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|Topic Question Title=|Predicate=|Object Type=DescriptiveText|Object Value True=|Object Value False=|Object Class=|Object Enum Values=|Object Regexp=|Single Answer Text Formula=|Multiple Answers Text Formula=|Answer Title Formula=|Description=In the process of [[Mechanism of Scientific Change|scientific change]], we are dealing with different epistemic ''agents'', taking different epistemic ''stances'' towards different epistemic ''elements''. For instance, we can say that the Paris community of 1720 [[Theory Acceptance|accepted ]] [[René Descartes|Cartesian natural philosophy]]. In this example, Paris community is the epistemic ''agent'', acceptance is their epistemic ''stance'', and Cartesian natural philosophy is the epistemic element. There are a number of important ontological questions that arise here: * What types of [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic ''agents'' ]] can there be? I.e. can epistemic agents be communal, individual and/or artificial (instruments, AI)?* What types of [[Epistemic Element|epistemic ''elements'' ]] can there be in the process of scientific change? I.e. are there theories, method, values, research programmes, paradigms, etc.?* What are the different ''[[Epistemic Stance|epistemic stances'' ]] that an agent can take towards an element? I.e. do these include acceptance, use, pursuit, employment, commitment, neglect, rejection, etc.?

|Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan,

|Prehistory=At the level of ontologyHistorically, the philosophy of science begins noteworthy progress with the logical positivists. While the positivists individually had varying views, we can summarize their ontology by generalizing from any existing overlap between authors. The logical positivist ontology consisted theories of a scientific community which stipulated theories and determined whether those theories were worthy of pursuit based on their empirical probability. A theory’s given empirical probability is determined by observational proof in favor of it. The positivists did change differed not recognize a multitude of methods and so the only epistemic elements in their ontology were theories (it should be noted that given the singular nature explanations of methods it was assumed all how science would adhere to one perfect method). Furthermorechanges through time, the logical positivists did not share the belief that theories can be outright rejectedbut also in their views on what exactly underwent change in science. InsteadThus, they believed theories are simply pursued on a basis range of instances different ontologies of confirmation.[[CiteRef::Schlick (1931)|ppscientific change have been suggested over the years.140-165]]

Proceeding In the early twentieth century, logical positivists, Karl Popper proposed his formulated an ontology of scientific change in his book Conjectures and Refutations. This While they individually held varying views, we can summarize their ontology included by generalizing from the same entities and agents as the logical overlap between authors. The positivists. However, Popper introduced generally supposed that there was a single scientific [[Method|method]] that did not change through history or across disciplines so that the notion of acceptance as an only epistemic stance by suggesting the rejection elements capable of change in their ontology were [[Theory|scientific theories which faced any refutation]].[[CiteRef::Schlick (1931)|pp.145-162]] A similar ontology was championed by many non-positivist authors, including [[Karl Popper]].[[CiteRef::Popper (1963)|pp. 62-63]] The contrast of terms suggested scientists could do more than simply pursue theories.

More drasticallyDespite its inherent vagueness, Thomas Kuhn’s [[Kuhn instantiated multiple changes (1962a)|''Structure of Scientific Revolutions'']] can be interpreted as suggesting a number of new ontological elements, including ''methods'', ''values'', ''questions'', ''standards'', and ''problems''. It is not quite clear whether these are all meant to the existing be independent epistemic elements with his model of scientific changein their own right. Kuhn’s Scientific Revolutions suggested that there was now Kuhn also famously used a second whole range of words denoting epistemic element beyond theories – methods – which could be modified stances, such as ''embraced'', ''universally received'', ''acknowledged'', and were dynamic in nature''committed'' among many others.[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962a1970c)|pp. 6610-8013]] Unlike his predecessorsIt remains to be seen whether he meant them as synonyms, Kuhn’s ontology did not share the same relations between epistemic agents and epistemic elements; while previously theories and methods were entirely under the control or whether he ascribed different meanings to at least some of the scientific community, under Kuhn’s view, the elements change arbitrarily when an overflow of anomalies occursthem.[[CiteRef::Kuhn Barseghyan (1962a2015)|ppp. 35-5030]]

Shifting backwards, Imre Lakatos generated a holistic account of scientific change slightly regressive to previous ontologies. Lakatos kept Kuhn’s view of the fluidity of paradigms within scientific communities however, with two small modifications. Firstly, Lakatos saw paradigms as research programmes, of which many simultaneously existed, and secondly Lakatos believed they followed a more rational model of change, i.e. modifications were judged as regressive or progressive based on certain conditions.[[CiteRef::Lakatos (1970)|pp. 31-34]] With regards to regression, Paul Feyerabend criticized Lakatos for once again suggesting that theories can only be pursued. The whole system Lakatos built was a high functioning competition between research programmes.[[CiteRef::Feyerabend (1970a)]] As such, per Lakatos, theories could never really be accepted, and thus they carried the potential to threaten science with a potentially infinite number of theories all of which are rational to pursue.

Finally, Larry Laudan paints the closest picture to the ontology scientonomy posits today. Laudan recognized values, theories, and methodologies as epistemic elements with relations to scientists as epistemic agents. Theories could be accepted under his view and methodologies could be employed. Each epistemic element under Laudan’s reticulated model could be modified. Laudan did not recognize the potential of theories to be used but not accepted but he did recognize pursued and accepted theories in contrast to Lakatos and the logical positivists.[[CiteRef::Laudan (1984a)]]

* ''theory'' [[Theory Is a Subtype of Epistemic Element (Barseghyan-2015)|Theories]] and ''method'' [[Method Is a Subtype of Epistemic Element (Barseghyan-2015)|methods]] as the only two types of [[Epistemic Elements - Theories and Methods (Barseghyan-2015)|''epistemic elements'']] that undergo scientific change;[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 3-11]]* three Three [[Epistemic Stances Towards Theories - Acceptance Use and Pursuit (Barseghyan-2015)|''epistemic stances'' towards ''theories'']]: ''acceptance'', ''use'', and ''pursuit'',[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 30-42]] as well as one [[Epistemic Stances Towards Methods - Employment (Barseghyan-2015)|''epistemic stance'' towards ''methods'']], ''employment'';[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 52-62]] * and ''community'' Community as the sole [[Subtypes of Epistemic Agents - Community (Barseghyan-2015)Agent|''type of epistemic agent'']] capable of taking these stances towards theories and methods.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 43-52]]  Only [[Descriptive Theory|descriptive theories]] were included in Barseghyan's original ontology, while the status of [[Normative Theory|normative theories]] was left indeterminate due to the [[The Paradox of Normative Propositions|the paradox of normative propositions]]. Once the paradox of normative propositions was [[Resolution to the Paradox of Normative Propositions (Sebastien-2016)|resolved]], the original ontology was extended by [[Zoe Sebastien|Sebastien]] to also include [[Normative Theory Is a Subtype of Theory (Sebastien-2016)|normative theories]].[[CiteRef::Sebastien (2016)]]

Only ''descriptive'' theories were included in Barseghyan's original ontologyIn 2018, while the status of normative theories was left indeterminate due [[William Rawleigh|Rawleigh]] suggested that [[Question|questions]] are to the be accepted as a separate [[The Paradox Question Is a Subtype of Normative PropositionsEpistemic Element (Rawleigh-2018)|the paradox type of normative propositionsepistemic element]]; the suggestion became accepted later that year and the ontology was modified to include theories, methods, and questions.[[CiteRef::Rawleigh (2018)]]

Once the paradox of normative propositions The ontology was further modified by Barseghyan in 2018. In his [[Resolution to the Paradox of Normative Propositions Barseghyan (Sebastien-20162018)|''resolved''redrafted ontology]], the original he suggested that methods are a subtype of normative theory. He also suggested including [[Definition|definitions]] as a subtype of theory.[[Epistemic Elements - Theories and Methods CiteRef::Barseghyan (Sebastien-20172018)|ontology was extended]] by As a result of the acceptance of [[Zoe SebastienModification:Sciento-2018-0006|Sebastienthat modification]] to also include , theories and questions became the two basic subtypes of epistemic elements, with definitions, normative , and descriptive theories.being subtypes of [[CiteRef::Sebastien (2016)Theory|theory]].|Current View=|Parent Topic=|Related Topics=Mechanism of Scientific Change,|Sorting Order=50