Changes

|Date Suggested Day=26

|Date Suggested Approximate=No

|Resource=Patton (2019)

|Preamble=In scientonomy, [[Epistemic Agents - Communities (Barseghyan-2015)|communities]] have been taken as the primary focus of interest for understanding the process of scientific change.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 43-52]] Currently, they are the only entity taken to be capable of bearing a mosaic. The currently accepted definition of [[Authority Delegation (Overgaard-Loiselle-2016)|authority delegation]][[CiteRef::Overgaard and Loiselle (2016)]] takes it to be a relationship between ''communities''. Yet, at the same time, Loiselle's own examples reveal that an individual can be the subject of authority delegation.[[CiteRef::Loiselle (2017)]] There seem to be many other instances, such as within individual scientific research groups, where authority is delegated to an individual.[[CiteRef::Patton (2019)]] Within the context of the new proposed definition of [[Epistemic Agent (Patton-2019)|epistemic agent]], there seems no good reason to reserve this status solely for communities. One may acknowledge that there are both communal and individual epistemic agents while at the same time recognizing that the two types of epistemic agents need not be similar in all respects. In particular, it is not yet clear whether the processes by which individuals acting independently chose their epistemic stances adhere to the same [[The Theory of Scientific Change|laws of scientific change]].

|Automatic=No

|Date Assessed Approximate=No

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