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I agree that the definitions of logical presupposition and epistemic presupposition should be accepted.
The role of presupposition acceptance necessary to subsequent question acceptance -- as outlined by the law of question acceptance -- diverges from the notion of “supposition” central to the analysis of argument structures in logic. Whereas a question may only be accepted if all its epistemic presuppositions are accepted, an argument could very well be deemed logically valid without the acceptance of its logical presuppositions. Thus, with respect to question acceptance, an epistemic agent could plausibly accept all the epistemic presuppositions without necessarily accepting all the logical presuppositions. If question acceptance is to be assessed according to the law of question acceptance, then there must exist a way of distinguishing between these two forms of presupposition.
Furthermore, distinguishing between these elements when developing scientonomic diagrams would help facilitate successful visualization of question acceptance. For, one could easily identify that all epistemic suppositions had been accepted without falling prey to the potentially explosive nature of the logical presuppositions. Accepting separate definitions of logical presupposition and epistemic presupposition would improve the specificity of our communal knowledge -- and perhaps our visualization capabilities.
As Carlin points out, there is clear value in distinguishing logical and epistemic presuppositions in scientonomic diagrams, and it is also necessary to distinguish between them based on the proposed Law of Question Acceptance. For example, if we are diagramming a historical case studies that involve instances of actual documented question acceptance, we cannot necessarily excise certain logical presuppositions of a question but we must indicate their separation from the epistemic presuppositions that are of concern to us as scientonomists. I do not see any need for modification of the definitions as they stand right now either. Overall, this modification is appealing given the presence of Questions as a basic class of epistemic element in our ontology and the need to reference their presuppositions in observational scientonomy alongside proposed laws concerning questions in theoretical scientonomy (for example, the law of question acceptance and the role of questions in disciplines).
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