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A list of all pages that have property "Abstract" with value "Can groups be rationa’l agents over and above their inspanidual members? We argue that group agents are distinguished by their capacity to mimic the way in which inspanidual agents act and that this capacity must “supervene” on the group members’ contributions. But what is the nature of this supervenience relation? Focusing on group judgments, we argue that, for a group to be rational, its judgment on a particular proposition cannot generally be a function of the members’ inspanidual judgments on that proposition. Rather, it must be a function of their inspanidual sets of judgments across many propositions. So knowing what the group members inspanidually think about some proposition does not generally tell us how the group collectively adjudicates that proposition: the supervenience relation must be “setwise,” not “proposition-wise.” Our account preserves the inspanidualistic view that group agency is nothing mysterious but also suggests that a group agent may hold judgments that are not directly continuous with its members’ corresponding inspanidual judgments.". Since there have been only a few results, also nearby values are displayed.

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    • List and Pettit (2006)  + (Can groups be rationa’l agents over and abCan groups be rationa’l agents over and above their individual</br>members? We argue that group agents are distinguished by their</br>capacity to mimic the way in which individual agents act and that this</br>capacity must “supervene” on the group members’ contributions. But</br>what is the nature of this supervenience relation? Focusing on group</br>judgments, we argue that, for a group to be rational, its judgment on a</br>particular proposition cannot generally be a function of the members’</br>individual judgments on that proposition. Rather, it must be a function</br>of their individual sets of judgments across many propositions. So</br>knowing what the group members individually think about some</br>proposition does not generally tell us how the group collectively</br>adjudicates that proposition: the supervenience relation must be “setwise,”</br>not “proposition-wise.” Our account preserves the individualistic</br>view that group agency is nothing mysterious but also suggests that a</br>group agent may hold judgments that are not directly continuous with</br>its members’ corresponding individual judgments.mbers’ corresponding individual judgments.)