Changes

|Prehistory=Prehistory here- currently in progress|History=The original definition In classical philosophy of science, although theories and methods are closely bound up with one another, theories change but the term was proposed by Barseghyan in 2015scientific method does not.According to [[Paul Hoyningen-Huene|Hoyningen-Huene]],[[CiteRef::Barseghyan Hoyningen-Huene (20152008)]][[CiteRef::Hoyningen-Huene (2013)]]|Current View=Three different types from the time of the Ancients until the second half of criteria have been the 20th century science just was characterized by its method. [[Aristotle]] and his medieval successors identified science with absolute certainty guaranteed by axiomatic proof. In the Prior and Posterior Analytics as well as the Organon, Aristotle identified so farthree determinants of scientific method: criteria the aims of discovery/ordering/display of demarcationfacts gained through passive observation, criteria the nature of the knowledge pursued as well as the explanatory causes of acceptancethat kind of knowledge, and criteria a logical system to aid the proper arrangement of compatibilityand inferences from observation. Methods should not be confused with openly professed [[Methodology|methodologiesCiteRef::Andersen and Hepburn (2015)]] In the West, these ideas were perpetuated and refined by medieval thinkers like [[Albertus Magnus]], [[Thomas Aquinas]], [[Robert Grosseteste]], [[Roger Bacon]], [[William of Ockham]], [[Andreas Vesalius]], which prescribe how science ''ought'' to be doneand [[Giacomo Zabarella]]. They developed accounts of the acquisition of knowledge through observation and induction and rules for the justification and application of induction. Methods should also be differentiated Scholars from research techniquesthe East such as [[Al-Kindi]], [[Alhazen]], which are used in theory construction and data gathering[[Averroes]] were more critical of the Ancients.== Open questions == •How do technological research tools relate to employed methods? CurrentlyThe Scientific Revolution of the 16th, according to the TSC17th, knowledge concerning technical tools takes and 18th centuries involved serious reflection on the forms legitimacy of accepted beliefs, for example: “telescopes are useful tools for examining distant celestial bodies”. This the methods that facilitated the rapid advancements in turn leads to scientific knowledge at the employment time. Thinkers like [[Galileo Galilei]] and [[Francis Bacon]] emphasized mathematical description and mechanical explanation as important constituents of telescopes as a disinterested method. [[Isaac Newton]]’s Opticks (1704)[[CiteRef::Newton (1704)]] and Principia Mathematica (1726)[[CiteRef::Newton (1999)]] also excluded non-epistemic values and subjectivity from scientific practice through his implicit method for examining celestial bodiesof experiments and reasoning and his explicit methodological rules. Subsequent thinkers clarified and reinforced Newton’s approach, including [[Colin Maclaurin]], [[Denis Diderot]], and [[Francesco Algarotti]]. However, are there technological tools that are used independently some criticized the self-effacement of any method? Consider the telescope before is was known to be useful to astronomyscientist and inductivism. These thinkers include the likes of [[George Berkeley]] (Paul Patton1734), 2016[[CiteRef::Berkeley (1992) One possibility might be ]] who challenged the technique Newtonian image of brainstormingscience, and [[David Hume]]’s attack on induction (1739).[[CiteRef:: we commonly use it as a research technique, but don’t seem Hume (2000)]] A search for new foundations to formulate it as a undergird the empirical methodensued in response to these critics. The most notable example is [[Immanuel Kant]]’s (Hakob Barseghyan1781) reply to Hume in the Critique of Pure Reason.[[CiteRef::Kant (1781)]] Kant’s contributions generated additional debates on science and methods. In centre stage during the 19th century was [[John S. Mill]]’s inductivism versus [[William Whewell]]’s hypothetico-deductivism. For both thinkers, 2016)theory acceptance and method employment remained closely bound up.

• Can we apply But the "accepted/used/pursued" distinction to methods? If soquantum revolution of the 20th century soon uprooted the security of commonsense intuitions, coaxing a renewed empiricism. From this might help us in our analysis emerged a methodological distinction by [[Hans Reichenbach]] (1938) between the contexts of how normative propositions discovery and justification.[[CiteRef::Reichenbach (especially ethical propositions1938) affect method employment. For example]] The literature focused on the latter, a method deemed unethical may not be used, but still accepted especially through such works as being effective for theory assessment[[Rudolf Carnap]]’s logical positivism which attempted to axiomatize scientific theories.

• The TSC currently states that Nevertheless, the distinction between the contexts of discovery and justification was challenged by the employment theory-ladenness of a new concrete method cannot lead observation. Emphasis on the sociological, institutional, material, and political variables within science grew, thanks to the rejection work of pioneers like [[Thomas Kuhn]], [[Paul Feyerabend]], [[Imre Lakatos]], [[Dudley Shapere]], [[Larry Laudan]], and [[Ernan McMullin]]. They replaced the positivists’ rational image of another employed methodscience with historicism. HoweverSome sociologists went further, claiming that it seems conceivable was not methods but social ideologies or individual interactions/circumstances that primarily determined the beliefs that method X might cease obtained to be employed when a new method is employed which is thought to be more effective than Xscientific knowledge (e.g., Latour and Woolgar (1979),[[CiteRef::Latour and Woolgar (1979)]] (1986),[[CiteRef::Latour and Woolgar (1986)]] Shapin and Schaffer (1985)[[CiteRef::Shapin and Schaffer (1985)]]). Are there any examples In addition, philosophers of this happening science increasingly specialized on specific fields within science.[[CiteRef::Andersen and Hepburn (2015)]] Combined, these changes culminated in the history abandonment of a grand unifying scientific methodology. Furthermore, by the 1980s philosophers of science? (Mirka Loiselleconcluded that theories and methods change and, moreover, 2016)theories shape methods.

• Scientists often seem to rely on practical propositions when conduction research— eBut philosophers like Larry Laudan rejected the notion that change in science occurs all at once.g “when conducting an experimentInstead, chose the cheapest technique capable of producing acceptable results”he proposed that theories and methodologies can change at different times. What is the status Contemporary studies attempt to reconcile sociological and rationalist accounts of practical propositions like these in the mosaic? Are they normative theories, or a separate entity? How are they accepted into the mosaic, scientific knowledge and method to understand how do they methods change through time? How do they affect other elements of the mosaic? Do they affect method employment? (Hakob Barseghyan, Paul Patton, 2016)especially in relation to theory acceptance.• Can a method become employed by being the deductive consequence |History=The original definition of an already accepted methodology? How would this affect the Methodology Can Shape Methods theorem, which states that methodology can only affect the employment of methods which are implementations of some more abstract requirement? term was proposed by Barseghyan in 2015.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (Mirka Loiselle, 20162015)]]

|Accepted From Approximate=YesNo|Acceptance Indicators=That's when the first scientonomic definition of the term, [[Method (Barseghyan-2015)]], became accepted, which is a indication that the topic itself is considered legitimate.