Bureaucrats, Comment administrators, editor, Interface administrators, Administrators (Semantic MediaWiki), Curators (Semantic MediaWiki), Suppressors, Administrators, Widget editors
11,019
edits
Changes
no edit summary
{{Topic
|Subject=
|Topic Type=Descriptive
|Subfield=Ontology
|Inherited From=
|Heritable=No
|Question Text Formula=
|Question Title Formula=
|Question=What is the '''ontology''' of scientific change? What are the fundamental ''entities'', ''processes'', and ''relations'' of scientific change?
|Topic Question Title=|Predicate=|Object Type=DescriptiveText|Object Value True=|Object Value False=|Object Class=|Object Enum Values=|Object Regexp=|Single Answer Text Formula=|Multiple Answers Text Formula=|Answer Title Formula=
|Description=In the process of [[Mechanism of Scientific Change|scientific change]], we are dealing with different epistemic ''agents'', taking different epistemic ''stances'' towards different epistemic ''elements''. For instance, we can say that the Paris community of 1720 [[Theory Acceptance|accepted]] [[René Descartes|Cartesian natural philosophy]]. In this example, Paris community is the epistemic ''agent'', acceptance is their epistemic ''stance'', and Cartesian natural philosophy is the epistemic element. There are a number of important ontological questions that arise here:
* What types of [[Epistemic AgentsAgent|epistemic ''agents'']] can there be? I.e. can epistemic agents be communal, individual and/or artificial (instruments, AI)?* What types of [[Epistemic ElementsElement|epistemic ''elements'']] can there be in the process of scientific change? I.e. are there theories, method, values, research programmes, paradigms, etc.?* What are the different [[Epistemic StancesStance|''epistemic stances'']] that an agent can take towards an element? I.e. do these include acceptance, use, pursuit, employment, commitment, neglect, rejection, etc.?
Addressing these questions is the main task of the ontology of scientific change.
|Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan,
|Formulated Year=2015
|Prehistory=Historically, theories of scientific change differed not only in their explanations of how science changes through time, but also in their views on what exactly underwent change in science. Thus, a range of different ontologies of scientific change have been suggested over the years.
In the early twentieth century, logical positivists formulated an ontology of scientific change. While they individually held varying views, we can summarize their ontology by generalizing from the overlap between authors. The positivists generally supposed that there was a single scientific [[Method|method]] that did not change through history or across disciplines so that the only epistemic elements capable of change in their ontology were [[Theory|scientific theories]].[[CiteRef::Schlick (1931)|pp.145-162]] A similar ontology was championed by many non-positivist authors, including [[Karl Popper]].[[CiteRef::Popper (1963)|pp. 62-63]]
Despite its inherent vagueness, Kuhn’s [[Kuhn (1962a)|''Structure of Scientific Revolutions'']] can be interpreted as suggesting a number of new ontological elements, including ''methods'', ''values'', ''questions'', ''standards'', and ''problems''. It is not quite clear whether these are all meant to be independent epistemic elements in their own right. Kuhn also famously used a whole range of words denoting epistemic stances, such as ''embraced'', ''universally received'',''acknowledged'', and ''committed'' among many others.[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1970c)|pp. 10-13]] It remains to be seen whether he meant them as synonyms, or whether he ascribed different meanings to at least some of them.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 30]]
Imre Lakatos generated a holistic account of scientific change slightly regressive to previous ontologies. Lakatos kept Kuhn’s view of the fluidity of paradigms within scientific communities however, with two small modifications. Firstly, Lakatos saw paradigms as research programmes, of which many simultaneously existed, and secondly Lakatos believed they followed a more rational model of change, i.e. modifications were judged as regressive or progressive based on certain conditions.[[CiteRef::Lakatos (1970)|pp. 31-34]] With regards to regression, Paul Feyerabend criticized Lakatos for once again suggesting that theories can only be pursued. The whole system Lakatos built was a high functioning competition between research programmes.[[CiteRef::Feyerabend (1970a)]] As such, per Lakatos, theories could never really be accepted, and thus they carried the potential to threaten science with a potentially infinite number of theories all of which are rational to pursue.
Barseghyan's original ontology included:
* ''theory'' [[Theory Is a Subtype of Epistemic Element (Barseghyan-2015)|Theories]] and ''method'' [[Method Is a Subtype of Epistemic Element (Barseghyan-2015)|methods]] as the only two types of [[Epistemic Elements - Theories and Methods (Barseghyan-2015)|''epistemic elements'']] that undergo scientific change;[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 3-11]]* three Three [[Epistemic Stances Towards Theories - Acceptance Use and Pursuit (Barseghyan-2015)|''epistemic stances'' towards ''theories'']]: ''acceptance'', ''use'', and ''pursuit'',[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 30-42]] as well as one [[Epistemic Stances Towards Methods - Employment (Barseghyan-2015)|''epistemic stance'' towards ''methods'']], ''employment'';[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 52-62]] * and ''community'' Community as the sole [[Subtypes of Epistemic Agents - Community (Barseghyan-2015)Agent|''type of epistemic agent'']] capable of taking these stances towards theories and methods.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 43-52]] Only [[Descriptive Theory|descriptive theories]] were included in Barseghyan's original ontology, while the status of [[Normative Theory|normative theories]] was left indeterminate due to the [[The Paradox of Normative Propositions|the paradox of normative propositions]]. Once the paradox of normative propositions was [[Resolution to the Paradox of Normative Propositions (Sebastien-2016)|resolved]], the original ontology was extended by [[Zoe Sebastien|Sebastien]] to also include [[Normative Theory Is a Subtype of Theory (Sebastien-2016)|normative theories]].[[CiteRef::Sebastien (2016)]]
The ontology was further modified by Barseghyan in 2018. In his [[Barseghyan (2018)|redrafted ontology]], he suggested that methods are a subtype of normative theory. He also suggested including [[William RawleighDefinition|Rawleighdefinitions]] as a subtype of theory.[[Epistemic Elements - Theories Methods and Questions CiteRef::Barseghyan (Rawleigh-2018)|suggested]] that As a result of the acceptance of [[QuestionModification:Sciento-2018-0006|questionsthat modification]] are to be accepted as a separate epistemic element; the suggestion , theories and questions became accepted later that year and the ontology was modified to include theoriestwo basic subtypes of epistemic elements, with definitions, methodsnormative, and questions.descriptive theories being subtypes of [[CiteRef::Rawleigh (2018)Theory|theory]].|Current View=|Parent Topic=|Related Topics=Mechanism of Scientific Change,|Sorting Order=50
|Page Status=Needs Editing
|Editor Notes=The whole prehistory needs rewriting. It's very poor at the moment.
}}
{{YouTube Video
|VideoID=1nmOYzimL2M
|VideoStartAt=97
|VideoDescription=Paul Patton's overview of the scientonomic ontology
|VideoEmbedSection=Description
}}
{{Acceptance Record
|Acceptance Indicators=The question was tacitly accepted even before its explicit formulation in 2017. Thus, it has the same acceptance date as the rest of the original TSC.
|Still Accepted=Yes
|Accepted Until Era=
|Accepted Until Year=
|Accepted Until Month=
|Accepted Until Day=
|Accepted Until Approximate=No
|Rejection Indicators=
}}