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There has also been a fierce debate among philosophers of science over the status of novel predictions. While, Popper, [[Imre Lakatos|Lakatos]] and Musgrave argued for a special status of novel predictions, Hempel, Carnap, and Laudan maintained that, as far as criteria for theory goes, there is no substantial difference between the value of novel predictions and post factual explanations of known facts. Nonetheless, some philosophers have used the lack of novel predictions in past historical episodes as a way to argue against the idea that theories are always accepted when they meet the criteria of the employed method. However this argument is unsound because it assumes that the hypothetico-deductive method was employed in every historical case.
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{{Acceptance Record
|Accepted From Approximate=No
|Acceptance Indicators=The law became ''de facto'' accepted by the community at that time together with the whole [[The Theory of Scientific Change|theory of scientific change]].
|Still Accepted=YesNo|Accepted Until Era=CE|Accepted Until Year=2017|Accepted Until Month=November|Accepted Until Day=29
|Accepted Until Approximate=No
|Rejection Indicators=The law became rejected as a result of the acceptance of [[The Second Law (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017)|the new formulation of the Second Law]] by Patton, Overgaard, and Barseghyan. For details, refer to [[Modification:Sciento-2017-0004|the modification]].
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