Changes

|QuestionSubject=How do theories become ''accepted'' into a mosaic?Theory Acceptance

|Subfield=Dynamics|Inherited From=|Heritable=No|Question Text Formula=|Question Title Formula=|Question=How do [[Theory|theories]] become [[Theory Acceptance|accepted]] into a mosaic?|Question Title=|Predicate=|Object Type=Text|Object Value True=|Object Value False=|Object Class=|Object Enum Values=|Object Regexp=|Single Answer Text Formula=|Multiple Answers Text Formula=|Answer Title Formula=|Description=The question of theory acceptance is one of the central problems of theoretical [[Scientonomy|scientonomy]]. Any scientonomic theory should explain how theories become part of a mosaic. Initially, when philosophy had a static conception of science, this question did not exist. However, as science progressed, it soon became It is clear that science epistemic agents replaces its their theories with theories that it they considers superior, and it does they do this on a continuous regular basis. At this pointThus, how science accepts theories became a central question for the philosophy of science. Answering this question is not trivial, because all of the obvious answers, such as verisimilitude and best fit to the data, all come with philosophical problems. The difficulty of solving the problem was compounded when it was realized that the methods by which theories are accepted changes over time.  One historical example of theory acceptance was the acceptance of Copernican heliocentrism, which involved the rejection of Aristotelian-Ptolemaic astronomy. Another example was when Einstein's general theory of relativity replaced [[Issac Newton| Newton's]] theory of universal gravitationhow'' epistemic agents accept theories.|Parent Topic=Mechanism of Scientific Change|Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan,

|Prehistory=This question has been one of the central questions topics of the classic philosophy of science, that no philosopher of science could bypass. Initially, philosophy held a static conception of science. [[Immanuel Kant]] believed that the axioms of Newtonian mechanics were ''a priori '' synthetic propositions. [[CiteRef::Kant (1781)]] Philosophers believed in a static conception of science because no scientific revolution had been experienced since the advent of modern science. While Scientonomy recognizes the transition from the Aristotelian-Medieval method to the Newtonian world view as a scientific revolution, this was not the case historically.

A major development occurred when [[Thomas Kuhn]] presented his groundbreaking analysis of scientific change in [[Kuhn_Kuhn (19621962a)| ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'']] According to Kuhn, periods of 'normal science' are interrupted by 'scientific revolutions' that involve paradigm shifts. In a paradigm shift involves a fundamental change in world view for the relevant scientific communities. In his conception of theory change, the old and new theories are incommensurable.[[CiteRef::Kuhn (19621962a)]] While Kuhn's ideas stirred much controversy, they were generally recognized as highly important.

In his [[Lakatos (1978a)|''Methodology of Scientific Research Programs'']],[[Imre Lakatos]] advocated a less cataclysmic view of scientific change. In a refinement of Popper's views, he believed that theories are not necessarily falsified by failed predictions. Rather, a theory's fate depends on its centrality in an overarching research program. The more central a theory is to its research program, the more effort will be extended towards saving it by modifying the research program's auxiliary hypotheses. [[CiteRef::Lakatos (1978a)]]

[[Paul Feyerabend]] argued in [[Feyerabend_Feyerabend (1975a)| ''Against Method'']] that the methods of theory acceptance change over time in science, and that these changes are largely arbitrary. [[Dudley Shapere]] agreed that scientific methods change over time. In [[Shapere_Shapere (1980)| ''The Character of Scientific Change'']], Shapere argued that the scientific methods used at the time are affected by the beliefs that the scientific community holds.[[CiteRef::Feyerabend (1975a)]][[CiteRef::Shapere (1980)]]

[[Larry Laudan]] agreed. In [[Laudan_Laudan (19841984a)| ''Science and Values'']], Laudan argues that the methods that scientific theories are accepted depend on the epistemic values that scientists hold. He recounted how knowledge of experimenters experimenter's bias and the placebo effect led to the development of the double blind method in drug testing. Laudan's ideas are important precursors to Scientonomy.[[CiteRef::Laudan (19841984a)]][[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)]]

In contrast, the strong program of the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK) research program, including sociologists like [[Barry Barnes]] and [[David Bloor]] seek to explain science as a sociological phenomenon and sometimes stress the role played by non-empirical social values in scientific change.|History=The original formulation of the second law was proposed by [[Hakob Barseghyan|Barseghyan]] in [[Barseghyan (2015)|''The Laws of Scientific Change'']].[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 129-132]] However, subsequent [[Scientonomy Seminar|seminar]] discussions revealed the law's two major flaws. First, it didn't clearly indicate what happened to a theory when a certain [[Theory Assessment Outcomes|assessment outcome]] obtained. Specifically, it didn't link theory assessment outcomes to the theory's acceptance or unacceptance. Secondly, the law sounded like a tautology which is not what a good law should sound like.[[CiteRef::Patton, Overgaard , and Barseghyan have proposed (2017)]]  Consequently, in 2017, [[The Second Law (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017)|a reformulation new formulation]] of the Second Law law was suggested by [[Paul Patton|Patton]], [[Nicholas Overgaard|Overgaard]], and Barseghyan, which [[Modification:Sciento-2017-0004|became accepted]] towards the end of Theory Acceptancethat year, thus, replacing the initial formulation. [[CiteRef::Patton, Overgaard, and Barseghyan (2017)]] The reformulated Second Law allows for second law also clearly indicated the possibility of [[Theory Assessment Outcomes (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017)|an inconclusive outcome to ]] of theory assessment. With an inconclusive outcome, theory acceptance, unacceptance or as opposed to sneaking the idea of inconclusiveness from the back door when dealing with the phenomenon of mosaic split are all possible. [[CiteRef::Patton, Overgaard, and Barseghyan (2017)]]|Current View=|Parent Topic=Mechanism of Scientific Change|Related Topics=Mechanism of Method Employment,Mechanism of Theory Rejection|Sorting Order=200|Page Status=Editor Approved|Editor Notes=|Order=1}}{{YouTube Video|VideoID=mWciydFqP_E|VideoStartAt=1443|VideoDescription=The second law explained by Gregory Rupik|VideoEmbedSection=History

|Accepted From Era=CE