Changes

|Description=There have been many cases in the history of science when one [[Scientific Community|community ,]] with a single [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]] divided into two or more communities, with different mosaics. These distinct communities would then have differ regarding at least one of their own distinct theories and methods. For example, consider the case outlined by [[Hakob BarseghyanTheory Acceptance|Barseghyanaccepted theories]]or [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)Employed Method|employed methods]]^p.203 For example, consider the case of the two scientific distinct mosaics that existed among the communities of French and English physicists natural philosophers in the early part of the 18th century, wherein the . The former accepted the a version of Cartesian physics and theory while the latter accepted a version of Newtonian physicstheory. [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 203]] We can see by various indicators[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp.113-120]] that the dispute between these two communities was not a simple matter of scientific disagreement within a community such as we might observe in , like the contemporary dispute between various interpretations of quantum mechanics. The In the case of quantum mechanics, even those who advocate alternatives acknowledge that the Copenhagen Interpretation is generally regarded as the currently accepted view .[[CiteRef::Faye (2014)]] but a number of other alternatives are advocated by various individuals within the field. As [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 202]] notes on page 202 it this is a perfectly acceptable situation so long as the individuals acknowledge that the ''accepted'' theory is that the Copenhagen Interpretation is accepted as the best description of its object. A Such contender theory might be theories are said to be [[Theory Pursuit|pursued]] but this is perfectly consistent with our present understanding of scientific change.  What makes the situation in the case of the 18th century French and English mosaics distinct communities different is that the communities regarded the two accepted different theories (Cartesian and Newtonian physics as the best description of their objects (see [[Theory Acceptance]]natural philosophies, respectively). In this such a case we are justified as regarded to regard these as two distinct epistemic communities which , each bears bearing its own mosaic. Understanding the mechanism by which how and why this sort of situation occurs situations arise is among the goals of a general descriptive theory of scientific changean important task.

|Prehistory=Traditionally the topic of why communities of scientists accept different theories has been an enigma for historians and philosophers of science, although the problem has been known about for some time. In the ''Categories'' for example, Aristotle grappled with the question of false belief and how false beliefs came to be acquired, and the significance of the question for science and epistemology.[[CiteRef::Miller (2013)|pp.289-290]] While it is true that Here we are no longer so interested in not concerned with judging the truth or falsity of beliefs, but rather with the question of how ''falsedivergent'' beliefs but are instead interested arise in epistemic communities. Pre-Kuhnian philosophers' typical response to divergent community beliefs has largely depended on their views of scientific change more generally. An example of this is the question work of [[Karl Popper]]. Popper regarded scientific change as being a process of conjectures and refutations, "of boldly proposing theories; of trying our best to show that these are erroneous; and of accepting them tentatively if our critical efforts are unsuccessful".[[CiteRef::Popper (1963)|p. 68]] Thus, Popper''divergent'' s approach suggested that any difference in the beliefs of certain communities could be chalked up to differences either in available knowledge (whether a conjecture had been refuted) or a difference in experimental methods (whether the central question same criteria were being applied in refutations). More generally, differences between philosophers of science during this period in their beliefs about how different science changes coloured their views about what factors (or mistakes) present in difference communities were relevant to divergent scientific beliefs arise . This form of thinking with regards to differences in assessment of scientific theories - if not the exact formulation it takes - was generally held by "positivists" or "logical empiricists" and accepted until the historical turn in epistemic communities remains the same1960s.[[CiteRef::Laudan, Laudan, and Donovan (1988)|p.4]]

Pre-Kuhnian philosophersIt was not until after [[Thomas Kuhn|Thomas Kuhn's]] publication of his 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions' typical response to that the consensus about divergent community beliefs has largely depended on their views of scientific change more generallywas challenged. An example of this is the work of [[Karl PopperCiteRef::Bird (2008)]]. Popper regarded Kuhn's "revolutionary" approach to scientific change radically diverged from his predecessors. On this view science has periods of ''normal science'' wherein the prevailing dogmas and core theories (the ''paradigm'') are unquestioned and science proceeds as being a process of conjectures and refutations, "puzzle solving. This can be interrupted by a ''crisis'' in which mounting anomalies cause scientists to question the theoretical foundations of boldly proposing theoriesthe paradigm.[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962a)]] Crises may have no impact on normal science or they may result in a ''revolution''; which is what Kuhn calls "the emergence of trying our best to show that these are erroneous; a new candidate for paradigm and of accepting them tentatively if our critical efforts are unsuccessfulwith the ensuing battle over its acceptance"."[[CiteRef::Popper Kuhn (19631962a)|p.6884]] ThusThe present question of how divergent beliefs arise within communities fits nicely into this framework - a unified community starts by doing normal science, any difference anomalies emerge within the paradigm, and a revolution occurs which splits the community. Subsequent work by philosophers in the beliefs field of certain communities could scientific change would be chalked up to differences either in available knowledge (whether a conjecture had been refuted) or a difference in experimental methods (whether coloured by the same criteria were being applied in refutations). This form kind of analysis of thinking with regards to differences the historical record that shaped Kuhn's view of thought on scientific theories - if not the exact formulation it takes - was generally held subject, including the work done by "positivists" or "logical empiricists" [[Imre Lakatos]], [[Paul Feyerabend]], and accepted until the historical turn in the 1960s[[Larry Laudan]].[[CiteRef::Laudan, Laudan, and Donovan (1988)|p.45]]

It was with One other approach to divergent community beliefs that deserves mention is the emergence approach taken by the social sciences, namely the sociology of Thomas Kuhn's ''Structures scientific knowledge (SSK) advanced principally by [[David Bloor]].[[CiteRef::Bloor (1976)]] SSK regards scientific activity as a kind human social activity and as such and area that falls under the purview of Scientific Revolutions'' in the 1960s that the consensus about divergent beliefs was challengedsocial sciences.[[CiteRef::Bird Longino (20082015)]]As such, any divergence in community beliefs is the result of and explainable by sociological factors that contribute to belief formation.