Hatfield, Gary. (2004) Sense-data and the Mind-Body Problem. In Schumacher (ed.) (2004), 305-331.
|Title||Sense-data and the Mind-Body Problem|
|Resource Type||collection article|
|Collection||Schumacher (ed.) (2004)|
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, philosophers, physicists, and the new psychologists agreed to this extent in their conceptions of the mind-body problem: they all had a healthy respect for the integrity of both the mental and the physical domains. Whatever their particular conunitments, whether phenomenalist, dualist, or materialist, they all aCcepted the reality of both mental and physical phenomena - where mental phenomena are, in the first instance, phenomenally characterized and perhaps equated with the contents of consciousness, and physical phenomena abstract from the knowing subject and sustain laws governing changes in spatiotemporally characterized objects. This acceptance of the mental domain held for physicists ~uch as Ludwig Boltzmann, Ernst Mach, and Hermann Hehnholtz no less than philosopher psychologists such as Wtlhehn Wundt and W~ James (despite their other differences).