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{{Definitional Topic|Question TypeSingular Capitalized=Method|Plural Capitalized=Methods|Singular Lowercase=method|Plural Lowercase=Definitionalmethods|Indefinite Article=a

|Description=One of the tasks of scientonomy is to explain how methods change through time. Thus, a proper definition of ''method'' is in order. |PrehistoryAuthors List=Hakob Barseghyan|Formulated Year=Prehistory here2015|HistoryPrehistory=The original definition In classical philosophy of science, although theories and methods are closely bound up with one another, theories change but the scientific method does not. According to [[Paul Hoyningen-Huene|Hoyningen-Huene]],[[CiteRef::Hoyningen-Huene (2008)]][[CiteRef::Hoyningen-Huene (2013)]] from the time of the Ancients until the second half of the term 20th century science just was proposed characterized by its method. [[Aristotle]] and his medieval successors identified science with absolute certainty guaranteed by axiomatic proof. In the Prior and Posterior Analytics as well as the Organon, Aristotle identified three determinants of scientific method: the aims of discovery/ordering/display of facts gained through passive observation, the nature of the knowledge pursued as well as the explanatory causes of that kind of knowledge, and a logical system to aid the proper arrangement of and inferences from observation.[[CiteRef::Andersen and Hepburn (2015)]] In the West, these ideas were perpetuated and refined by Barseghyan medieval thinkers like [[Albertus Magnus]], [[Thomas Aquinas]], [[Robert Grosseteste]], [[Roger Bacon]], [[William of Ockham]], [[Andreas Vesalius]], and [[Giacomo Zabarella]]. They developed accounts of the acquisition of knowledge through observation and induction and rules for the justification and application of induction. Scholars from the East such as [[Al-Kindi]], [[Alhazen]], and [[Averroes]] were more critical of the Ancients. The Scientific Revolution of the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries involved serious reflection on the legitimacy of the methods that facilitated the rapid advancements in scientific knowledge at the time. Thinkers like [[Galileo Galilei]] and [[Francis Bacon]] emphasized mathematical description and mechanical explanation as important constituents of a disinterested method. [[Isaac Newton]]’s Opticks (1704)[[CiteRef::Newton (1704)]] and Principia Mathematica (1726)[[CiteRef::Newton (1999)]] also excluded non-epistemic values and subjectivity from scientific practice through his implicit method of experiments and reasoning and his explicit methodological rules. Subsequent thinkers clarified and reinforced Newton’s approach, including [[Colin Maclaurin]], [[Denis Diderot]], and [[Francesco Algarotti]]. However, some criticized the self-effacement of the scientist and inductivism. These thinkers include the likes of [[George Berkeley]] (1734),[[CiteRef::Berkeley (1992)]] who challenged the Newtonian image of science, and [[David Hume]]’s attack on induction (1739).[[CiteRef::Hume (2000)]] A search for new foundations to undergird the empirical method ensued in response to these critics. The most notable example is [[Immanuel Kant]]’s (1781) reply to Hume in 2015the Critique of Pure Reason.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan Kant (20151781)]]Kant’s contributions generated additional debates on science and methods. In centre stage during the 19th century was [[John S. Mill]]’s inductivism versus [[William Whewell]]’s hypothetico-deductivism. For both thinkers, theory acceptance and method employment remained closely bound up.

|Current View=CurrentlyBut the quantum revolution of the 20th century soon uprooted the security of commonsense intuitions, '''method''' is defined as coaxing a set of criteria for employment in theory assessmentrenewed empiricism. Three different types of criteria have been identified so far: criteria of demarcation, criteria From this emerged a methodological distinction by [[Hans Reichenbach]] (1938) between the contexts of acceptance, discovery and criteria of compatibilityjustification. Methods should not be confused with openly professed [[Methodology|methodologiesCiteRef::Reichenbach (1938)]]The literature focused on the latter, especially through such works as [[Rudolf Carnap]]’s logical positivism which prescribe how science ''ought'' attempted to be done. Methods should also be differentiated from research techniques, which are used in theory construction and data gatheringaxiomatize scientific theories.

<imagemap>ImageNevertheless, the distinction between the contexts of discovery and justification was challenged by the theory-ladenness of observation. Emphasis on the sociological, institutional, material, and political variables within science grew, thanks to the work of pioneers like [[Thomas Kuhn]], [[Paul Feyerabend]], [[Imre Lakatos]], [[Dudley Shapere]], [[Larry Laudan]], and [[Ernan McMullin]]. They replaced the positivists’ rational image of science with historicism. Some sociologists went further, claiming that it was not methods but social ideologies or individual interactions/circumstances that primarily determined the beliefs that obtained to scientific knowledge (e.g., Latour and Woolgar (1979),[[CiteRef::Latour and Woolgar (1979)]] (1986),[[CiteRef::Latour and Woolgar (1986)]] Shapin and Schaffer (1985)[[CiteRef:: Method_and_Types_of_Criteria_Class_DiagramShapin and Schaffer (1985)]]). In addition, philosophers of science increasingly specialized on specific fields within science.png|center|627pxrect 674 251 706 289 [[WikipediaCiteRef:Object_composition#Composition|This is :Andersen and Hepburn (2015)]] Combined, these changes culminated in the abandonment of a symbol grand unifying scientific methodology. Furthermore, by the 1980s philosophers of compositionscience concluded that theories and methods change and, moreover, theories shape methods. But philosophers like Larry Laudan rejected the notion that change in science occurs all at once. It shows Instead, he proposed that a theories and methodologies can change at different times. Contemporary studies attempt to reconcile sociological and rationalist accounts of scientific knowledge and method can consist to understand how methods change, especially in relation to theory acceptance.|History=The original definition of criteria the term was proposed by Barseghyan in 2015.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)]] When the ontology of three different typesscientific change was redrafted in 2019, the original definition was replaced by a [[Method (Barseghyan-2018)|new definition]].[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2018)]]desc none|Current View=|Related Topics=Scientific Mosaic, Theory|Page Status=Needs Editing|Editor Notes=}}{{Acceptance Record|Community=Community:Scientonomy|Accepted From Era=CE|Accepted From Year=2016</imagemap> |Accepted From Month=January|Accepted From Day=1 |Accepted From Approximate=No|Acceptance Indicators=That's when the first scientonomic definition of the term, [[File:Method_Barseghyan_2015_DefinitionMethod (Barseghyan-2015)]], became accepted, which is a indication that the topic itself is considered legitimate.png|Still Accepted=Yes|Accepted Until Era=|Accepted Until Year=|Accepted Until Month=|centerAccepted Until Day=|390px]]Accepted Until Approximate=No|Related TopicsRejection Indicators=Theory, Scientific Mosaic