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Response to the Argument from Nothing Permanent (Barseghyan-2015) (view source)
Revision as of 06:10, 30 November 2018
, 06:10, 30 November 2018no edit summary
There is the possibility of a mechanism of scientific change that governs the changes in theories, methods and other elements of science.
[[File:Fixed and changing methods.jpg|center|600px500px]]
|Resource=Barseghyan (2015)
|Prehistory=All previous responses to the Argument from Nothing Permanent seem to target the nothing permanent thesis: there are no permanent features in science.
One way to answer would be to say that there is a permanent method of science, the scientific method. This was implicit in the beliefs of philosophers of science from Whewell and Herschel up to about 1970.[[CiteRef::Laudan (1996)|p. 213]] However, it is now commonly held that the scientific method is changeable, see for instance Feyerabend's ''Against Method''.[[CiteRef::Feyerabend (1975a)]] See the page on [[Possibility of Scientonomy - Argument from Changability of Scientific Method]] for more details.
The sociology of scientific knowledge, developed by Barnes and Bloor, argues against the underlying rationalism within the internal factors of scientific change, and instead proposes that the external sociological factors are the best description of scientific change. This denies the nothing permanent thesis by supposing the permanent features in scientific change are encompassed by sociology. See the page on The Argument from Social Construction for more details.
Most similar to the scientonomic stance is that of Laudan's reticulated model. Laudan postulates that although theories, methods and axiological values are all transient in science, there is still a model to account for their behaviour. Laudan's reticulated model describes relations between three levels of hierarchy; theories, methods and aims. Unlike other theories of scientific change, Laudan's reticulated model acknowledges a changing method of science that is influenced both by theories and also aims. He describes the interactions between theories, methods and aims as follows: theories constrain methods, while methods justify theories; methods realize aims, while aims justify methods; theories and aims must harmonize. Laudan's model provides a mechanism of scientific change which can account for dynamic methods, shifting aims and the developing criteria needed by theories in order to be accepted. This reticulated model provides a dynamic that explains the process of scientific change—it posits that the underlying feature of science is its reticulated model. Thus, Laudan denies the nothing permanent thesis by proposing a mechanism that governs how science changes.
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