Changes

|Description=Communities may take several [[Epistemic Stances Towards Theories|epistemic stances]] towards theories. Theories can be [[Theory Acceptance|accepted]] by a community as the best currently available description of the world. Even when they are not so accepted, they can be deemed [[Epistemic Stances - Acceptance Theory Use and Pursuit (Barseghyan-2015)|instrumentally useful]] for certain problems. They can be deemed promising and worthy of [[Theory Pursuit|pursuit]]. The question at issue here is that of which of these stances need a scientonomic theory account for. Ought it account only for accepted theories, or ought it also account for scientists decisions to pursue theories as worthy of further development, or their decisions to treat theories as instrumentally useful?

|Prehistory=In its most general sense, the key question at issue is that of what ontological units a scientonomic theory ought to take as its subject matter. The specific form prehistory of the question has evolved with changing notions descriptive topic of those ontological units. Thomas Kuhn's theory the [[Ontology of scientific change identified the Scientific Change|ontological units of scientific change as frameworks which he referred to as ''paradigms'', which can be defined as a characteristic set of beliefs and preconceptions held by a scientific community including instrumental, theoretical, and metaphysical commitments all together. [[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962)]][[CiteRef::Kuhn(1977)|ppis discussed elsewhere.293-319]] Kuhn himself confessed that he had confusingly used the term in several different senses. [[CiteRef::Kuhn(1977)|pp.293-294]] In an attempt to clarify matters he sought to replace his broadest definition The prehistory of the paradigm, given above, with the concept concepts of ''disciplinary matrices'', defined as those shared elements that account for the relatively unproblematic professional communication and relative unanimity of professional judgment within a scientific community. [[CiteRef::Kuhn (1977) Epistemic Stances Towards Theories|p.297]] For Kuhn, then, a theory of scientific change ought to deal with disciplinary matrices and their changes over time. While for Kuhn, paradigms or disciplinary matrices were primary, there was likewise confusion about the different epistemic stances a community that communities might take towards a theory. Kuhn used a number of equally vague words, including ''universally received'', ''embraced'', ''acknowledged'', and ''committed'' to describe the status of theories within scientific communities. [[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962)|pp. 10-13]] The prehistory of ontologies of scientific change is best discussed likewise dealt with elsewhere. The normative question at issue can only be stated , in its current form given , arises specifically within the context of the specific ontology of scientific change assumed by the current Barseghyan [[Theory of Scientific Change|theory.   Until a proper taxonomy of scientific change]], and the definitions of its key concepts such as the [[Scientific Mosaic|scientific mosaic]], [[Theory Acceptance|theory acceptance]], [[Theory Pursuit|theory pursuit]], and [[Epistemic Stances Towards TheoriesTheory Use|epistemic stances towards theoriestheory use]] was formulated the question at issue could not be clearly framed.|Related Topics=Scope of Scientonomy - Construction and Appraisal, Scope of Scientonomy - Descriptive and Normative, Scope of Scientonomy - Explicit and Implicit, Scope of Scientonomy - Individual and Social, Scope of Scientonomy - Time Fields and Scale, Epistemic Stances Towards Theories, Ontology of Scientific Change, Theory Acceptance, Theory Use, Theory Pursuit,