disciplines. HoweverClearly, science does not have to progressthis goes against Laudan's own views stated a few years prior in his [[Laudan (1984a)|''Science and Values (1984)'']]. Laudan writesInterestingly, “in his famous debate with [[…John Worrall]] there is nothing that compels us in 1988-89, he returned to make our judgements of the progressiveness of a theory choice depends upon our acquiescence in the aims of science held by those who forged his 1984 position that choice in the first place.” Laudan believed methods were changeable because they were dictated by the individual goals of those who were actually doing science, which are variouschange through time (see section [[#Criticism|Criticism]]). Implications that can This mysterious inconsistency in Laudan's position remains to be drawn from the ever changing goals of science are the apparent progressiveness of science is dependent on the value metric of the given scientific community in questionexplained.  == Criticisms & New Directions =|Criticism=In 1988, [[John Worrall]] responded to Laudan’s [[Laudan (1984a)|''Science and Values'' ]] in a paper titled "[[Worrall (1988)|''The Value of a Fixed Methodology" (1988'']].) Worrall seeks to demonstrate how the reticulated model is incorrect by stating that when Laudan claims, methodological change to be real, he means only explicit methodological change there is realafter all a core unchangeable method of theory evaluation. Implicit methodology According to Worrall remains static. Worrall believed that, should methodological change truly be implicit, then the reticulated model could not provide an explanation for scientific change. If methodological change was purely explicit then it would not conflict with the hierarchical view and thus the reticulated model is not necessary.  In 1989 Laudan replies to Worrall’s criticism in "If it Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix it" (1989). Laudan points out that Worrall has conceded to the possibility 's alleged historical examples of changes occurring in “implicit methods” and that these changeable methods are all subject to bigger principles examples of science which are unchangeablechanges in explicitly stated methodologies. Implicit criteria that scientists actually employ in theory assessment, according to Worrall replies , remain static. Thus, according to Worrall Laudan in his "Fix 's reticulated fails as it and be Damned" (1989). Worrall claims tries to explain something that he and Laudan do not have a disagreement on the level of methods changing but they do at the methodological leveldoesn't really exist, i. Worrall believes that even if some of these beliefs can be changeable there are also ones that are unrevisablee. It is under changes in the purview of this fixed element that scientists can do science.  The idea that methods implicit method of science change but do so in a rational fashion is one of Laudan's lasting contributions. == Related Articles ==[[Karl Popper]] [[Thomas Kuhn]] [[Imre Lakatos]] [[Paul FeyerabendCiteRef::Worrall (1988)]]

Laudan replied to Worrall’s criticism in 1989 in his [[John Laudan (1989a)|''If it Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix it'']]. Laudan points out that Worrallhas conceded to the possibility of changes occurring in “implicit methods” and that these changeable methods are all subject to bigger principles of science which are unchangeable.[[CiteRef::Laudan (1989a)]]

== Notes ==Donovan, Arthur L., ed. Scrutinizing Science: Empirical Studies of Scientific Change. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988. Laudan, Larry. "If It AinWorrall't Broke, Don't Fix It." The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40, no. 3 s final reply came in his [[Worrall (1989)|''Fix it be Damned: 369-75. A Reply to Laudan, Larry'']]. Progress Worrall claims that he and its Problems: Toward Laudan do not have a Theory disagreement on the level of Scientific Growth. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977. Laudan, Larry. Science and Values: The Aims of Science and Their Role in Scientific Debatemethods changing but they do at the methodological level. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. Worrall, John. "The Value believes that even if some of a Fixed Methodthese beliefs can be changeable there are also ones that are unrevisable." The British Journal for It is under the Philosophy purview of Science 39, nothis fixed element that scientists can do science. 2 (1988)[[CiteRef:: 263-75. Worrall, John. "Fix It and Be Damned: A Reply to Laudan." The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 40, no. 3 (1989): 376-88. ]]

The changeability of methods is one of the lasting components of Laudan’s approach to scientific change.|Related Topics=Mechanism of Scientific Change, Mechanism of Method Employment, Mechanism of Theory Acceptance,|Page Status= Authors ==Needs EditingStephen Watt, 2015}}