Changes

|QuestionSubject=How do theories become ''accepted'' into a mosaic?Theory Acceptance

|Subfield=Dynamics|Inherited From=|Heritable=No|Question Text Formula=|Question Title Formula=|Question=How do [[Theory|theories]] become [[Theory Acceptance|accepted]] into a mosaic?|Question Title=|Predicate=|Object Type=Text|Object Value True=|Object Value False=|Object Class=|Object Enum Values=|Object Regexp=|Single Answer Text Formula=|Multiple Answers Text Formula=|Answer Title Formula=|Description=The question of theory acceptance is one of the central problems of theoretical [[Scientonomy|scientonomy]]. Any scientonomic theory should explain how theories become part of a mosaic. Initially, when philosophy had a static conception of science, this question did not exist. However, as science progressed, it soon became It is clear that science epistemic agents replaces its their theories with theories that it they considers superior, and it does they do this on a continuous regular basis. At this pointThus, how science accepts theories became a central question for the philosophy of science. Answering this question is not trivial, because all of the obvious answers, such as verisimilitude and best fit to the data, all come with philosophical problems. The difficulty of solving the problem was compounded when it was realized that the methods by which ''how'' epistemic agents accept theories are accepted changes over time.  One historical example of theory acceptance was when heliocentrism replaced Ptolemaic Astronomy. Another example was when the General Theory of Relativity replaced the Classical Mechanics initially developed by Isaac Newton.|Parent Topic=Mechanism of Scientific Change|Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan,

|Prehistory=This question has been one of the central questions topics of the classic philosophy of science. It wouldnInitially, philosophy held a static conception of science. [[Immanuel Kant]] believed that the axioms of Newtonian mechanics were 't be too much 'a priori'' synthetic propositions. [[CiteRef::Kant (1781)]] Philosophers believed in a static conception of an exaggeration to say that science because no philosopher scientific revolution had been experienced since the advent of modern science could bypass . While Scientonomy recognizes the transition from the Aristotelian-Medieval method to the Newtonian world view as a scientific revolution, this issuewas not the case historically.

Initially, philosophy held a static conception The scientific revolutions in the early twentieth century caused philosophers of scienceto wonder how science accepts its theories. In his [[Immanuel KantPopper (1959)|''Logic of Scientific Discovery'']] believed , [[Karl Popper]] argued that the axioms of Newtonian Mechanics were old theories are replaced by new theories when an old theory is falsified and a priori synthetic propositions. Philosophy believed new theory is corroborated in a static conception of science because no scientific revolution had been experienced since the advent of modern scienceby experimental evidence. While Scientonomy recognizes the transition from the Aristotilian-Medieval method to the Newtonian world view as This occurs when an experiment successfully tests a scientific revolution, this was not bold conjecture made by the case historicallynew theory.[[CiteRef::Kant Popper (17811959)]]

The A major development occurred when [[Thomas Kuhn]] presented his groundbreaking analysis of scientific revolutions change in the early twentieth century caused philosophers of science to being asking the question of how science accepts its theories. In his [[Popper Kuhn (19591962a)|''Logic The Structure of Scientific DiscoveryRevolutions'']]According to Kuhn, [[Karl Popper]] argued that old theories periods of 'normal science' are replaced interrupted by new theories when an old theory is falsified and 'scientific revolutions' that involve paradigm shifts. In a paradigm shift involves a new theory corroborated fundamental change in a crucial experimentworld view for the relevant scientific communities. This occurs in a crucial experiment that successfully tests a bold conjecture made by In his conception of theory change, the old and new theorytheories are incommensurable.[[CiteRef::Popper Kuhn (19591962a)]] While Kuhn's ideas stirred much controversy, they were generally recognized as highly important.

The importance In his [[Lakatos (1978a)|''Methodology of novel predictions in theory acceptance was also stressed by Scientific Research Programs'']], [[Imre Lakatos]]advocated a less cataclysmic view of scientific change. HoweverIn a refinement of Popper's views, he believed that theories are not necessarily falsified by bad failed predictions. Rather, a theory's fate depends on its place centrality in the an overarching research program. The more central a theory is to its research program, the more effort will be extended towards saving it can be saved by modifying the research program's auxiliary hypotheses. [[CiteRef::Lakatos (1978a)]]

The next significant development occurred when [[Thomas KuhnPaul Feyerabend]] suggested argued in [[Kuhn_Feyerabend (19621975a)|''Against Method'']] that the methods of theory acceptance change over time in science, and that these changes are paradigm shifts, where the world view of the entire largely arbitrary. [[Dudley Shapere]] agreed that scientific community changesmethods change over time. In his conception [[Shapere (1980)| ''The Character of theory changeScientific Change'']], Shapere argued that the scientific methods used at the old and new theories time are incommensurableaffected by the beliefs that the scientific community holds.[[CiteRef::Kuhn_Feyerabend (1975a)]][[CiteRef::Shapere (19621980)]]

[[Paul FeyerabendLarry Laudan]] argued in agreed. In [[Feyerabend_Laudan (1975a1984a)#_SCITE461b06a68d155a4ce7ad07ce0c937f01|Against Method''Science and Values'']] , Laudan argues that the methods that scientific theories are accepted depend on the epistemic values that scientists hold. He recounted how knowledge of experimenter's bias and the placebo effect led to the development of theory acceptance change over time the double blind method in sciencedrug testing. He argued that these changes were largely arbitraryLaudan's ideas are important precursors to Scientonomy. [[Dudley ShapereCiteRef::Laudan (1984a)]] agreed that scientific methods change over time. In [[Shapere_CiteRef::Barseghyan (19802015)#_SCITE8839fcd96a6f811c37c5f89c08f3d56d|The Character of Scientific Change]], Shapere argued that the scientific methods used at the time are affected by the beliefs the scientific community holds.

In contrast, the strong program of the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK), including sociologists like [[Larry LaudanBarry Barnes]] and [[David Bloor]] seek to explain science as a sociological phenomenon and sometimes stress the role played by non-empirical social values in scientific change.|History=The original formulation of the second law was proposed by [[Hakob Barseghyan|Barseghyan]] in [[Barseghyan (2015)|''The Laws of Scientific Change'']] also agreed. In [[Laudan_CiteRef::Barseghyan (19842015)#_SCITE4831d06ea2d0bc389f667bbe83339636|Science and Valuespp. 129-132]]However, Laudan argues that subsequent [[Scientonomy Seminar|seminar]] discussions revealed the methods that scientific theories are accepted depend on the values that scientists havelaw's two major flaws. First, it didn't clearly indicate what happened to a theory when a certain [[Theory Assessment Outcomes|assessment outcome]] obtained. He recounted how knowledge of experimenters bias and the placebo effect led Specifically, it didn't link theory assessment outcomes to the development of the double blind method in drug testingtheory's acceptance or unacceptance. many of Secondly, the ideas promoted by Laudan are important precursors to Scientonomylaw sounded like a tautology which is not what a good law should sound like.[[CiteRef::Patton, Overgaard, and Barseghyan (2017)]]

In contrast the Sociologist of Scientific Knowledge Consequently, in 2017, [[The Second Law (SSKPatton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017) research program|a new formulation]] of the law was suggested by [[Paul Patton|Patton]], including sociologists like [[Barry BarnesNicholas Overgaard|Overgaard]] , and Barseghyan, which [[David BloorModification:Sciento-2017-0004|became accepted]] believe towards the end of that scientists are motivated year, thus, replacing the initial formulation.[[CiteRef::Patton, Overgaard, and Barseghyan (2017)]] The reformulated second law also clearly indicated the possibility of [[Theory Assessment Outcomes (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017)|an inconclusive outcome]] of theory assessment, as opposed to a large extent by non-empirical social valuessneaking the idea of inconclusiveness from the back door when dealing with the phenomenon of mosaic split.[[CiteRef::Patton, Overgaard, and Barseghyan (2017)]]|Current View=|Parent Topic=Mechanism of Scientific Change|Related Topics=Mechanism of Method Employment,Mechanism of Theory Rejection|Sorting Order=200|Page Status=Editor Approved|Editor Notes=|Order=1}}{{YouTube Video|VideoID=mWciydFqP_E|VideoStartAt=1443|VideoDescription=The second law explained by Gregory Rupik|VideoEmbedSection=History

|Accepted From Era=CE