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|Description=According to this formulation of the first law for theories, an accepted [[theory]] remains accepted unless replaced by other theories, even though sometimes that replacement may simply be the negation of the theory. That is, "if for some reason scientists of a particular field stop pursuing new theories, the last accepted theory will safely continue to maintain its position in the mosaic," with no further confirmation of the theory required.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p.122]]. There is no specification of what sort of theory might replace an accepted theory. Barseghyan notes that, in the most minimal case, a theory may simply be replaced by its own negation.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p.122]]

|Prehistory=The abundance of exempla below of instances of anomaly-tolerance is arguably the main reason for the rejection of Popper's ""falsificationist"" view on the part of Kuhn, Lakatos, and Laudan.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p.124]] Specifically, ""falsificationism"" is "the view that the whole course of science is nothing but a series of conjectures and their refutations" (Barseghyan (2015)'s summary). Since the mere presence of anomalies does not necessarily lead to the acceptance of a proposition's negation, it seems clear that "counterexamples do not kill theories."[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p.124]]

<blockquote>Suppose a scientific community accepts that a certain drug is therapeutically efficient in alleviating a certain condition. In principle, this proposition can be replaced by its own negation, i.e. the proposition that the drug is not efficient in alleviating the condition. HSC shows many examples of this sort. Recall, for instance, the medieval and early modern belief that bloodletting is efficient in restoring the proper balance of humors in the body and, thus, restoring health. When this belief was rejected it was simply replaced by its negation.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p.122]]</blockquote>