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One Finally, it is important to note that one of the main reasons why the classic philosophy of science failed to accomplish its task was engaged with both normative and descriptive views is that many philosophers conflated the descriptive questions with the vagueness of its position regarding this questionnormative ones . The theories of Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos, and early Laudan can all be considered either as descriptions of how science changes through time and/or prescriptions of how it ought to change.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|pp. 12-21]]
Scope of Scientonomy - Descriptive and Normative (view source)
Revision as of 21:58, 11 March 2018
, 21:58, 11 March 2018no edit summary
|Question=Ought a scientonomic theory be ''descriptive'' or ''normative''?
|Topic Type=Normative
|Description=There are at least three different sorts of questions concerning the process of scientific change; historical questions, theoretical questions, and methodological questions [[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)|p. 12]]. Historical questions deal with actual courses of events such as what theories were accepted and what methods were employed at a particular time. Theoretical questions deal with such matters as the mechanisms of theory and method change. These are both sorts of descriptive questions. Methodological questions deal with normative matters such as what methods ought to be employed and what theories ought to be accepted. The question at issue is which of these sorts of questions ought to fall within the scope of scientonomy, and which should not. As a result, the answer to this question will determine which cases can be investigated through scientonomy.
|Parent Topic=Scope of Scientonomy
|Authors List=Hakob Barseghyan,
|Formulated Year=2015
|Prehistory=Logical positivists were concerned with justifying scientific knowledge and progress. In their case, it was about increasing the probabilities. As a consequence, they believed that a theory of scientific change should be normative. After all, the actual scientific practices may concern many changes in belief that were not justified on epistemic grounds. An illustration of this tendency can be found in [[Alfred Jules Ayer]]'s work engaged with questions of justification such as whether the principle of verifiability is justified rather than empirical questions about the behavior of the scientists.[[CiteRef::Ayer (1952)]]
Likewise, [[Karl Popper]] believed that his theories were meant to be normative and he did not focus on studying the actual examples of science.[[CiteRef::Popper (1959)]] However, both group occasionally employed examples from the history of science to persuade other philosophers. For instance, Popper used Eddington’s confirmation of Einstein’s theory to illustrate his concept of crucial experiments.[[CiteRef::Popper (1959)]]
[[Imre Lakatos]] distinguished between internal and external history of science. The latter is concerned with what actually happened during an episode of scientific change while the former is about justifying the scientific change on grounds that are epistemically acceptable. [[CiteRef::Lakatos (1971a)]] Internal history of science is about reconstructing a scientific episode and justifying it by using the normative theories we possess. [[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962a)]]
After the Structure of Scientific Revolutions was published, [[Thomas Kuhn]] changed the view of the entire field. He showed that many of the scientific changes were completely different from the normative philosophical views of how good science ought to be conducted. For example, scientists often tolerated the existence of anomalies which would not be permitted according to the naive falsificationist view Popper defended in his work the Logic of Scientific Discovery.[[CiteRef::Kuhn (1962a)]] [[CiteRef::Popper (1959)]]This led to a disenchantment over the normative theories due to the fact that it they were not justifying the actual science as it is conducted. Given that the main reason for normative justification of various scientific practices was justifying the epistemic authority of science, philosophers of science began accepting that the actual practice of science should be the starting point of philosophical theories. This is often called the historicist turn in the philosophy of science literature.
|Related Topics=Scope of Scientonomy - Acceptance Use and Pursuit, Scope of Scientonomy - Construction and Appraisal, Scope of Scientonomy - Explicit and Implicit, Scope of Scientonomy - Individual and Social, Scope of Scientonomy - Time Fields and Scale,
|Page Status=Editor Approved
