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|Prehistory=Traditionally, philosophers of science have conflated the roles of methods and methodologies. This conflation can be traced back to [[William Whewell]]’s [[Whewell (1840)|''The Philosophy of Inductive Sciences'']], in which it is proposed that philosophy of science both describes the essence of knowledge and advocates its best methods.[[CiteRef::Whewell (1840)]] [[Thomas Kuhn’s Kuhn]]’s conceptions of paradigms and scientific revolutions also possessed both descriptive and normative connotations.[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962)]] Similarly, [[Imre Lakatos’ Lakatos]]’ methodology of scientific research programmes and [[Larry Laudan’s Laudan]]’s problem-oriented methodology, expressed in his early works, are constructed simultaneously as descriptions of methods of science and methodologies regulating what scientists ought to do.[[CiteRef::Lakatos (1970)]][[CiteRef::Laudan (1984a)]] Many contemporary authors working in the field inherited this view from Kuhn, Lakatos, Laudan and other classics of the genre.