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|Description=[[Epistemic Agents|Epistemic agents ]] (e.g. individual scientists, [[Epistemic Community|scientific communities]]) can take different epistemic stances (e.g. ''acceptance'', ''use'', ''pursuit'', ''employment'') towards different [[Epistemic Elements|epistemic elements]] (e.g. The ''theories'', ''methods''). In principle, the types of stances that can be in principle taken towards a [[Theory|theory ]] may or may not be the same as the types of stances that can be taken towards [[Method|methods ]] of [[Theory Assessment Outcomes|theory evaluationassessment]]. Thus, it must be clarified which types of stances (e.g. ''acceptance'', ''use'', ''pursuit'', ''employment'') can be taken towards epistemic elements of any given type (e.g. ''theories'', ''methods'').

In [[Imre Lakatos]]'s theory of scientific change individual theories were encompassed in larger assemblages called research programs. A research program consists of a family of scientific theories containing 'hard core' assumptions, which are stubbornly defended, surrounded by a protective belt of associated auxiliary assumptions, which may be modified if needed to protect the hard core. Lakatos identified two epistemic stances that epistemic agents might take toward research programs. They could be deemed either ''progressive'' or ''degenerating''. A research program was ''progressive'' if its theories successfully predicted hitherto unexpected facts.It was degenerating if it failed to make successful bold predictions, and if its theories were intentionally fashioned so as to accommodate already known facts. [[CiteRef::Lakatos (1978)]]

[[Larry Laudan]]'s reticulated model of scientific change involved scientific theories, scientific methods, and scientific values, all interdependent. Methods could change along with theories, and thus epistemic agents could take stances with respect to them both. For Laudan, a theory would be regarded as ''accepted'' by an agent if that agent accepted its truth, or ''rejected'' if deemed by the agent to be false. He also proposed a new stance, that of ''pursuit''. To pursue a theory is to work with it or explore it without committing to a belief that it is true. [[CiteRef::Godfrey-Smith (2003)]][[CiteRef::Laudan (1997)|pp. 108-114]]|Related Topics=Epistemic Agents, Epistemic Elements, Ontology of Scientific Change,|Page Status=StubEditor Approved