Open main menu

Changes

no edit summary
|Date Suggested Day=26
|Date Suggested Approximate=No
|Authors List=Paul Patton,
|Resource=Patton (2019)
|Preamble=Currently the only entity taken to be capable of bearing a mosaic in In scientonomy is a , [[Epistemic Agents Bearers of Mosaic - Communities (Barseghyan-2015)|communitycommunities]] have been taken as the primary focus of interest for understanding the process of scientific change.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 43-52]]Currently, they are the only entity taken to be capable of bearing a mosaic. The currently accepted definition of [[Epistemic Agent Authority Delegation (PattonOvergaard-Loiselle-20192016)|A new definitionauthority delegation]][[CiteRef::Overgaard and Loiselle (2016)]] takes it to be a relationship between ''communities''. Yet, at the same time, Loiselle's own examples reveal that an individual can be the subject of epistemic agent has been proposedauthority delegation.[[CiteRef::Loiselle (2017)]] There seem to be many other instances, such as within individual scientific research groups, where authority is delegated to an individual. [[CiteRef::Patton (2019)]] Within the context of that the new proposed definitionof [[Epistemic Agent (Patton-2019)|epistemic agent]], there seems no good reason to reserve this status solely for communities. One may acknowledge that there are both communal and individual epistemic agents while at the question same time recognizing that the two types of epistemic agents need not be similar in all respects. In particular, it is not yet clear whether the processes by which individuals, or tools and instruments can be acting independently chose their epistemic agents requires an answerstances adhere to the same [[The Theory of Scientific Change|laws of scientific change]].|Modification=|To Accept=Individual Epistemic Agents - Communities and Individuals Agent Exists, Individual Epistemic Agent Is a Subtype of Epistemic Agent (Patton-2019),|To Reject=Epistemic Agents - Communities (Barseghyan-2015),|To Accept Questions=Applicability of the Laws of Scientific Change to Individuals,
|Automatic=No
|Verdict=OpenAccepted|Date Assessed Year=2022|Date Assessed Month=January|Date Assessed Day=10
|Date Assessed Approximate=No
|Verdict Rationale=It was agreed during seminar discussions that the "modification aims to codify our ''de facto'' communal stance towards the ontology of epistemic agents".<sup>[[Modification_talk:Sciento-2019-0015#comment-191|c1]]</sup> This is confirmed by the fact that several recent articles take this ontology of epistemic agents for granted (e.g., [[Barseghyan and Levesley (2021)]], [[Machado-Marques and Patton (2021)]]).[[CiteRef::Barseghyan and Levesley (2021)]][[CiteRef::Machado-Marques and Patton (2021)]] Even as early as 2017, several of Loiselle's examples of authority delegation concern individual experts (see [[Loiselle (2017)]]).[[CiteRef::Loiselle (2017)]]
|Superseded By=
}}