Changes

|Preamble=The role of tools and instruments in [[Scientific Change|scientific change]] is clearly important, but has not been defined within scientonomy. The question of whether epistemic tools can be subjects of [[Authority Delegation|authority delegation]] has been raised. This is not possible. The scientific data produced by some epistemic tools are a kind of [[Theory|theory]]. Theories must be [[The Second Law|assessed]], in accordance with an [[Method|employed method]]. This assessment requires semantic understanding of the data, and of the theories specifying the conditions under which the epistemic tool can be deemed a reliable source of knowledge. [[CiteRef::Patton (2019)]] Given the current state of artificial intelligence, epistemic tools lack the needed cognitive abilities to possess this understanding. [[CiteRef::Patton (2019)]] Therefore a new role for epistemic tools and their relationship to [[Epistemic Agent|epistemic agents]] must be specified. The role proposed here , that of tool reliance, plausibly locates its basis in the concrete requirements of the employed method of some epistemic agent.  The question of whether tools can be subjects of authority delegation has been raised, as has the question of the relationship between tools and instruments and the concrete requirements of the employed method. The proposed relationship of tool reliance would clarify these issues by specifying a new role in scientonomy for epistemic tools.