Bureaucrats, Comment administrators, editor, Interface administrators, Administrators (Semantic MediaWiki), Curators (Semantic MediaWiki), Suppressors, Administrators, Widget editors
11,020
edits
Changes
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
m
|Major Contributions='''==Later Views===In the early 1980s, Laudan on comes to realize that there is no such thing as a universal and unchangeable method of science. One early indication of this transition is found in the Changeability discussion of Method[[Dudley Shapere]]'s [[Shapere (1980)|'' The Character of Scientific Change (1980)''Early views'' Laudan’s early views are best seen through his work]]. In that paper, Progress and its Problems (1977) where he discusses Shapere defended the idea that methods of science change as a process result of evolution changes in our theories about the world. In his comment on Shapere's paper, Laudan seems to appreciate that utilizes empirically verified evidencemethods of science are changeable while still arguing that there must exist "persistent metacriteria for the choice of criteria". According to [[CiteRef::Shapere (1980)|p. 247]] However, in his [[Laudan(1984a)|''Science and Values (1984)'']], comparison Laudan presents his '''reticulated model''' which is an attempt to explain how methods of theories and concepts and finding science change in a rational fashion. At the solutions to theories confronted with anomalies comprise a key part to time, this view was against the changing nature commonly held belief that some core methods of scienceremain unchangeable. This lead to an important debate with [[John Worrall]] (see section [[#Criticism|Criticism]]). ''Later views''
Laudan’s later views include his prescription to the changeability of methods. In his1984 work Science and Values he describes his Laudan's reticulated model, which serves as a demonstration of his belief that scientific methods change. He believed this because he viewed individual scientist’s goals as being a major contributing force to the formulation of scientific methods. This view was against the commonly held belief in the community that , theories, methods , and aims of science do not changeare all changeable. By 1988One aspect of having changeable theories, his beliefs on method change became slightly less clear. In Scrutinizing Science: Empirical Studies of Scientific Change (1988)methods, it appears as though he and aims is defending a static methodthat many different cognitive goals will satisfy the model. Laudan was a co-author believes this is possible because there are many different reasons or purposes for why someone would want to engage in scientific inquiry and because of a series this there must be many different goals for studying science. Another aspect of papers having multiple goals is that the goals which stated belef in this static method, however, meet the view requirements of unchanging methods is nonetheless present in this workthe model may be mutually incompatible. As suchFor instance, one can draw consider two conclusions: eitherscientists possessing different goals, he changed his view on dynamic methods or he merely did not object Goal 1 and Goal 2. Goal 1 states that science is done to the static method being assumed in the workunderstand nature. Judging by how closely his 1988 work Goal 2 states that science is dated done to Science and Valuesprove nature doesn’t exist. Now Goal 2 is obviously rather extreme but Goal 2 suggests that nature is not real, where Goal 1 assumes natures existence. These two views are incompatible as they both strive to prove opposite claims. One cannot prove nature doesn’t exist if it is in all likelihood the latter optionassumed nature does exist.
'''The model does not specify any way to determine which goal is the “right” one. Laudan suggests that “There is no single “right” goal for inquiry because it is evidently legitimate to engage in inquiry for a wide range of reasons and with a wide variety of purpose.” Furthermore the reticulated model allows for progress in science. Progress being, “a certain sequence of theories [that] move scientists closer to realizing or achieving a certain goal states.” As long as progress, relative to goals, occurs then it can be said to progressing. However, science does not have to progress. Laudan writes, “[…] there is nothing that compels us to make our judgments of the progressiveness of a theory choice depends upon our acquiescence in the aims of science held by those who forged that choice in the first place.” Laudan believed methods were changeable because they were dictated by the individual goals of those who were actually doing science, which are various. Implications that can be drawn from the ever changing goals of science are the apparent progressiveness of science is dependent on Scientific Rationality'''the value metric of the given scientific community in question.
''The Covariance Fallacy'' The Covariance Fallacy can be found in Science and Values. It states that it, “[…] assumes that the presence or absence of consensus with respect to factual claims can be used to infer the existence of agreement or disagreement with respect to cognitive aims.”
Form 1: The first form of the Covariance Fallacy describes those differences between scientists beliefs that stem from the aims and goals of science. For example, in the Kuhnian tradition, each paradigm has its own metaphysics and cognitive standards. If two scientists disagree, it stands to reason that they are in different paradigms. Furthermore Laudan believes that it is possible for scientists to share cognitive goals but have fundamental disagreements about the nature of the universe.Form 2: The second form of the Covariance Fallacy is the assumption that simply because any given scientists agree on the factual evidence and methodologies, they also share the same cognitive goals. ''The Hierarchical Structure of Scientific Debates: A Model of Rational Consensus Formation'' This model has three levels of disagreement: factual, methodological and axiological. Disagreements in the scientific community range from differences in why two scientists are studying a given scientific phenomena to what constitutes evidence of a theory. An example of a disagreement of the factual level can be found in 17th century Newtonian physics, in where Newton believed in the possible existence of a vacuum in contradiction to the prevailing view of plenism. There are also levels of resolution: Methodological for Factualfactual, Axiological axiological for Methodological methodological, and none for axiological. The axiological level is fixed. Resolution is the act of discovering which side of a disagreement is deemed correct by the scientific community. To resolve the disputes the community must look to the next level to see if the disputed claim can work in the higher level. Laudan posits that this is the structure for how scientists resolve disputes prior to his reticulated method. ''Goal Evaluation''
The reticulated model of scientific change is a system where methods, theories and aims of science are all changeable. One aspect of having changeable; theories, methods and aims is that many different cognitive goals will satisfy the model. Laudan believes this is possible because there are many different reasons or purposes for why someone would want replied to engage Worrall’s criticism in 1989 in scientific inquiry and because of this there must be many different goals for studying science. Another aspect of having multiple goals is that the goals which meet the requirements of the model may be mutually incompatible. To demonstrate the incompatibility that two goals can have let, consider two scientists possessing different goals, Goal 1 and Goal 2. Goal 1 states that science is done to understand nature. Goal 2 states that science is done to prove nature doesn’t exist. Now Goal 2 is obviously rather extreme but Goal 2 suggests that nature is not real, where Goal 1 assumes natures existence. These two views are incompatible as they both strive to prove opposite claims. One cannot prove nature doesn’t exist if it is assumed nature does exist. The model does not specify any way to determine which goal is the “right” one. his [[Laudan suggests that “There is no single “right” goal for inquiry because (1989a)|''If it is evidently legitimate to engage in inquiry for a wide range of reasons and with a wide variety of purpose.” Furthermore the reticulated model allows for progress in science. Progress beingAin’t Broke, “a certain sequence of theories [thatDon’t Fix it'']] move scientists closer to realizing or achieving a certain goal states.” As long as progress, relative to goals, occurs then it can be said to progressing. However, science does not have to progress. Laudan writes, “[…] there is nothing points out that compels us Worrall has conceded to make our judgements of the progressiveness possibility of a theory choice depends upon our acquiescence changes occurring in the aims of science held by those who forged “implicit methods” and that choice in the first place.” Laudan believed these changeable methods were changeable because they were dictated by the individual goals are all subject to bigger principles of those who were actually doing science, which are various. Implications that can be drawn from the ever changing goals of science are the apparent progressiveness of science is dependent on the value metric of the given scientific community in questionunchangeable. [[CiteRef::Laudan (1989a)]]
|Criticism=In 1988 John Worrall responded to Laudan’s Science and Values 's final reply came in a work titled The Value of Fixed Methodology (1988.) his [[Worrall seeks to demonstrate how the reticulated model is incorrect by stating that when Laudan claims, methodological change to be real, he means only explicit methodological change is real. Implicit methodology to Worrall remains static. Worrall believed that, should methodological change truly be implicit, then the reticulated model could not provide an explanation for scientific change. If methodological change was purely explicit then it would not conflict with the hierarchical view and thus the reticulated model is not necessary. In 1989 Laudan replies to Worrall’s criticism in If it Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix it (1989). Laudan points out that Worrall has conceded to the possibility of changes occurring in “implicit methods” and that these changeable methods are all subject to bigger principles of science which are unchangeable.Worrall replies to Laudan in his |''Fix it be Damned: A Reply to Laudan (1989)'']]. Worrall claims that he and Laudan do not have a disagreement on the level of methods changing but they do at the methodological level. Worrall believes that even if some of these beliefs can be changeable there are also ones that are unrevisable. It is under the purview of this fixed element that scientists can do science. [[CiteRef::Worrall (1989)]]
TODO: Add these resources ass proper Bibliographic RecordsDonovan, Arthur L., ed. Scrutinizing Science: Empirical Studies |Related Topics=Mechanism of Scientific Change. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988. Laudan, Larry. "If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It." The British Journal for the Philosophy Mechanism of Science 40, no. 3 (1989): 369-75. Laudan, Larry. Progress and its Problems: Toward a Theory of Scientific Growth. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977. Laudan, Larry. Science and Values: The Aims of Science and Their Role in Scientific Debate. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. Worrall, John. "The Value of a Fixed Method." The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39, no. 2 (1988): 263-75. WorrallEmployment, John. "Fix It and Be Damned: A Reply to Laudan." The British Journal for the Philosophy Mechanism of Science 40Theory Acceptance, no. 3 (1989): 376-88. |Related TopicsPage Status=Needs Editing
no edit summary
|First Name=Larry
|Last Name=Laudan
|SummaryDOB Era=CE|DOB Year=1941|DOB Month=October|DOB Day=16|DOB Approximate=No|DOD Approximate=No|Brief='''Larry Laudan''' is an American philosopher of science who greatly shaped the debates in the field from the late 1970s till the mid 1990s. He |Summary=Laudan wrote many works , notably, [[Laudan (1977a)|''Progress and its Problems (1977)'']], [[Laudan (1981a)|''Science and Hypothesis (1981) '']], and importantly [[Laudan (1984a)|''Science and Values (1984)'']] and [[Laudan (1996)|''Beyond Positivism and Relativism (1996)'']]. Larry [[CiteRef::Laudan (1977a)]][[CiteRef::Laudan (1981a)]][[CiteRef::Laudan (1984a)]][[CiteRef::Laudan (1996)]] Laudan’s most notable contribution is to the idea that study of scientific methods change, representing a departure from the tradition of Kuhnian “paradigms.” Laudan presents is his ''reticulated model as an explanation for how '' of scientific change where [[Method|methods can ]] of theory evaluation change together with scientific [[Theory|theories]] and he goals of scientific inquiry in a piecemeal rational fashion. He later defended this his view from the criticisms made by notable colleagues like [[John Worrall]].
|Historical Context=Prior to Laudan’s contribution to the discourse on scientific change, the Kuhnian tradition was the prevailing approach to the topic. In this preceding tradition, methods were seen as fixed to the paradigm in which they were utilized. Theories were also seemingly fixed to the paradigm in which they were discovered.
|Major Contributions====Early Views===
Laudan’s early views are best seen through his [[Laudan (1977a)|''Progress and its Problems (1977)'']] where he essentially attempted to explicate the one universal and unchangeable method of science, akin to the previous attempts by Popper, Lakatos, and others. The central tenet of the early-Laudan is the pragmatist idea that scientists prefer theories that solve more problems - empirical or conceptual. Similar to Lakatos, he accepts that scientific theories live and die in an ocean of anomalies and that there is no such thing as a decisive refutation of a theory by a counterexample. However, he disagrees with Popper and Lakatos on the question of novel predictions. While both Popper and Lakatos argued that a new theory is better than the old theory only if it has confirmed novel predictions (the so-called "excess corroborated empirical content"), Laudan holds that novel predictions are not given any epistemic advantage in the process of theory choice. According to Laudan, it is not a theory's ability to predict novel phenomena ''per se'' that gets the theory accepted, but its ability to solve more empirical or conceptual problems (one of which can be its ability to predict novel phenomena).[[CiteRef::Laudan (1977a)]]
Laudan’s first distinct reason for refuting a goal is that the goal is seen as being utopian and unrealizable. He gives three types of utopianism: demonstrable utopianism, semantic utopianism, and epistemic utopianism.
Laudan’s second reason for refuting a goal is when it is not congruent with its implicit and explicit components. This discontinuity can result when a person creating a theory fails to recognize certain consequences of the theory. As such, what is assumed to be his goal is actually an unrecognized consequence. Laudan elaborates, “Since virtually any action has indefinitely many consequences…[t]here is always some doubt about which, if any, of these consequences were the one the agent intended to bring about and which were in effect, just incidental or inadvertent side effects of his actions.” The fact that an agent can be unaware of unseen goals is further compounded by the fact that in some cases the agent is simply unaware of what their goals are, or they may seek to hide their goals from the community.
===Laudan in the VPI project===Paradoxically, in the famous VPI project that resulted in [[Donovan, Laudan, and Laudan (Eds.) (1988)|''Scrutinizing Science (1988)'']], Laudan appears to be tacitly subscribing to the idea that there is after all a universal and unchangeable method of science. While not openly articulated, this tacit premise underlies the whole exercise of trying to test different methodological dicta suggested by the likes of Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, and Laudan himself against the historical record. If not restricted to any particular community, time period, or discipline, such a testing would only make sense if the criteria of theory assessment were the same in all communities, all time periods, and all disciplines.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 18]] Since Laudan and other members of the VPI project didn't restrict themselves to a specific community, time period, or discipline, they tacitly assumed that the same method would be employed in all communities/time periods/disciplines. Clearly, this goes against Laudan's Reticulated Modelown views stated a few years prior in his [[Laudan (1984a)|''Science and Values (1984)'']]. Interestingly, in his famous debate with [[John Worrall]] in 1988-89, he returned to his 1984 position that methods of science change through time (see section [[#Criticism|Criticism]]). This mysterious inconsistency in Laudan's position remains to be explained.|Criticism=In 1988, John Worrall responded to Laudan’s [[Laudan (1984a)|''Science and Values'']] in a paper titled [[Worrall (1988)|''The Value of a Fixed Methodology'']]. Worrall seeks to demonstrate how the reticulated model is incorrect by stating that there is after all a core unchangeable method of theory evaluation. According to Worrall, Laudan's alleged historical examples of changes in methods are all examples of changes in explicitly stated methodologies. Implicit criteria that scientists actually employ in theory assessment, according to Worrall, remain static. Thus, according to Worrall Laudan's reticulated fails as it tries to explain something that doesn't really exist, i.e. changes in the implicit method of science.[[CiteRef::Worrall (1988)]]
The changeability of methods is one of the lasting components of Laudan’s approach to scientific change.
}}
