Changes

Jump to navigation Jump to search
5,534 bytes added ,  18:45, 9 January 2023
no edit summary
{{Definitional Topic
|Singular Capitalized=Method
|Plural Capitalized=Methods
|Singular Lowercase=method
|Plural Lowercase=methods
|Indefinite Article=a
|Question=What is '''method'''? How should it be ''defined''?
|Description=One of the tasks of scientonomy is to explain how methods change through time. Thus, a proper definition of ''method'' is in order.
|Year FormulatedAuthors List=2015Hakob Barseghyan|AuthorFormulated Year=Hakob Barseghyan,2015|Prehistory=Prehistory hereIn classical philosophy of science, although theories and methods are closely bound up with one another, theories change but the scientific method does not. According to [[Paul Hoyningen-Huene|History=The original definition Hoyningen-Huene]],[[CiteRef::Hoyningen-Huene (2008)]][[CiteRef::Hoyningen-Huene (2013)]] from the time of the Ancients until the second half of the term 20th century science just was proposed characterized by its method. [[Aristotle]] and his medieval successors identified science with absolute certainty guaranteed by Barseghyan in 2015axiomatic proof. In the Prior and Posterior Analytics as well as the Organon, Aristotle identified three determinants of scientific method: the aims of discovery/ordering/display of facts gained through passive observation, the nature of the knowledge pursued as well as the explanatory causes of that kind of knowledge, and a logical system to aid the proper arrangement of and inferences from observation.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan Andersen and Hepburn (2015)]]In the West, these ideas were perpetuated and refined by medieval thinkers like [[Albertus Magnus]], [[Thomas Aquinas]], [[Robert Grosseteste]], [[Roger Bacon]], [[William of Ockham]], [[Andreas Vesalius]], and [[Giacomo Zabarella]]. They developed accounts of the acquisition of knowledge through observation and induction and rules for the justification and application of induction. Scholars from the East such as [[Al-Kindi]], [[Alhazen]], and [[Averroes]] were more critical of the Ancients. |Current View=Currently The Scientific Revolution of the 16th, 17th, '''method''' is defined and 18th centuries involved serious reflection on the legitimacy of the methods that facilitated the rapid advancements in scientific knowledge at the time. Thinkers like [[Galileo Galilei]] and [[Francis Bacon]] emphasized mathematical description and mechanical explanation as important constituents of a set disinterested method. [[Isaac Newton]]’s Opticks (1704)[[CiteRef::Newton (1704)]] and Principia Mathematica (1726)[[CiteRef::Newton (1999)]] also excluded non-epistemic values and subjectivity from scientific practice through his implicit method of criteria experiments and reasoning and his explicit methodological rules. Subsequent thinkers clarified and reinforced Newton’s approach, including [[Colin Maclaurin]], [[Denis Diderot]], and [[Francesco Algarotti]]. However, some criticized the self-effacement of the scientist and inductivism. These thinkers include the likes of [[George Berkeley]] (1734),[[CiteRef::Berkeley (1992)]] who challenged the Newtonian image of science, and [[David Hume]]’s attack on induction (1739).[[CiteRef::Hume (2000)]] A search for employment new foundations to undergird the empirical method ensued in response to these critics. The most notable example is [[Immanuel Kant]]’s (1781) reply to Hume in the Critique of Pure Reason.[[CiteRef::Kant (1781)]] Kant’s contributions generated additional debates on science and methods. In centre stage during the 19th century was [[John S. Mill]]’s inductivism versus [[William Whewell]]’s hypothetico-deductivism. For both thinkers, theory assessmentacceptance and method employment remained closely bound up. Three different types  But the quantum revolution of the 20th century soon uprooted the security of commonsense intuitions, coaxing a renewed empiricism. From this emerged a methodological distinction by [[Hans Reichenbach]] (1938) between the contexts of criteria have been identified so fardiscovery and justification.[[CiteRef:: criteria Reichenbach (1938)]] The literature focused on the latter, especially through such works as [[Rudolf Carnap]]’s logical positivism which attempted to axiomatize scientific theories.  Nevertheless, the distinction between the contexts of demarcationdiscovery and justification was challenged by the theory-ladenness of observation. Emphasis on the sociological, criteria institutional, material, and political variables within science grew, thanks to the work of acceptancepioneers like [[Thomas Kuhn]], [[Paul Feyerabend]], [[Imre Lakatos]], [[Dudley Shapere]], [[Larry Laudan]], and criteria [[Ernan McMullin]]. They replaced the positivists’ rational image of compatibilityscience with historicism. Methods should Some sociologists went further, claiming that it was not be confused with openly professed methods but social ideologies or individual interactions/circumstances that primarily determined the beliefs that obtained to scientific knowledge (e.g., Latour and Woolgar (1979),[[CiteRef::Latour and Woolgar (1979)]] (1986),[[CiteRef::Latour and Woolgar (1986)]] Shapin and Schaffer (1985)[[CiteRef::Shapin and Schaffer (1985)]]). In addition, philosophers of science increasingly specialized on specific fields within science.[[Methodology|methodologiesCiteRef::Andersen and Hepburn (2015)]]Combined, these changes culminated in the abandonment of a grand unifying scientific methodology. Furthermore, by the 1980s philosophers of science concluded that theories and methods change and, moreover, which prescribe how theories shape methods. But philosophers like Larry Laudan rejected the notion that change in science ''ought'' occurs all at once. Instead, he proposed that theories and methodologies can change at different times. Contemporary studies attempt to reconcile sociological and rationalist accounts of scientific knowledge and method to be done. Methods should also be differentiated from research techniquesunderstand how methods change, which are used especially in relation to theory construction and data gatheringacceptance.|History=The original definition of the term was proposed by Barseghyan in 2015.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)]] When the ontology of scientific change was redrafted in 2019, the original definition was replaced by a [[Method (Barseghyan-2018)|new definition]].[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2018)]]|Current View=|Related Topics=Scientific Mosaic, Theory|Page Status=Needs Editing|Editor Notes=}}{{Acceptance Record|Community=Community:Scientonomy|Accepted From Era=CE|Accepted From Year=2016|Accepted From Month=January|Accepted From Day=1|Accepted From Approximate=No|Acceptance Indicators=That's when the first scientonomic definition of the term, [[Method (Barseghyan-2015)]], became accepted, Scientific Mosaicwhich is a indication that the topic itself is considered legitimate.|Still Accepted=Yes|Accepted Until Era=|Accepted Until Year=|Accepted Until Month=|Accepted Until Day=|Accepted Until Approximate=No|Rejection Indicators=
}}

Navigation menu