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|Question=How do ''questions'' become ''accepted'' as legitimate topics of inquiry? What is the ''mechanism'' of question acceptance?
|Topic Type=Descriptive
|Description=TODO: Will add descriptionVarious theorists have recognized that the kinds of questions that can be asked by scientists changes over time. Kuhn, van Fraassen, and Lauden have all noted this fact to varying degrees without proposing a concrete mechanism by which questions come to be accepted as legitimate at any given time. Kuhn, for example, recognized that the kinds of questions that can be asked by scientists changes with each paradigm shift, but declined to propose a specific mechanism for this phenomena (i.e. what makes a question acceptable in one paradigm but not in another).  The ontology of epistemic elements of scientific change put forward by [[Epistemic Elements - Theories Methods and Questions (Rawleigh-2018)|Rawleigh]] includes [[Question|questions]] as one of the central elements of scientific change, alongside [[Theory|theories]] and [[Method|methods]]. This, along with the fact that Rawleigh proposes ''acceptance'' and ''unacceptance'' as the possible stances of [[Epistemic Community|epistemic communities]] suggests that there ought to be mechanism by which questions are introduced into a mosaic as legitimate topics of inquiry. There already exists an accepted [[The Second Law (Patton-Overgaard-Barseghyan-2017)|mechanism for theories]] and an accepted [[The Third Law (Sebastien-2016)|mechanism for methods]] to explain how those elements become part of a mosaic. Given that a mechanism for theories and methods exists, it is very likely that a mechanism for questions also exists.
|Parent Topic=Mechanism of Scientific Change
|Authors List=William Rawleigh,
|Formulated Year=2018
|Current View=There is currently no accepted answer to the mechanism of question acceptance.
|Page Status=Stub
}}

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