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Due to lacking further justification, background assumptions bring a form of relativism into science. [[CiteRef::Longino (Longino, 1990) ]] Without an objective or non-arbitrary means of determining the background assumptions, the influence of subjective and arbitrary background assumptions is inimical to the objective normative accounts of traditional philosophers of science. Non-inferentialist justification that is not based on infallible knowledge, which is practically impossible to attain, implies that there is enough room for arbitrary factors such as personal ideology to influence the choice of a particular background assumption or affect the use of a particular background assumption on confirmation. Longino criticizes this belief on the grounds that background assumptions lead to a form of relativism only if an individualist conception of scientific method and scientific knowledge is presupposed. [[CiteRef::Longino (Longino 1990) ]] She argues that a method of inquiry is “objective to the degree that it permits '''transformative criticism'''”. [[CiteRef::Longino (Longino 1990) ]] An '''epistemic community''' requires four conditions for having transformative criticism: [[CiteRef::Longino (Longino, 1990)]]

Longino’s account treats knowledge as a social product. [[CiteRef::Longino (Longino, 1990) ]] '''Scientific objectivity''' is not the result of a particular normative methodology such as Popper’s falsificationism. Instead, scientific objectivity comes from the open discourse and culture of criticism within science. [[CiteRef::Longino (Longino, 1990) ]] Her contextual empiricist position implies that epistemic justification is dependent on the epistemic contexts. Background assumptions can play a role in the epistemic justification by turning a set of observations into evidence. Scientific communities have their own practices and the objectivity of scientific knowledge is coming from the community rather than the individual scientist. Social and cultural context can also affect the epistemic justification since background assumption can make a particular contextual values relevant.

According to the traditional accounts, scientific methodology is value free. This means that non-epistemic values such as moral values should not play a role within scientific methodology. Most if not all philosophers of science agree that moral values can play a role in the question of which sort of projects ought to be pursued. Value free science is concerned with the role of non-epistemic values within scientific methodology. Hempel argued against the use of such values on the grounds that these values cannot give empirical support to various theories (Hempel, 1960). For example, the political debate about the moral desirability of nuclear energy has no bearing on whether chain reaction is true. Longino criticizes the idea of value free science in distinguishes between what she calls '''contextual values''' and '''constitutive values'''. (Longino, 1983a) Contextual values are social and practical interests (Longino, 1995). They can include inclusion, diffusion of power, ontological heterogeneity… (Longino 1994) By contrast, constitutive values are the values that are in accordance with the goals of science. They can include fruitfulness, accuracy, precision, simplicity and novel predictions. (Longino, 1995) Longino purports to show that under certain conditions, contextual values can become constitutive values. [[CiteRef::Longino (Longino, 1990) ]] For instance, the contextual value of diversity can become constitutive in a case where diversity of perspectives, which tend to have diversity of beliefs and values. Diversity is in fact required to turn hypothesis into knowledge due to the fact that transformative criticism is a necessary part of theory assessment. Longino also uses the example of feminist values to bolster her account. (Longino, 1987) Scientists with feminist values are skeptical about various claims on gender who can help minimize the bias on the topic of gender. As mentioned in the previous section Longino’s account of knowledge is a social one. Diversity of perspectives, beliefs and values is, therefore, necessary for scientific objectivity. [[CiteRef::Longino (Longino, 1990)]]