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Mechanism of Theory Acceptance (view source)
Revision as of 21:29, 9 March 2017
, 21:29, 9 March 2017no edit summary
A major development occurred when [[Thomas Kuhn]] presented his groundbreaking analysis of scientific change in [[Kuhn_(1962)| ''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'']] According to Kuhn, periods of 'normal science' are interrupted by 'scientific revolutions' that involve paradigm shifts. In a paradigm shift involves a fundamental change in world view for the relevant scientific communities. In his conception of theory change, the old and new theories are incommensurable.[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962)]] While Kuhn's ideas stirred much controversy, they were generally recognized as highly important.
In his [[Lakatos (1978a)|''Methodology of Scientific Research Programs'']],[[Imre Lakatos]] advocated a less cataclysmic view of scientific change, extending the earlier views of Popper. In a refinement of Popper's views, he believed that theories are not necessarily falsified by failed predictions. Rather, a theory's fate depends on its centrality in an overarching research program. The more central a theory is to its research program, the more effort will be extended towards saving it by modifying the research program's auxiliary hypotheses. [[CiteRef::Lakatos (1978a)]]
[[Paul Feyerabend]] argued in [[Feyerabend_(1975a)| ''Against Method'']] that the methods of theory acceptance change over time in science, and that these changes are largely arbitrary. [[Dudley Shapere]] agreed that scientific methods change over time. In [[Shapere_(1980)| ''The Character of Scientific Change'']], Shapere argued that the scientific methods used at the time are affected by the beliefs that the scientific community holds.[[CiteRef::Feyerabend (1975a)]][[CiteRef::Shapere (1980)]]
