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Methodology and Methods (view source)
Revision as of 04:34, 11 January 2018
, 04:34, 11 January 2018no edit summary
|Formulated Year=2016
|Academic Events=Scientonomy Seminar 2016,
|Prehistory=As noted in Barseghyan’s Laws of Scientific Change, the distinction between methodology and method has been largely unrecognized in the course of the philosophy of science, and the confusion has been exacerbated by a general lack of a normative-descriptive distinction in theories of scientific change.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)]]
The distinction between methodology and methods might be traced first to Popper’s views on falsificationism. Popper acknowledged that while falsificationism may be an effective criterion of demarcation, and a methodological goal for scientists, they rarely will actually reject a theory in the face of a falsifying instance.[[CiteRef::Thornton (2016)]] Nonetheless, static method theorists like Popper or Lakatos typically suggest that the explicit static methodology they propose is the normative goal for scientists, and that “good” science ought to strive towards such methodologies. Lakatos said that “methodological standards act like teachers: they give marks to theories” and that theories which propose ad hoc modifications ought to be refused,[[CiteRef::Motterlini (Ed.) (1999)]] demonstrating the belief of static method theorists that methods of appraisal ought to be taken from explicit methodologies. That being said, the distinction between explicit methodology and implicit method is ephemeral at best amongst Popperians.
Laudan perhaps comes the closest to acknowledging the distinction between method and methodology, but ultimately confuses them when explaining their respective roles.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)]] Laudan’s reticulated model criticizes accepted views of the time by recognizing that the explicit methodologies scientists hold are often in opposition to actually employed methods. However, in explaining how methods are “constrained” (i.e. underdetermined) by theories and “justified” by axiological aims, Laudan seems to conflate methodologies of argumentation and the actual method that theories are evaluated by.[[CiteRef::Laudan (1984a)]] Barseghyan notes that other authors from Laudan’s period also conflated the terms, including Zahar and Leplin.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)]].
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{{Acceptance Record
|Accepted From Day=1
|Accepted From Approximate=No
|Acceptance Indicators=It was acknowledged as an open question by the seminar of [[Scientonomy Seminar 2016]].
|Still Accepted=Yes
|Accepted Until Approximate=No
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