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Mechanism of Theory Pursuit (view source)
Revision as of 02:26, 31 December 2016
, 02:26, 31 December 2016no edit summary
|Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan,
|Formulated Year=2015
|Prehistory=Among classical philosophers of science, there was no unanimity as to whether the question of theory pursuit can have a reasonable answer. For instance, [[Imre Lakatos]] can be interpreted as claiming that while one has to [[Theory Acceptance|accept]] the most progressive research programme, one can legitimately [[Theory Pursuit|pursue]] any research programme whatsoever.[[CiteRef::Lakatos (19711971a)|p. 117]] The latter part of the claim would be readily accepted by Paul Feyerabend.[[CiteRef::Feyerabend (1976a)|pp. 213-216]]
However, there were other philosophers who thought that there ''can'' be rules telling us which theories are pursuit worthy. In his [[Laudan (1977)|''Progress and Its Problems'']], [[Larry Laudan]] devises a methodological rule indicating when it is rational to pursue a certain research tradition. According to Laudan, "''it is always rational to pursue any research tradition which has a higher rate of progress than its rivals''".[[CiteRef::Laudan (1977)|p. 111]]
|History=In [[Barseghyan (2015)|''The Laws of Scientific Change'']], Barseghyan left the question of including the logic of pursuit into the scope of scientonomy open. According to Barseghyan, "we are neither restrained nor obliged to provide an account of pursuit in an actual TSC".[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 41]]
}}
