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Necessary Method theorem (Barseghyan-2015) (view source)
Revision as of 20:37, 10 March 2018
, 20:37, 10 March 2018no edit summary
However, with the arrival of Kuhn and the fluidity of methods, the necessity of methods could finally come into question – though not specifically by him. Kuhn posited periods of normal science, which followed a certain method, but were eventually overtaken by anomalies and faced scientific revolutions. After a scientific revolution everything would be overturned and a new method would be taken on within the period of normal science. [[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962a)|pp. 62-76]]Albeit Kuhn did not consider the necessity of methods discretely, it would seem in his formulations he determined a strict structure including methods. Therein, it would be fair to conclude he would have believed methods to be necessary. Additionally, Kuhn’s ideas gave rise to similar formulations by authors such as [[Imre Lakatos]].
Like Kuhn, Lakatos believed there were several paradigms in scientific communities throughout history. Unlike Kuhn, Lakatos stipulated theories must be assessed holistically and with a singular method. Additionally, he posited there were many research programmes which were at war with each other instead of just a single paradigm. Theories were judged to be regressive or progressive via a fitting criterion which we can interpret as Lakatos’ method.[[CiterefCiteRef::Lakatos (1970)|pp. 31-34]] Once again, we see the acceptance of the necessity of methods within the community of the philosophy of science.
Generally, it is not until the likes of [[Paul Feyerabend]] at which point the necessity of methods is rejected. However, very few philosophers of science to this day hold this view.
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