Changes

|QuestionSubject=What is the '''ontology''' of scientific change? What are the fundamental ''elements'' that undergo scientific change?

|DescriptionSubfield=Ontology|Inherited From=|Heritable=No|Question Text Formula=|Question Title Formula=|Question=In principle, What is the process '''ontology''' of scientific change can concern many different types of entities. One important question is to establish ? What are the most fundamental units that undergo ''entities'', ''processes'', and ''relations'' of scientific change. Over ?|Question Title=|Predicate=|Object Type=Text|Object Value True=|Object Value False=|Object Class=|Object Enum Values=|Object Regexp=|Single Answer Text Formula=|Multiple Answers Text Formula=|Answer Title Formula=|Description=In the years, it has been argued that the fundamental units process of scientific change include theories ([[Karl PopperMechanism of Scientific Change|Popperscientific change]]), paradigms (we are dealing with different epistemic ''agents'', taking different epistemic ''stances'' towards different epistemic ''elements''. For instance, we can say that the Paris community of 1720 [[Thomas KuhnTheory Acceptance|Kuhnaccepted]]), research programmes ([[Imre LakatosRené Descartes|LakatosCartesian natural philosophy]]). In this example, Paris community is the epistemic ''agent'', acceptance is their epistemic ''stance'', research traditions (early-and Cartesian natural philosophy is the epistemic element. There are a number of important ontological questions that arise here: * What types of [[Larry LaudanEpistemic Agent|Laudanepistemic agents]])can there be? I.e. can epistemic agents be communal, methods individual and/or artificial ([[Thomas Kuhn|Kuhn]]instruments, AI)?* What types of [[Dudley ShapereEpistemic Element|Shapereepistemic elements]]can there be in the process of scientific change? I.e. are there theories, later-[[Larry Laudan|Laudan]])method, and values (, research programmes, paradigms, etc.?* What are the different [[Thomas KuhnEpistemic Stance|Kuhnepistemic stances]]that an agent can take towards an element? I.e. do these include acceptance, use, pursuit, employment, [[Larry Laudan|Laudan]])commitment, neglect, rejection, etc. ?

Any descriptive theory Addressing these questions is the main task of scientific change needs to establish a basic the ontology of scientific change.|Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan,

|HistoryPrehistory=InitiallyHistorically, theories of scientific change differed not only in their explanations of how science changes through time, but also in their views on what exactly underwent change in science. Thus, this question hasn't a range of different ontologies of scientific change have been openly stated suggested over the years.  In the early twentieth century, logical positivists formulated an ontology of scientific change. While they individually held varying views, we can summarize their ontology by generalizing from the overlap between authors. The positivists generally supposed that there was a single scientific [[Method|method]] that did not change through history or across disciplines so that the only epistemic elements capable of change in ''their ontology were [[Theory|scientific theories]].[[CiteRef::Schlick (1931)|pp.145-162]] A similar ontology was championed by many non-positivist authors, including [[Karl Popper]].[[CiteRef::Popper (1963)|pp. 62-63]] Despite its inherent vagueness, Kuhn’s [[Barseghyan Kuhn (20151962a)|the LSC''Structure of Scientific Revolutions'']]can be interpreted as suggesting a number of new ontological elements, including ''methods'', ''values'', ''questions'', ''standards'', and ''problems''. InsteadIt is not quite clear whether these are all meant to be independent epistemic elements in their own right. Kuhn also famously used a whole range of words denoting epistemic stances, such as ''embraced'', the ontology of scientific change was posited implicitly in the ''Metatheoryuniversally received'', ''acknowledged'', and '' through the committed''among many others.[[CiteRef:Category:Definitional TopicKuhn (1970c)|definitionpp. 10-13]]'' It remains to be seen whether he meant them as synonyms, or whether he ascribed different meanings to at least some of them.[[Scientific MosaicCiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|scientific mosaicp. 30]]  Imre Lakatos generated a holistic account of scientific change slightly regressive to previous ontologies. Lakatos kept Kuhn’s view of the fluidity of paradigms within scientific communities however, with two small modifications. Firstly, Lakatos saw paradigms as research programmes, of which many simultaneously existed, and secondly Lakatos believed they followed a set more rational model of all accepted theories and employed methodschange, i.e. modifications were judged as regressive or progressive based on certain conditions.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan Lakatos (20151970)|ppp. 31-34]] With regards to regression, Paul Feyerabend criticized Lakatos for once again suggesting that theories can only be pursued. The whole system Lakatos built was a high functioning competition between research programmes.5[[CiteRef::Feyerabend (1970a)]] Towards As such, per Lakatos, theories could never really be accepted, and thus they carried the end potential to threaten science with a potentially infinite number of 2016theories all of which are rational to pursue. Finally, it gradually became clear that Larry Laudan paints the closest picture to the ontology of a field cannot scientonomy posits today. Laudan recognized values, theories, and methodologies as epistemic elements with relations to scientists as epistemic agents. Theories could be accepted under his view and should not methodologies could be employed. Each epistemic element under Laudan’s reticulated model could be postulated via definitionsmodified. What constitutes Laudan did not recognize the elements potential of a certain ontology is for the respective empirical research theories to be established used but not accepted but he did recognize pursued and, thus, is not a matter of definitionsaccepted theories in contrast to Lakatos and the logical positivists. [[CiteRef::Laudan (1984a)]]|History=In other words[[Hakob Barseghyan|Barseghyan]]'s [[Barseghyan (2015)|''The Laws of Scientific Change'']], the question of what constitutes the ontology of scientific change is discussed without being explicitly formulated. While the question has been accepted and discussed at length by [[Community:Scientonomy|the scientonomy community]] ever since its inception, it wasn't until the early 2017 when the question was openly formulated and documented.  Barseghyan's original ontology included:* [[Theory Is a certain field is Subtype of Epistemic Element (Barseghyan-2015)|Theories]] and [[Method Is a Subtype of Epistemic Element (Barseghyan-2015)|methods]] as the only two types of [[Epistemic Elements|epistemic elements]] that undergo scientific change;[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 3-11]]* Three [[Epistemic Stances Towards Theories|epistemic stances towards theories]]: ''acceptance'', ''use'', and ''pursuit'',[[CiteRef:Category:Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 30-42]] as well as one [[Epistemic Stances Towards Methods|epistemic stance towards methods]], ''employment'';[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 52-62]] * Community as the sole [[Subtypes of Epistemic Agent|type of epistemic agent]] capable of taking these stances towards theories and methods.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 43-52]]  Only [[Descriptive TopicTheory|descriptive questiontheories]]were included in Barseghyan''s original ontology, not definitionalwhile the status of [[Normative Theory|normative theories]] was left indeterminate due to the [[The Paradox of Normative Propositions|the paradox of normative propositions]]. IndeedOnce the paradox of normative propositions was [[Resolution to the Paradox of Normative Propositions (Sebastien-2016)|resolved]], what sort of elements change during the process original ontology was extended by [[Zoe Sebastien|Sebastien]] to also include [[Normative Theory Is a Subtype of scientific change is not something Theory (Sebastien-2016)|normative theories]].[[CiteRef::Sebastien (2016)]] In 2018, [[William Rawleigh|Rawleigh]] suggested that should [[Question|questions]] are to be decided accepted as a separate [[Question Is a Subtype of Epistemic Element (Rawleigh-2018)|type of epistemic element]]; the suggestion became accepted later that year and the ontology was modified to include theories, methods, and questions.[[CiteRef::Rawleigh (2018)]] The ontology was further modified by Barseghyan in 2018. In his [[Barseghyan (2018)|redrafted ontology]], he suggested that methods are a definition, but should be formulated subtype of normative theory. He also suggested including [[Definition|definitions]] as a descriptive subtype of theory .[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2018)]] As a result of the acceptance of [[Modification:Sciento-2018-0006|that says "Such-modification]], theories and-such questions became the two basic subtypes of epistemic elements undergo scientific change", with definitions, normative, and descriptive theories being subtypes of [[Theory|theory]].|Current View=|Parent Topic=|Related Topics=Mechanism of Scientific Change,|Sorting Order=50|Page Status=Needs Editing|Editor Notes=The whole prehistory needs rewriting. It's very poor at the moment.}}{{YouTube Video|VideoID=1nmOYzimL2M|VideoStartAt=97|VideoDescription=Paul Patton's overview of the scientonomic ontology|VideoEmbedSection=Description