Changes

Jump to navigation Jump to search
no edit summary
Some authors can be considered stereotypical “social constructivists” in arguing that a scientific community is strictly a specialized social process. For Ludwik Fleck, theories as they are passed down through generations, and between groups of scientists, and misunderstood, reshaped, and refined based on the fundamentally incommensurable nature of communication that arises from social organization.[[CiteRef::Sady (2016)]] Fleck argues that scientific thought is a highly specified kind of observation, socially constructed by the transfer of knowledge from one generation to the next by a process of institutional induction through schools, churches, and so on.[[CiteRef::Cohen and Schnelle (Eds.) (1986)]] Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar likewise contend in Laboratory Life that the construction of scientific facts relies on an elaborate, ritualized, and almost tribe-like devotion to actions that are fundamentally social. Scientists take scientific claims and construct structures of institution and social support, which is what the acceptance of a fact in a communal context actually relies upon.[[CiteRef::Latour and Woolgar (1979)]]
 
A formulation similar to this theorem has been proposed by [[Marina DiMarco]] and [[Kareem Khalifa]]:
 
<blockquote>If nonepistemic considerations can be tiebreakers in cases of transient underdetermination, then scientists may appeal to nonepistemic considerations when accepting or rejecting hypotheses.[[CiteRef::DiMarco and Khalifa (2019)|p. 1022]]</blockquote>
 
It is unclear whether the "may" here is to be understood as normative or descriptive. Yet, if interpreted descriptively, DiMarco and Khalifa's formulation captures the gist of our theorem: sociocultural factors (i.e. "nonepistemic considerations") affect the process of theory acceptance when the method of the time itself allows for such an influence by underdetermining theory choice.
|Page Status=Needs Editing
}}
{{Acceptance Record

Navigation menu