Changes

|Question=How ought a scientonomic theory deal with the various stances that a community might take towards a theory? How ought it to classify those stances? Which stances towards a theory ought a scientonomic theory account for?

|Description=There has been a long tradition of confusing different Communities may take several [[Epistemic Stances Towards Theories|epistemic stances that ]] towards theories. Theories can be [[Theory Acceptance|accepted]] by a community can take towards a theoryas the best currently available description of the world. KuhnEven when they are not so accepted, they can be deemed [[Theory Use|instrumentally useful]] for instance, used a number of equally vague words, including ''universally received'',''embraced'', ''acknowledged'', certain problems. They can be deemed promising and ''committed'', to describe the status worthy of theories within scientific communities.[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1970c)Theory Pursuit|pp. 10-13pursuit]] ''Acceptance'' too has had a plethora . The question at issue here is that of different meanings. Once the taxonomy which of epistemic these stances is clarifiedneed a scientonomic theory account for. Ought it account only for accepted theories, or ought it is important also account for scientists decisions to identify stances for which changes ''ought pursue theories as worthy of further development, or their decisions to be'' traced and explained by scientonomy.treat theories as instrumentally useful?

|Prehistory=In the historical literatureits most general sense, many different words have been used to describe the attitudes a scientific community can take towards key question at issue is that of what ontological units a scientonomic theory, generally without any attempt ought to clarify their respective meaningstake as its subject matter. Attempts to draw distinctions between well-specified stances have occasionally been made. In The prehistory of the descriptive topic of the eighteenth century, [[David HumeOntology of Scientific Change|ontological units of scientific change]] distinguished between ''believing'' and ''entertaining'' a theoryis discussed elsewhere. The prehistory of concepts of the [[CiteRef::Hume (1739/40) Epistemic Stances Towards Theories|p. 83epistemic stances that communities might take towards theories]] is likewise dealt with elsewhere. The normative question at issue, in its current form, arises specifically within the context of the ontology assumed by the current Barseghyan [[Larry LaudanTheory of Scientific Change|theory of scientific change]], and the definitions of its key concepts such as the [[CiteRef::Laudan (1977) Scientific Mosaic|pp. 108-114scientific mosaic]] and Stephen Wykstra , [[CiteRef::Wykstra (1980) Theory Acceptance|p. 216theory acceptance]] similarly distinguished between the ''acceptance'' and the ''pursuit'' of a theory , and Barseghyan has argued that a similar distinction was implicit in the work of [[Imre LakatosTheory Pursuit|theory pursuit]]. , and [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015) Theory Use|p. 33theory use]].|Related Topics=Scope of Scientonomy - Construction and Appraisal, Scope of Scientonomy - Descriptive and Normative, Scope of Scientonomy - Explicit and Implicit, Scope of Scientonomy - Individual and Social, Scope of Scientonomy - Time Fields and Scale, Epistemic Stances Towards Theories, Ontology of Scientific Change, Theory Acceptance, Theory Use, Theory Pursuit,

|Acceptance Indicators=That is when the community accepted its first answer to this question, the [[Scope of Scientonomy - Acceptance, use, and pursuit (Barseghyan-2015)]], which indicates that the question is itself considered legitimate.