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One of the most prominent ideas that many philosophers prior to and during Mill’s time believed in was the ‘uniformity of nature.’ This concept was usually the uncritical starting assumption of many philosophers, including Mill himself. The principle of the ‘uniformity of nature’ states that the natural phenomenon behaves in a uniform, law-like fashion. The universe was thought to be governed by general laws that were considered immutable. This idea is also sometimes characterized as the ‘law of causation’--- “it is a law that there is a law for everything”.[[CiteRef::Buchdahl (1971)|p.348]]
Most influential philosophers of the past few centuries strongly adhered to this concept. Rationalist philosophers such as Leibniz and Descartes, and their followers maintained this principle. Kant himself ardently believed in the principle of the ‘uniformity of nature.’ Though Mill, and some British empiricists generally, tried to disassociate themselves from rationalist and Kantian doctrines, they nonetheless believed in this principle. Given this widespread acceptance, Mill too implicitly agreed to it, and used it to justify his claims in support inductive inferences [[CiteRef::Buchdahl (Buchdahl, 1971).]]
Another important concept that Mill inherited is Hume’s ‘problem of induction.’ The primary idea is that due to our limited particular experiences we generalize the results, thinking that the future will resemble the past. However, since our experience is limited, but the future universalization is infinite, there is no justification that the future will resemble the past. Take a classic example: one may observe million swans all of whom are white. Accordingly, one can make the universal conclusion that, given our large set of data, “all swans are white.” Importantly, this conclusion makes an assertion about the future: all swans that will be observed in the future will also be white. However, no matter how many singular observational instances there may be, it cannot be guaranteed that a future instance may not refute the past. That is, we cannot necessarily claim that there will never be a non-white swan (e.g., black swan). This is Hume’s ‘problem of induction,’ which plagues all empirical sciences. Inheriting the British empiricist tradition, Mill had to, broadly speaking, justify induction and, particularly, empirical sciences as well. The ‘problem of induction’ provided the context within which Mill worked.
Mill entered the debate on the epistemology of science through the publication of his book “A System of Logic” in 1843. Most of his work was in response to the book “History of Inductive Sciences ” by William Whewell that was published in 1837. Mill’s book, which expressed his “difference of opinion” [[CiteRef::Strong (Strong, 1955, )|p.209) ]] with Whewell, was popular among the British empiricists. One of the reasons that the intellectual community disregarded Whewell’s ideas on science was his departure from the tradition of British empiricist such as Locke and Berkeley. Instead, Whewell had aligned himself with continental philosophers such as Kant. This contention, however, was more than a mere divide between rationalist and empiricist traditions. Whewell approached science through its history, whereas Mill thought that using logic was more appropriate [[CiteRef::Strong (Strong, 1955)]].
Like his predecessor Whewell, Mill thought that one of the essential tasks of the philosophy of science was to formulate a method of evaluation for scientific theories. Unlike most philosophers before them, both Whewell and Mill were cognizant that the history of science and philosophy of science are intimately connected. Yet, they differed in their approaches for what provides, or is the source of justification for the evaluative criteria for scientific theories and laws. On one hand, Whewell took what could appropriately be termed as the ‘historicist’ approach: he thought that the study of history of science provides us with the evaluative criteria. Specifically, Whewell’s historical survey led him to conclude that the evaluative criteria are ‘distilled from’ and derive their justification out of the historical record. Hence, Whewell’s somewhat unqualified historicist approach not only ‘finds’ the scientific criteria by studying history of science, but also provides its justification based on scientific history [[CiteRef::Losee (Losse, 1983)]]. In particular, Whewell showed that the historical survey of the development of a given science reveals that the leading ideas become ‘clarified’ through progressive criticism. These leading, fundamental ideas are not construed as being ‘accidental,’ as it is these idea that lead to the development of the said branch of science around which the science organizes itself [[CiteRef::Buchdahl (Buchdahl, 1971)]]. It was this historicist approach against which Mill primarily argued.
Another issue in Mill’s day pertained to the justification being necessarily true, as opposed to being true only contingently. Philosophers such as Kant and Whewell, who was heavily influenced by Kant’s work, were deductive necessitarians: they held that deductive reasoning is necessarily true, meaning that the conclusion of a deductive argument is universal and necessary. Contrarily, for them, inductive reasoning lead to conclusions that were inevitably fallible, showing that Whewell and Kant were critically aware of Hume’s problem. Deviating from Whewell, Mill’s empiricism favors inductive reasoning. Although Mill employs terminology such as “invariable” and “unconditionality” when describing logic of scientific justification, he is not a necessitarian as he lived in a post-Humean context. There is ongoing debate to this day whether Mill’s notions can ultimately be reduced to ones requiring a ‘necessary connection.’ If so, Mill would be rendered an inductive necessitarian [[CiteRef::Buchdahl (Buchdahl, 1971)]].
|Major Contributions=Mill’s Empiricism:
Mill is an empiricist who believes that all our ideas are gained through sense perception. Departing from the rationalist doctrines, which hold reason as the primary source of knowledge, Mill follows a long line of British empiricists such as Locke, Berkeley and Hume. The ‘source’ of ideas primarily refers to where the ideas come from, as opposed to denying the role that reason plays. As such, Mill holds that the mind is furnished with ideas through experience, and then reason can use these ideas. His empiricism is thoroughgoing: there is no source other than experience and observation that provides us with our ideas (SEP, Mill, 2.1). His empiricism is quite radical: in fact, it is phenomenalistic. Drawing upon the works of earlier empiricist idealists such as Berkeley, Mill thinks that the mind-dependent reality is all we have access to. That is, there is nothing other than the ideas provided by sensations that the mind has access to. Unlike some earlier empiricists like Locke, Mill thinks that the external objects (if any) are not perceivable. Whereas Locke believed that the object’s primary qualities and the ideas invoked by them resemble each other, Mill is more prudent in arguing that the only thing we can perceive is “a set of appearances” (System, VIII: 783). Mill’s position that we cannot know anything about how things are in-themselves, but only know how they appear to us is called the “Relativity of Human Knowledge” (Examination, IX: 4).
