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|Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan,
|Formulated Year=2015
|Prehistory=The prehistory concerning synchronism versus asynchronism of method employment is rooted in a debate between Thomas Kuhn and Larry Laudan, the former promoting synchronism and the latter asynchronism. For Kuhn, science changes in phases, the first of which is normal science.<ref>Anderson and Hepburn. Scientific Change. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stable URL: http://www.iep.utm.edu/s-change/. </ref> Normal science is marked by a consensus on the aspects of science that constitute a paradigm: concepts used in communication, the meaningfulness and relevance of some problems to research, and model solutions to research problems. Kuhn’s later formulation of a paradigm, a disciplinary matrix, includes laws, beliefs about the existence of objects/phenomena, values concerning research evaluation, and exemplary problems. Normal science is further characterized by an expectation that solutions will agree with problems previously researched. However, sometimes anomalies emerge in this agreement does not obtain. When anomalies are serious they can put pressure on the reigning paradigm.
Serious anomalies eventually give way to a crisis in the paradigm, which calls for the modification or a revolutionary abandonment of the paradigm. Anomalies that strike at the foundation of the paradigm are often solved by new theories which, if accepted, culminate in a new consensus within the scientific community. This is known as a revolution. The new consensus among the community is not a cumulative progression from the old consensus; rather, the two paradigms are incommensurable with respect to the set of problems, the approaches to those problems, conceptual changes, and the world of the community’s research.
Kuhn’s notion of incommensurability first tabled the discussion of the synchronism or asynchronism of method employment. According to Thomas Nickles (2017), the incommensurability of Kuhnian revolutions involves a wholesale change in goals as well as methodological standards and values.<ref>Nickles, Thomas, "Scientific Revolutions", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/scientific-revolutions/></ref> Thus, in Kuhn’s system method employment necessarily depends upon theory acceptance, from which it follows that methods and theories change synchronously.<ref>Barseghyan, Hakob. (2015) The Laws of Scientific Change. Springer, pg. 151.</ref>
Larry Laudan, a critique of Kuhn, challenged this synchronism.<ref>Anderson and Hepburn. Scientific Change. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://www.iep.utm.edu/s-change/. </ref> For him, research is conducted within the historical tradition of a given domain which that research can change.<ref>Laudan, L. (1977). Progress and Its Problems. Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth. Berkeley: University of California Press.</ref> Traditions are comprised of general assumptions about entities and processes. Problem solving, usually concerning anomalies, drives scientific change. Contra Kuhn, anomalies can be addressed by methodological or ontological changes instead of theory modifications. Severe anomalies in particular require alterations at both the methodological/ontological and theoretical levels.<ref>Anderson and Hepburn. Scientific Change. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://www.iep.utm.edu/s-change/. </ref>
Contrary to Kuhn, for whom “change is simultaneous rather than sequential,” Laudan regards method employment as separable from theory acceptance.<ref>Laudan, L. (1986). Science and Values: The Aims of Science and their Role in Scientific Debate. University of California Press, pg. 69.</ref> It is possible to change methodologies, which Laudan treats as methods, without accepting new theories.<ref>Laudan, L. (1986). Science and Values: The Aims of Science and their Role in Scientific Debate. University of California Press, pg. 74.</ref> A paradigm shift is not necessary for methods to change.<ref>Laudan, L. (1986). Science and Values: The Aims of Science and their Role in Scientific Debate. University of California Press, pg. 81.</ref> Consequently, methods and theory change can be asynchronous.
|Current View=[[Mirka Loiselle]] challenged the asynchronism of method employment theorem during the seminar of 2016. According to Mirka, the employment of a method is simultaneous to the acceptance of a proposition stating that the method is effective. Whether or not this poses a challenge to the theorem remains an open question.
|Page Status=Stub

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