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|First Name=Larry
|Last Name=Laudan
|DOB Approximate=No|DOD Approximate=No|Summary='''Larry Laudan''' is an American philosopher of science who greatly shaped the debates in the field from the late 1970s till the mid 1990s. He wrote many works notably, [[Laudan (19771977a)|''Progress and its Problems (1977)'']], [[Laudan (1981)|''Science and Hypothesis (1981)'']], and importantly [[Laudan (1984)|''Science and Values (1984)'']].[[CiteRef::Laudan (19771977a)]][[CiteRef::Laudan (1981)]][[CiteRef::Laudan (1984)]] Larry Laudan’s most notable contribution to the study of scientific change is his ''reticulated model'' of scientific change where [[Method|methods]] of theory evaluation change together with scientific [[Theory|theories]] and goals of scientific inquiry in a piecemeal rational fashion. He later defended his view from the criticisms made by notable colleagues like John Worrall.
|Historical Context=Prior to Laudan’s contribution to the discourse on scientific change, the Kuhnian tradition was the prevailing approach to the topic. In this preceding tradition, methods were seen as fixed to the paradigm in which they were utilized. Theories were also seemingly fixed to the paradigm in which they were discovered.
|Major Contributions====Early Views===Laudan’s early views are best seen through his work, ''Progress and its Problems (1977)'' where he discusses science as a process of evolution that utilizes empirically verified evidence. According to Laudan, comparison of theories and concepts and finding the solutions to theories confronted with anomalies comprise a key part to the changing nature of science.[[CiteRef::Laudan (19771977a)]]
===Later Views===
The Covariance Fallacy can be found in Science and Values. It states that it, “[…] assumes that the presence or absence of consensus with respect to factual claims can be used to infer the existence of agreement or disagreement with respect to cognitive aims.”
Form 1: The first form of the Covariance Fallacy describes those differences between scientists beliefs that stem from the aims and goals of science. For example, in the Kuhnian tradition, each paradigm has its own metaphysics and cognitive standards. If two scientists disagree, it stands to reason that they are in different paradigms. Furthermore Laudan believes that it is possible for scientists to share cognitive goals but have fundamental disagreements about the nature of the universe.
Form 2: The second form of the Covariance Fallacy is the assumption that simply because any given scientists agree on the factual evidence and methodologies, they also share the same cognitive goals.
|Criticism=In 1988 John Worrall responded to Laudan’s Science and Values in a work titled The Value of Fixed Methodology (1988.) Worrall seeks to demonstrate how the reticulated model is incorrect by stating that when Laudan claims, methodological change to be real, he means only explicit methodological change is real. Implicit methodology to Worrall remains static. Worrall believed that, should methodological change truly be implicit, then the reticulated model could not provide an explanation for scientific change. If methodological change was purely explicit then it would not conflict with the hierarchical view and thus the reticulated model is not necessary.
The changeability of methods is one of the lasting components of Laudan’s approach to scientific change.
|Related Topics=Mechanism of Scientific Change, Mechanism of Method Employment, Mechanism of Theory Acceptance,
|Page Status=Stub
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