Changes

Clearly, then, observations are laden with theories that depend on the cultural and social context of the observer. By extension, because societies are composed of individuals who have theory-laden observations, the phenomenon of theory-ladenness in observations also manifests itself at the social level.

Mill believes that a society makes scientific (and other types of) progress when it allows the free flow of ideas by everyone. The ability to express oneself freely is not restricted to social and economic elite. Rather, Mill contends that people from all types of diverse backgrounds should have the right to fearlessly express themselves (On Liberty citation). Therefore, the ideas proposed by people from diverse vantage points lead to a plethora of novel and unique ideas or theories (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, p.142). This constant emergence of novel theories allows for the exploration of hitherto unexplored notions, and after evaluation, the best ones are retained (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, p.116). This process continues: new, radical ideas are continuously (and without hindrance) proposed, they are explored, they may challenge orthodox scientific beliefs, and if they become accepted, the best ideas then become the scientific belief. Thus, for Mill, this “marketplace of ideas” is a necessary condition that allows science to progress (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, p.116, 142).

|Criticism=Mill believes in a refined and self-critical use of induction. He uses the history of the growth of science as evidence to substantiate his claims. However, Mill himself was not an historian of science. As a matter of fact, his knowledge of the subject was based mostly on secondary sources (SEP, Mill, 3.3). In particular, Mill drew heavily on William Whewell’s History of Inductive Science, John Herschel’s Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy and August Comte’s Cours de Positive Philosophie. Likewise, Mill’s appeal to the history of science for his claims in support of induction was made possible due to the work done by Alexander Bain (Autobiography, I: 215–7, 255). According to Christopher Macleod, Mill most likely would not have viewed induction as being exhaustive of reasoning in science had he conducted primary research in the history of science (SEP, Mill, 3.3). In other words, if Mill himself had engaged with primary research material on the history of scientific practice, it is unlike that he would have viewed scientific growth as being a result of progressively refined induction (SEP, Mill, 3.3). Macleod contends that the history of successful scientific practice reveals that, instead of mere refined induction, creative use of hypothesis-making has also played a critical role (SEP, Mill, 3.3). Therefore, Mill cannot, on one hand, declare imaginative hypothesis-making as invalid and, on the other hand, claim use history of science is indicative of proper reasoning, as history reveals that hypothesis-making has, contrary to Mill’s ideas, contributed enormously to the growth of scientific knowledge.