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Bolstering his views on the effective use of induction, Mill advocates for the use of experiments in science. Though he concedes that we may “discover, by mere observation without experiment, a real uniformity in nature” [[CiteRef::Mill (1974a)]], he regards using experiments in science is as the best way of uncovering the causal mechanism between events. Experiments enable us to “meet with some of the antecedents apart from the rest, and observe what follows from them; or some of the consequents, and observe by what they are preceded.” [[CiteRef::Mill (1974a)]] In other words, controlled variables in experiments allow us to unearth the causal mechanism between two events. For example, we can either see how, given A, we can reach its effect B, or if we were given the effect B, we could infer the cause A. Hence, this form of refined induction is possible in a controlled experimental setting, a feature that Mill considers unique to and indispensable for science.

Arguing in the same vein as British empiricists such as Locke, Mill advances the idea of tabula rasa - human mind is a clean slate with no preconceived, or innate ideas. This position is consistent with his belief in the non-existence of ''a priori '' knowledge, which differentiates him from rationalists, like Kant and Whewell. Nevertheless, Mill thinks that human mind is malleable in two respects. First, experiences and observations make their mark on the mind, thus molding it accordingly. Second, background conditions, which vary between different cultures, play a cardinal role in shaping one’s mind. Mill thinks that the tremendous amount of “pliability” [[CiteRef::Mill (1977a)]] exhibited by the human mind has implications for our observations.

Living in a particular culture or society, and the specific experiences tend to merge the observations and the inferences that one hasmakes. Therefore, the “observation and inferences are intimately blended” in a mixture.[[CiteRef::Mill (1974b)]] In this regard, Mill agrees with Whewell who thought that, during the process of hypothesis-formation, it is not possible to distinguish between ‘sensational’ and ‘intellectual’ aspects of knowledge, hence making the distinction between ‘data’ and ‘inference’ artificial. As hinted above, for Mill this blending of observation and inference occurs due to human predisposition for induction; more importantly, it’s it is repeated induction in the similar same cultural or societal context that compounds our observations and inferences. Thus, whenever a person makes an observation, she will have, through association, a certain inference depending on the cultural context in which she was raised.[[CiteRef::Macleod (2016)]] Even though both authors recognize the impact of theory-ladenness, they hold somewhat different views. While on one side, Mill interprets theory-ladenness as socially and culturally constructed, Whewell provides a more logical reason. For him, there are no independent ‘facts’ with individualindependent, underlying ontological basis against which theories can be tested, thus precluding the making of inference from the data.[[CiteRef::Losee (1983)]]

Mill makes universal and normative claims about how science progresses in any given society. He thinks that a society makes scientific (and other types of) progress when it allows the free flow of ideas by everyone. The ability to express oneself freely is not restricted to social and economic elite. Rather, people from all types of diverse backgrounds should have the right to fearlessly express themselves. Therefore, the ideas proposed by people from diverse vantage points lead to a plethora of novel and unique ideas or theories.[[CiteRef::Godfrey-Smith (2003)|p.142]] This constant emergence of novel theories allow the exploration of hitherto unexplored notions, and after evaluation, the best ones are may be retained.[[CiteRef::Godfrey-Smith (2003)|p.116]] This process continues: new, New and radical ideas are continuously (and without hindrance) proposed, they are explored, they may challenge orthodox scientific beliefs, and if they become accepted, the best ideas then become the scientific belief. Thus, for MillAs a result, this “marketplace of ideas” is a necessary condition that enables the progression of for and allows scienceto progress.[[CiteRef::Godfrey-Smith (2003)|p.116,142]]|Criticism=Many commentators during from Mill’s days (and until now) have made time to this day make a general argument against the inductivist camp of which Mill is a part. Many like Whewell argued that if inductive inferences are valid, whether they be iterative, initiating or enumerative, they should lead to a “nonfalsifiable establishment of connections between truths.”[[CiteRef::Buchdahl (1971)|p.364]] Mill himself concedes that the ‘certainty’ of inductive inferences is ‘absolute’ inasmuch as we are concerned with practical purposes. Inductive inferences do not hold absolutely “in circumstances unknown to us, and beyond the possible range of our experience,” such as the “distant parts of the stellar regions.” [[CiteRef::Buchdahl (1971)|p.365]] It is not fully clear how Mill can, on the one hand, concede that inductive inferences are inevitably fallible, and on the other hand, use such terms as “unconditional” and “invariable” to describe inductive inferences.[[CiteRef::Buchdahl (1971)]]

Another objection to Mill by Whewell is with respect to the idea of confirmed novel predictions. Mill agrees that a hypothesis is seen as favorable if it explicates the previously hitherto unexplained facts. However, he considers the corroboration of novel facts as a mere “coincidence” striking as profound only to the “ignorant vulgar.”[[CiteRef::Strong (1955)|p.228]] Whewell objects to Mill that the history of science reveals the opposite: when hitherto unobserved facts, which were posited by certain theories, were discovered, this new information was seen as confirming evidence in support of the theory. In fact, some of the best theories, according to Whewell, earned their prestigious place in the scientific mosaic in virtue of the confirmation of their novel predictions. Whewell cites as an example the observance of the return of Haley’s comet as evidence confirming Newtonian theory, thereby demonstrating that, if we view the historical record on of science, it becomes clear that the discovery of new facts predicted by the theories do, indeed, serve as confirming evidence, which is contrary to what Mill thought.[[CiteRef::Strong (1955)]]