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The Second Law (Barseghyan-2015) (view source)
Revision as of 18:01, 29 November 2017
, 18:01, 29 November 2017no edit summary
There has also been a fierce debate among philosophers of science over the status of novel predictions. While, Popper, [[Imre Lakatos|Lakatos]] and Musgrave argued for a special status of novel predictions, Hempel, Carnap, and Laudan maintained that, as far as criteria for theory goes, there is no substantial difference between the value of novel predictions and post factual explanations of known facts. Nonetheless, some philosophers have used the lack of novel predictions in past historical episodes as a way to argue against the idea that theories are always accepted when they meet the criteria of the employed method. However this argument is unsound because it assumes that the hypothetico-deductive method was employed in every historical case.
|History=This was the original formulation of the second law proposed by Barseghyan in [[Barseghyan (2015)|''The Laws of Scientific Change'']]. [[Scientonomy Seminar|Seminar]] discussions revealed the law's two major flaws. First, it didn't clearly indicate what happened to a theory when a certain [[Theory Assessment Outcomes|assessment outcome]] obtained. Specifically, it didn't link theory assessment outcomes to the theory's acceptance or unacceptance. Secondly, the law sounded like a tautology which is not what a good law should sound like. Consequently, in 2017, a new formulation of the law was suggested by Patton, Overgaard and Barseghyan, which became accepted towards the end of that year and, thus, replaced the initial formulation.[[CiteRef::Patton, Overgaard, and Barseghyan (2017)]]
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