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Mechanism of Theory Acceptance (view source)
Revision as of 03:54, 22 June 2017
, 03:54, 22 June 2017no edit summary
The scientific revolutions in the early twentieth century caused philosophers of science to wonder how science accepts its theories. In his [[Popper (1959)|''Logic of Scientific Discovery'']], [[Karl Popper]] argued that old theories are replaced by new theories when an old theory is falsified and a new theory is corroborated in by experimental evidence. This occurs when an experiment successfully tests a bold conjecture made by the new theory.[[CiteRef::Popper (1959)]]
A major development occurred when [[Thomas Kuhn]] presented his groundbreaking analysis of scientific change in [[Kuhn (19621962a)|''The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'']] According to Kuhn, periods of 'normal science' are interrupted by 'scientific revolutions' that involve paradigm shifts. In a paradigm shift involves a fundamental change in world view for the relevant scientific communities. In his conception of theory change, the old and new theories are incommensurable.[[CiteRef::Kuhn (19621962a)]] While Kuhn's ideas stirred much controversy, they were generally recognized as highly important.
In his [[Lakatos (1978a)|''Methodology of Scientific Research Programs'']], [[Imre Lakatos]] advocated a less cataclysmic view of scientific change. In a refinement of Popper's views, he believed that theories are not necessarily falsified by failed predictions. Rather, a theory's fate depends on its centrality in an overarching research program. The more central a theory is to its research program, the more effort will be extended towards saving it by modifying the research program's auxiliary hypotheses. [[CiteRef::Lakatos (1978a)]]
