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{{Theory
|Topic=Scientonomy
|Theory Type=Definition
|Topic=Scientonomy
|Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan,
|Formulated Year=2015
Though highly relevant to the traditional field of philosophy of science, theoretical scientonomy differs from it in that, as a descriptive scientific field, it does not include the normative question of how science ''should'' be conducted so as to produce reliable knowledge. In the past, when a unitary and fixed scientific method was believed to exist, the descriptive question of how the process of scientific change actually works was often conflated with the normative question of how it should work if reliable knowledge is to be produced. Scientonomy seeks a clear distinction between the two, and claims only the former as its subject matter.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 12-20]] This restriction is motivated by the same concerns as Bloor's symmetry postulate in the sociology of scientific knowledge.[[CiteRef::Golinski (1998)]] Scientonomy's descriptive account, however, does include the descriptive study of normative propositions espoused by scientific practitioners such as those contained in their openly accepted norms such as scientific methods or ethical imperatives.[[CiteRef::Sebastien (2016)]] Theoretical scientonomy concerns itself specifically with two major tasks:
#) the formulation of a [[Ontology of Scientific Change|standard ontology]] of epistemic entities and relations involved in the process of scientific change; and #) the unearthing of the [[Mechanism of Scientific Change|general patterns]] that underlie the process of scientific change.
The search for fixed general laws obviates the charge of incoherent relativism sometimes leveled at the sociology of scientific knowledge.[[CiteRef::Siegel (2011)]] By seeking such laws, scientonomy hopes to illuminate questions such as the nature of scientific rationality, and the naturalistic epistemological question of how knowledge has been acquired.
The particularist claim that science appears, to superficial observation at least, to possess no general features that have remained fixed through history is not grounds for dismissing the possibility of a theory of scientific change. Theories often reveal that unexpected regularities underlie seemingly disparate phenomena. On the face of it, a point of light revolving in the heavens and a falling apple seem to have nothing whatsoever in common. Newton’s theory of Universal Gravitation asserted, however, that both are movements under the influence of a gravitational force. The theory was highly successful in accounting for both falling bodies and the movements of the planets using a small set of simple general principles. The similarities between the two classes of phenomena only became evident through the formulation of the theory. Success in theory formulation often depends on the ability to identify such unexpected connections.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 86]]
|Resource=Barseghyan (2015)
|Prehistory=
|History=
|Page Status=Needs Editing
|Editor Notes=The whole thing needs to be edited with a simple idea in mind: we are still very much a project of science of science, rather than a full-fledged science of science. HB I went over the article and made some minor changes in wording to stress the preliminary nature of scientonomy. I also added a reference. I also added a reference. I am leaving it as 'needs editing' because a prehistory still needs to be added. PP

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