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|Preamble=[[Scientific Mosaic (Barseghyan-2015)|The current definition of ''scientific mosaic'']] is flawed in at least two ways. Its most obvious deficiency is that it is not compatible with [[Epistemic Elements - Questions and Theories (Barseghyan-2018)|the new scientonomic ontology]] suggested in the same paper,[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2018)]] where ''questions'' are a distinct class of epistemic elements. Thus, if the new ontology becomes accepted, the current definition of ''scientific mosaic'' as a set of all accepted theories and employed methods will also have to be changed to reflect this new ontology. Yet, there is a more systematic flaw with the definition – the fact that it has the types of epistemic elements hard-wired in it. [[Barseghyan (2015)|''The Laws of Scientific Change'']] didn’t have a special discussion of the ontology of scientific change, but introduced the two basic elements of the initial scientonomic ontology through the definition of scientific mosaic.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 5]] This is problematic, as any ontology of any field is not merely a set of ''definitions'' of entities and relations, but also a set of ''descriptive'' propositions stating which of those entities and relations actually exist. For example, the ontology of the standard model doesn’t merely define what it means by ''fermion'', ''boson'', ''quark'', or ''lepton'', but also tells us that these types of subatomic particles populate physical reality. Unlike the definitions of ''quark'', ''lepton'', or ''boson'', these descriptive propositions are contingent, i.e. they are hypotheses about the structural elements of physical reality. Similarly, when we say that “questions and theories are the two fundamental types of epistemic elements”, we are suggesting a hypothesis about the structural elements of our domain, i.e. we are making a descriptive claim about theories and methods which is not the same as simply defining these concepts. Thus, an ontology cannot be postulated through definitions.