Changes

|Prehistory=There has been a long tradition In its most general sense, the key question at issue is that of confusing different stances that what ontological units a community can scientonomic theory ought to take towards a theoryas its subject matter. [[Thomas Kuhn]], for example, used a number The specific form of equally vague words, including ''universally received'', ''embraced'', ''acknowledged'', and ''committed'' to describe the status question has evolved with changing notions of theories within scientific communitiesthose ontological units. Thomas Kuhn's theory of scientific change regarded identified the ontological units of scientific change to be as frameworks that which he referred to as ''paradigms'' , which can be defined as a characteristic set of beliefs and preconceptions held by a scientific community including instrumental, theoretical, and metaphysical commitments all together. [[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962)]], a term which he [[CiteRef::Kuhn(1977)|pp.293-319]] Kuhn himself later confessed that he had confusingly used the term in several different senses. [[CiteRef::Kuhn(1977)|pp.293-319294]] He clarified In an attempt to clarify matters he sought to replace his theory by introducing broadest definition of the paradigm, given above, with the concept of ''disciplinary matriciesmatrices'', defined as those shared elements that account for the relatively unproblematic professional communication and relative unanimity of professional judgment within a scientific community. These include shared symbolic generalizations[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1977) |p.297]] For Kuhn, then, a theory of scientific change ought to deal with disciplinary matrices and their changes over time. While for Kuhn, paradigms or disciplinary matrices were primary, there was likewise confusion about the different stances a community might take towards a theory. Kuhn used a number of equally vague words, including ''universally received'', ''embraced'', models''acknowledged'', and exemplars ''committed'' to describe the status of theories within scientific communities. [[CiteRef::Kuhn (19771962)|pp. 10-13]] The prehistory of ontologies of scientific change is best discussed elsewhere. The question at issue can only be stated in its current form given the specific ontology of scientific change assumed by the Barseghyan theory.