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|Description=A community's [[Scientific Mosaic|mosaic]] consists of the set of all accepted [[Theory|theories]] accepted and employed [[Method|methods]] employed by the that community at some particular time. How do disciplinary boundaries exist within the mosaic: are they expressible as theories and/or methods?Is the statement of disciplinary boundaries a mere definition of a discipline, a description of what a discipline has been doing, or a normative prescription of what a discipline ought to do. For example, when physicists say "Physics is the study of the nature and properties of matter and energy", it's not quite clear whether this is meant as a definition, description or prescription. It can have three different meanings:* '''definition''': physics, ''by definition'', is the study of the nature and properties of matter and energy;* '''description''': physics ''has been'' studying the nature and properties of matter and energy; * '''prescription''': physics ''ought to'' study the nature and properties of matter and energy.Is it possible that actual disciplinary boundaries are some kind of a combination of the three? If that is so, then how are the definition of a discipline, its description and its prescription interrelated? The task is to clarify the exact nature of disciplinary boundaries.  In addition, how are topics of disciplines related to disciplinary boundaries? Different disciplines are interested in different topics and it seems likely that there is a substantial link between the topics covered by a discipline and the boundaries of the discipline. However, it is possible for different disciplines to study the same topic. For instance, behavioural economics can study behaviours in different settings which is also a topic studied by psychology. Thus, it seems likely that there is more to disciplinary boundaries and different topics.|Parent Topic=Ontology of Scientific ChangeEpistemic Elements

|Prehistory=Until very recently the question of the status of disciplinary boundaries was fundamentally mostly ignored questions. [[Static and Dynamic Methods|Static methodologists simply ]] showed very little interests interest in the subject. Perhaps the earliest comparison that can be drawn to a similar subject would have been although they did weigh in on the related question of the demarcation in dividing pseudo-of scientific theories from pseudo-scientific theoriesones. Through demarcation criteria, while not sufficiently establishing the status of disciplinary boundaries, philosophers Philosophers of science like [[Karl Popper]] and [[Rudolf Carnap]] were able to effectively establish formulated criteria for distinguishing scientific disciplines like astronomy and physics from non-scientific disciplinestopics like astrology and palm reading. Carnap's verificationism maintained that a theory is scientific only if it can be verified by observation. [[CiteRef::Godfrey-Smith (2003)|pp. 27]] Popper, on the other hand, maintained that a theory is only scientific if it is vulnerable to falsification by conflicting observations. [[CiteRef::Godfrey-Smith (2003)|pp. 58]]  Later, dynamic methodologists like [[Imre Lakatos]] and [[Thomas Kuhn]] said more that was of relevance to the status of disciplinary boundaries, without explicitly broaching the subject. Lakatos saw the scientific endeavour as consisting of research programs.

Carnap’s demarcation criteria is commonly known A more interesting comparison to be drawn between history and the status of disciplinary boundaries lies in the opinion of dynamic methodologists such as Verificationism that of [[Imre Lakatos]] and [CiteRef::Godfrey-Smith (2003)|pp. 27[Thomas Kuhn]]. Heavily based on probabilityLakatos, Carnap believed a theory could only be scientific if it was testable. Carnap believed a theory should be tested while never outright stating his opinion on its occurrences and given disciplinary boundaries seems to have formed a probabilitystrong implicit foundation for disciplinary boundaries. PopperFor Lakatos, very similarly, had periods of stability in science involve research programs. What is interesting is that one of the main criteria known as Falsificationism but whereas for Carnap a theory could to become accepted into a research program is to be refuted multiple times, for Popper, once a theory was proved wrong it was permanently refutedin unity with the rest of the program. [[CiteRef::Godfrey-Smith Lakatos (20031970)|pp. 5832-34]]Herein it is evident, while there were no absolute criteria by which to determine disciplinary boundaries, Lakatos at least regarded them in some sort of simple terms in that they had to work with each other. In essence, for Lakatos disciplinary boundaries were still ambiguous but more defined than his static methodologist predecessors.

A more interesting comparison to be drawn between history and the status of disciplinary boundaries lies in the opinion of dynamic methodologists such as that of [[Imre Lakatos]] and [[Thomas Kuhn]]. , like Lakatos, while never outright stating his opinion took an explicit stance on disciplinary boundaries seems to have formed . Kuhn had a strong implicit foundation for disciplinary boundariesvery interesting system of five shared values which theories progress through. For LakatosIgnoring his future contradictions and deconstructions of these values, periods one of stability in science involve research programsthe five values which shows his recognition of disciplinary boundaries is consistency. What is interesting is Consistency as a value entailed that one of the main criteria for a theory to become accepted into a research program is to be in unity internally consistent but also consistent with other theories of the rest of paradigm. Like in the programcase for Lakatos, disciplinary boundaries are seen as ambiguous but at least recognized by Kuhn.[[CiteRef::Lakatos Kuhn (19701973a)|pp. 32320-34339]]. Herein it is evident, while there were no absolute criteria by which to determine disciplinary boundaries, Lakatos at least regarded them in some sort of simple terms in that they had to work with each other. In essence, for Lakatos disciplinary boundaries were still ambiguous but more defined than his static methodologist predecessors.

KuhnSome more recent authors (Becher, like LakatosBechtel, Hoskin, never took an explicit stance on disciplinary boundariesand Stichweh) have attempted to clarify the nature of academic disciplines. Kuhn had [[Tony Becher]] conducted a case study by interviewing experts from six apparently distinct disciplines, and used the data obtained to propose a very interesting system number of five shared values which theories progress throughdifferent methodological ways to distinguish between disciplines. Ignoring his future contradictions He contends that each discipline has its own qualities – not just epistemological, but cultural as well, and deconstructions regards each of these valuesin turn to contrast between disciplines.[[CiteRef::Becher (1981)|p. 109]] Becher identifies the way practitioners approach problems, one the extent of the five values which shows his recognition role of ideology, and characteristic modes of disciplinary boundaries is consistencypublication as distinguishing epistemological features between fields. Consistency as As an example, he contends that historians and biologists are more open-ended in their problem solving (do not require an initial hypothesis), whereas physicists and sociologists prefer a value entailed more concrete starting point. He also contends that ideology plays a theory be internally consistent but also consistent with other theories lesser role in the natural sciences than in fields like history and sociology, and cites examples of different modes of publication from discipline to discipline.[[CiteRef::Becher (1981)|pp. 111-112]] Becher’s main point then comes as he states that “characteristic beliefs, values and practices are, if anything, more noticeable than epistemological distinctions.”[[CiteRef::Becher (1981)|p. 113]] That is, we can examine the paradigm. Like in social structure of a discipline rather than what the case field of study actually is to tell different disciplines apart – for Lakatosexample, disciplinary boundaries historians prefer non-technical language and are seen as ambiguous but at least recognized by Kuhnlargely amateur-driven, whereas physicists use highly technical language and “seem sharply conscious of a hierarchy of esteem attaching to particular specialisms within their discipline.”[[CiteRef::Becher (1981)|p. 113]] Becher’s paper is more of a prescription of methodology than one claiming to know how to tell disciplines apart – his approach involves interviewing faculty members and identifying the “main structural similarities and differences within and between the […] domains”. [[CiteRef::Kuhn Becher (19731981)|p. 110]]