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|Prehistory=Until very recently the question of the status of disciplinary boundaries was mostly ignored. [[Static and Dynamic Methods|Static methodologists]] showed very little interest in the subject although they did weigh in on the related question of the demarcation of scientific theories from pseudo-scientific ones. Philosophers of science like [[Karl Popper]] and [[Rudolf Carnap]] formulated criteria for distinguishing scientific disciplines like astronomy and physics from non-scientific topics like astrology and palm reading. Carnap's verificationism maintained that a theory is scientific only if it can be verified by observation. [[CiteRef::Godfrey-Smith (2003)|pp. 27]] Popper, on the other hand, maintained that a theory is only scientific if it is vulnerable to falsification by conflicting observations. [[CiteRef::Godfrey-Smith (2003)|pp. 58]]

A more interesting comparison to be drawn between history and the status of disciplinary boundaries lies in the opinion of dynamic methodologists such as that of [[Imre Lakatos]] and [[Thomas Kuhn]]. Lakatos, while never outright stating his opinion on disciplinary boundaries seems to have formed a strong implicit foundation for disciplinary boundaries. For Lakatos, periods of stability in science involve research programs. What is interesting is that one of the main criteria for a theory to become accepted into a research program is to be in unity with the rest of the program.[[CiteRef::Lakatos (1970)|pp. 32-34]] Herein it is evident, while there were no absolute criteria by which to determine disciplinary boundaries, Lakatos at least regarded them in some sort of simple terms in that they had to work with each other. In essence, for Lakatos disciplinary boundaries were still ambiguous but more defined than his static methodologist predecessors.