Changes

Ontology of Scientific Change (view source)

Revision as of 16:43, 29 March 2018

141 bytes added , 16:43, 29 March 2018

no edit summary

|Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan,

|Formulated Year=2015

|Prehistory=In the early twentieth century, logical positivists formulated an ontology of scientific change. While they individually held varying views, we can summarize their ontology by generalizing from the overlap between authors. The logical positivist ontology consisted of a [[Scientific Community|scientific community]] which stipulated [[Theory|theories]] and determined whether those theories were worthy of pursuit based on their empirical probability. A theory’s empirical probability is determined by observational evidence in its favour ~~of it~~. The positivists supposed that there was a single scientific method that did not ~~recognize that methods could vary over time~~ change through history or ~~between~~ across disciplines so that the only epistemic elements capable of change in their ontology were theories ~~(it was assumed that all science would adhere to a single transhistorical method)~~. Furthermore, the logical positivists did not share the belief that theories could be outright rejected. Instead, they believed theories are simply pursued on a basis of instances of confirmation.[[CiteRef::Schlick (1931)|pp.145-162]]

~~Following on~~ In the aftermath of the logical positivists, [[Karl Popper ]] proposed his ontology of scientific change in his book ''Conjectures and Refutations''. This ontology included many of the same entities and agents as for the logical positivists. However, Popper introduced the notion of [[Theory Acceptance|acceptance]] as an epistemic stance by suggesting ~~the rejection of~~ that theories ~~which faced any~~ could be rejected due to empirical refutation.[[CiteRef::Popper (1963)|pp. 62-63]] The contrast of terms suggested scientists could do more than simply pursue theories.

~~More drastically,~~ [[Thomas Kuhn ~~instantiated multiple changes to the existing epistemic~~ ]] proposed numerous new elements ~~with~~ in his model of [[Mechanism of Scientific Change|scientific change]]. Kuhn’s ''Structure of Scientific Revolutions '' [[CiteRef::Kuhn (1963)]] suggested ~~that there was now~~ a number of new ontological elements, including methods, values, questions, standards, and problems. He also speaks of paradigms as collections of theori second epistemic element beyond ~~theories – methods – which could be modified and were dynamic in nature~~theories–methods–as modifiable epistemic elements.[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962a)|pp. 66-80]] Unlike his predecessors, Kuhn’s ontology did not share the same relations between epistemic agents and epistemic elements; while previously theories and methods were entirely under the control of the scientific community, under Kuhn’s view, the elements change arbitrarily when an overflow of anomalies occurs.[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962a)|pp. 35-50]]

Shifting backwards, Imre Lakatos generated a holistic account of scientific change slightly regressive to previous ontologies. Lakatos kept Kuhn’s view of the fluidity of paradigms within scientific communities however, with two small modifications. Firstly, Lakatos saw paradigms as research programmes, of which many simultaneously existed, and secondly Lakatos believed they followed a more rational model of change, i.e. modifications were judged as regressive or progressive based on certain conditions.[[CiteRef::Lakatos (1970)|pp. 31-34]] With regards to regression, Paul Feyerabend criticized Lakatos for once again suggesting that theories can only be pursued. The whole system Lakatos built was a high functioning competition between research programmes.[[CiteRef::Feyerabend (1970a)]] As such, per Lakatos, theories could never really be accepted, and thus they carried the potential to threaten science with a potentially infinite number of theories all of which are rational to pursue.

Paul Patton

editor, Administrators

2,020

edits