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{{Topic
|QuestionSubject=How do theories become ''accepted'' into a mosaic?Theory Acceptance
|Topic Type=Descriptive
|Subfield=Dynamics|Inherited From=|Heritable=No|Question Text Formula=|Question Title Formula=|Question=How do [[Theory|theories]] become [[Theory Acceptance|accepted]] into a mosaic?|Question Title=|Predicate=|Object Type=Text|Object Value True=|Object Value False=|Object Class=|Object Enum Values=|Object Regexp=|Single Answer Text Formula=|Multiple Answers Text Formula=|Answer Title Formula=|Description=The question of theory acceptance is one of the central problems of theoretical [[Scientonomy|scientonomy]]. Any scientonomic theory should explain how theories become part of a mosaic. Initially, when philosophy had a static conception of science, this question did not exist. However, as science progressed, it soon became It is clear that science epistemic agents replaces its their theories with theories that it they considers superior, and it does they do this on a continuous regular basis. At this pointThus, the question is ''how science accepts '' epistemic agents accept theories became a .|Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan|Formulated Year=2015|Prehistory=This question has been one of the central question for topics of the philosophy of science. Answering Initially, philosophy held a static conception of science. [[Immanuel Kant]] believed that the axioms of Newtonian mechanics were ''a priori'' synthetic propositions. [[CiteRef::Kant (1781)]] Philosophers believed in a static conception of science because no scientific revolution had been experienced since the advent of modern science. While Scientonomy recognizes the transition from the Aristotelian-Medieval method to the Newtonian world view as a scientific revolution, this question was not the case historically. The scientific revolutions in the early twentieth century caused philosophers of science to wonder how science accepts its theories. In his [[Popper (1959)|''Logic of Scientific Discovery'']], [[Karl Popper]] argued that old theories are replaced by new theories when an old theory is falsified and a new theory is not trivialcorroborated in by experimental evidence. This occurs when an experiment successfully tests a bold conjecture made by the new theory.[[CiteRef::Popper (1959)]]  A major development occurred when [[Thomas Kuhn]] presented his groundbreaking analysis of scientific change in [[Kuhn (1962a)|''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'']] According to Kuhn, because all periods of 'normal science' are interrupted by 'scientific revolutions' that involve paradigm shifts. In a paradigm shift involves a fundamental change in world view for the relevant scientific communities. In his conception of theory change, the obvious answersold and new theories are incommensurable.[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962a)]] While Kuhn's ideas stirred much controversy, such they were generally recognized as verisimilitude and best fit highly important. In his [[Lakatos (1978a)|''Methodology of Scientific Research Programs'']], [[Imre Lakatos]] advocated a less cataclysmic view of scientific change. In a refinement of Popper's views, he believed that theories are not necessarily falsified by failed predictions. Rather, a theory's fate depends on its centrality in an overarching research program. The more central a theory is to its research program, the more effort will be extended towards saving it by modifying the research program's auxiliary hypotheses. [[CiteRef::Lakatos (1978a)]] [[Paul Feyerabend]] argued in [[Feyerabend (1975a)|''Against Method'']] that the datamethods of theory acceptance change over time in science, all come with philosophical problemsand that these changes are largely arbitrary. [[Dudley Shapere]] agreed that scientific methods change over time. In [[Shapere (1980)| ''The difficulty Character of solving Scientific Change'']], Shapere argued that the scientific methods used at the problem was compounded when it was realized time are affected by the beliefs that the scientific community holds.[[CiteRef::Feyerabend (1975a)]][[CiteRef::Shapere (1980)]] [[Larry Laudan]] agreed. In [[Laudan (1984a)|''Science and Values'']], Laudan argues that the methods by which that scientific theories are accepted changes over timedepend on the epistemic values that scientists hold. He recounted how knowledge of experimenter's bias and the placebo effect led to the development of the double blind method in drug testing. Laudan's ideas are important precursors to Scientonomy. [[CiteRef::Laudan (1984a)]][[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)]]
One historical example In contrast, the strong program of the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK), including sociologists like [[Barry Barnes]] and [[David Bloor]] seek to explain science as a sociological phenomenon and sometimes stress the role played by non-empirical social values in scientific change.|History=The original formulation of the second law was proposed by [[Hakob Barseghyan|Barseghyan]] in [[Barseghyan (2015)|''The Laws of Scientific Change'']].[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 129-132]] However, subsequent [[Scientonomy Seminar|seminar]] discussions revealed the law's two major flaws. First, it didn't clearly indicate what happened to a theory when a certain [[Theory Assessment Outcomes|assessment outcome]] obtained. Specifically, it didn't link theory assessment outcomes to the theory's acceptance or unacceptance. Secondly, the law sounded like a tautology which is not what a good law should sound like.[[CiteRef::Patton, Overgaard, and Barseghyan (2017)]]  Consequently, in 2017, [[The Second Law (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017)|a new formulation]] of the law was when heliocentrism replaced Ptolemaic Astronomysuggested by [[Paul Patton|Patton]], [[Nicholas Overgaard|Overgaard]], and Barseghyan, which [[Modification:Sciento-2017-0004|became accepted]] towards the end of that year, thus, replacing the initial formulation. Another example was when [[CiteRef::Patton, Overgaard, and Barseghyan (2017)]] The reformulated second law also clearly indicated the General possibility of [[Theory Assessment Outcomes (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017)|an inconclusive outcome]] of theory assessment, as opposed to sneaking the idea of Relativity replaced inconclusiveness from the Classical Mechanics initially developed by Isaac Newtonback door when dealing with the phenomenon of mosaic split.[[CiteRef::Patton, Overgaard, and Barseghyan (2017)]]|Current View=
|Parent Topic=Mechanism of Scientific Change
|Authors ListRelated Topics=Hakob BarseghyanMechanism of Method Employment,Mechanism of Theory Rejection|Formulated YearSorting Order=2015200|PrehistoryPage Status=This question has been one of the central questions of the classic philosophy of science. It wouldn't be too much of an exaggeration to say that no philosopher of science could bypass this issue. Editor Approved|Editor Notes=|Order=1}}{{YouTube Video|VideoID=mWciydFqP_E|VideoStartAt=1443Initially, philosophy held a static conception of science. [[Immanuel Kant]] [[Kant_(1781)#_SCITEa80372857ad2020366e6129a3f86ebdc|believed]] that the axioms of Newtonian Mechanics were a priori synthetic propositions.VideoDescription=The second law explained by Gregory Rupik|Related TopicsVideoEmbedSection=Mechanism of Method Employment,History
}}
{{Acceptance Record
|Community=Community:Scientonomy
|Accepted From Era=CE
|Accepted From Year=2016
|Accepted From Month=January
|Acceptance Indicators=This is when the community accepted its first answer to this question, [[The Second Law (Barseghyan-2015)]], which indicates that the question is itself considered legitimate.
|Still Accepted=Yes
|Accepted Until Era=
|Accepted Until Year=
|Accepted Until Month=
|Accepted Until Day=
|Accepted Until Approximate=No
|Rejection Indicators=
}}

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