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A community's [[Scientific Mosaic|mosaic]] consists In addition, how are topics of the set of all accepted [[Theory|theories]] and employed [[Method|methods]] by the community at some particular time. How do disciplines related to disciplinary boundaries exist within the mosaic: ? Different disciplines are they expressible as theories interested in different topics and/or methods? Is it seems likely that there is a substantial link between the statement of disciplinary boundaries a mere definition of topics covered by a discipline, a description and the boundaries of what a the discipline has been doing. However, or a normative prescription of what a discipline ought it is possible for different disciplines to dostudy the same topic. For exampleinstance, when physicists say "Physics is the behavioural economics can study of physical processes", it's not quite clear whether this behaviours in different settings which is meant as also a definition, description or prescriptiontopic studied by psychology. It can have three different meanings:* '''definition''': physics, ''by definition''Thus, is the study of physical processes;* '''description''': physics ''has been'' studying physical processes; * '''prescription''': physics ''ought to'' study physical processes.Is it possible that actual disciplinary boundaries are some kind of a combination of the three? If seems likely that there is so, then how are the definition of a discipline, its description and its prescription interrelated? The task is more to clarify the exact nature of disciplinary boundariesand different topics.
Carnap’s demarcation criteria is commonly known as Verificationism.Later, dynamic methodologists like [[CiteRef::Godfrey-Smith (2003)|pp. 27Imre Lakatos]] Heavily based on probability, Carnap believed a theory could only be scientific if it was testable. Carnap believed a theory should be tested on its occurrences and given a probability. Popper, very similarly, had criteria known as Falsificationism but whereas for Carnap a theory could be refuted multiple times, for Popper, once a theory was proved wrong it was permanently refuted.[[CiteRef::Godfrey-Smith (2003)|pp. 58Thomas Kuhn]]said more that was of relevance to the status of disciplinary boundaries, without explicitly broaching the subject. Lakatos saw the scientific endeavour as consisting of research programs.
Status of Disciplinary Boundaries (view source)
Revision as of 21:20, 29 November 2018
, 21:20, 29 November 2018no edit summary
|Question=How do disciplinary boundaries exist within the scientific mosaic?
|Topic Type=Descriptive
|Description={{#evt:service=youtubeA community's [[Scientific Mosaic|mosaic]] consists of the set of all [[Theory|id=hQE-PdeGNY0theories]] accepted and [[Method|alignment=rightmethods]] employed by that community at some particular time. How do disciplinary boundaries exist within the mosaic: are they expressible as theories and/or methods? Is the statement of disciplinary boundaries a mere definition of a discipline, a description of what a discipline has been doing, or a normative prescription of what a discipline ought to do. For example, when physicists say "Physics is the study of the nature and properties of matter and energy", it's not quite clear whether this is meant as a definition, description or prescription. It can have three different meanings:|urlargs=start=371* '''definition''': physics, ''by definition'', is the study of the nature and properties of matter and energy;|* '''description=Nicholas Overgaard explains ''': physics ''has been'' studying the topicnature and properties of matter and energy; |container=frame * '''prescription''': physics ''ought to'' study the nature and properties of matter and energy.}}Is it possible that actual disciplinary boundaries are some kind of a combination of the three? If that is so, then how are the definition of a discipline, its description and its prescription interrelated? The task is to clarify the exact nature of disciplinary boundaries.
|Parent Topic=Epistemic Elements
|Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan,
|Formulated Year=2016
|Academic Events=Scientonomy Seminar 2016,
|Prehistory=Until very recently the question of the status of disciplinary boundaries was fundamentally mostly ignored questions. [[Static and Dynamic Methods|Static methodologists simply ]] showed very little interests interest in the subject. Perhaps the earliest comparison that can be drawn to a similar subject would have been although they did weigh in on the related question of the demarcation in dividing pseudo-of scientific theories from pseudo-scientific theoriesones. Through demarcation criteria, while not sufficiently establishing the status of disciplinary boundaries, philosophers Philosophers of science like [[Karl Popper]] and [[Rudolf Carnap]] were able to effectively establish formulated criteria for distinguishing scientific disciplines like astronomy and physics from non-scientific disciplinestopics like astrology and palm reading. Carnap's verificationism maintained that a theory is scientific only if it can be verified by observation. [[CiteRef::Godfrey-Smith (2003)|pp. 27]] Popper, on the other hand, maintained that a theory is only scientific if it is vulnerable to falsification by conflicting observations. [[CiteRef::Godfrey-Smith (2003)|pp.58]]
A more interesting comparison to be drawn between history and the status of disciplinary boundaries lies in the opinion of dynamic methodologists such as that of [[Imre Lakatos]] and [[Thomas Kuhn]]. Lakatos, while never outright stating his opinion on disciplinary boundaries seems to have formed a strong implicit foundation for disciplinary boundaries. For Lakatos, periods of stability in science involve research programs. What is interesting is that one of the main criteria for a theory to become accepted into a research program is to be in unity with the rest of the program.[[CiteRef::Lakatos (1970)|pp. 32-34]] Herein it is evident, while there were no absolute criteria by which to determine disciplinary boundaries, Lakatos at least regarded them in some sort of simple terms in that they had to work with each other. In essence, for Lakatos disciplinary boundaries were still ambiguous but more defined than his static methodologist predecessors.
Kuhn, like Lakatos, never took an explicit stance on disciplinary boundaries. Kuhn had a very interesting system of five shared values which theories progress through. Ignoring his future contradictions and deconstructions of these values, one of the five values which shows his recognition of disciplinary boundaries is consistency. Consistency as a value entailed that a theory be internally consistent but also consistent with other theories of the paradigm. Like in the case for Lakatos, disciplinary boundaries are seen as ambiguous but at least recognized by Kuhn.[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1973a)|pp. 320-339]]
Some more recent authors (Becher, Bechtel, Hoskin, and Stichweh) have attempted to clarify the nature of academic disciplines. [[Tony Becher]] conducted a case study by interviewing experts from six apparently distinct disciplines, and used the data obtained to propose a number of different methodological ways to distinguish between disciplines. He contends that each discipline has its own qualities – not just epistemological, but cultural as well, and regards each of these in turn to contrast between disciplines.[[CiteRef::Becher (1981)|p. 109]] Becher identifies the way practitioners approach problems, the extent of the role of ideology, and characteristic modes of publication as distinguishing epistemological features between fields. As an example, he contends that historians and biologists are more open-ended in their problem solving (do not require an initial hypothesis), whereas physicists and sociologists prefer a more concrete starting point. He also contends that ideology plays a lesser role in the natural sciences than in fields like history and sociology, and cites examples of different modes of publication from discipline to discipline.[[CiteRef::Becher (1981)|pp. 111-112]] Becher’s main point then comes as he states that “characteristic beliefs, values and practices are, if anything, more noticeable than epistemological distinctions.”[[CiteRef::Becher (1981)|p. 113]] That is, we can examine the social structure of a discipline rather than what the field of study actually is to tell different disciplines apart – for example, historians prefer non-technical language and are largely amateur-driven, whereas physicists use highly technical language and “seem sharply conscious of a hierarchy of esteem attaching to particular specialisms within their discipline.”[[CiteRef::Becher (1981)|p. 113]] Becher’s paper is more of a prescription of methodology than one claiming to know how to tell disciplines apart – his approach involves interviewing faculty members and identifying the “main structural similarities and differences within and between the […] domains”.[[CiteRef::Becher (1981)|p. 110]]
|Related Topics=Status of Questions,
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