editor, Administrators
146
edits
Changes
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
The Zeroth Law (Harder-2015) (view source)
Revision as of 19:02, 10 February 2023
, 19:02, 10 February 2023no edit summary
We should be careful not to confuse these concepts of ''compatibility'' and ''consistency''. Barseghyan details the distinction between these two concepts:
<blockquote<>"the formal definition of inconsistency is that a set is inconsistent just in case it entails some sentence and its negation, i.e. ''p'' and ''not-p''. The classical logical principle of noncontradiction stipulates that ''p'' and ''not-p'' cannot be true ... In contrast, the notion of compatibility implicit in the zeroth law is much more flexible, for its actual content depends on the criteria of compatibility employed at a given time. As a result, the actually employed criteria of compatibility can differ from mosaic to mosaic. While in some mosaics compatibility may be understood in the classical logical sense of consistency, in other mosaics it may be more flexible ... in principle, there can exist such mosaics, where two theories that are inconsistent in the classical logical sense are nevertheless mutually compatible and can be simultaneously accepted within the same mosaic. In other words, a mosaic can be ''inconsistency-intolerant'' or ''inconsistency-tolerant'' depending on the criteria of compatibility employed by the scientific community of the time"[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)||pp.154]].</blockquote>
These criteria are employed [[method|methods]], and therefore can change over time according to [[The Third Law (Barseghyan-2015)|the law of method employment]]. They dictate the standard that other theories and methods must meet so as to remain compatible with each other. The compatibility criterion of the contemporary scientific mosaic is believed to be along the lines of a non-explosive paraconsistent logic.[[CiteRef::Priest, Tanaka, and Weber (2015)]] This logic allows known contradictions, like the contradiction between signal locality in special relativity and signal non-locality in quantum mechanics to coexist without implying triviality. The compatibility criterion can be understood as a consequence of fallibilism about science. Even a community's best theories are merely truth-like, not strictly true. Our current compatibility criteria appears to be formulated as such. It is very likely that our current compatibility criteria has not always been the one employed. Discovery of the kind of compatibility criteria contained in the current and historical mosaics is an important empirical task for observational scientonomy.
Relativity maintains that all signals are local. That is, no signal can travel faster than light. Quantum theory, on the other hand, predicts faster than light influences. This has been known since the 1930's,[[CiteRef::Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (1935)]] yet both quantum theory and relativity remain in the mosaic. Yet, despite the existence of this contradiction, the community accepts both theories as the best available descriptions of their respective domains.
|Example Type=Historical
}}
{{Theory Example
|Title=Fallibilist and Infallibilist Communities
|Description=Barseghyan presents the following example of two hypothetical communities to illustrate the notion of ''incompatibility tolerance''.
<blockquote>First, imagine a community that believes that all of their accepted theories are absolutely (demonstratively) true. This ''infallibilist'' community also knows that, according to classical logic, p and not-p cannot be both true. Since, according to this community, all accepted theories are strictly true, the only way the community can avoid triviality is by stipulating that any two accepted theories must be mutually consistent. In other words, by the third law, they end up employing the classical logical law of noncontradiction as their criterion of compatibility.
Now, imagine another community that accepts the position of ''fallibilism''. This community holds that no theory in empirical science can be demonstratively true and, consequently, all accepted empirical theories are merely quasi-true. But if any accepted empirical theory is only quasi-true, it is possible for two accepted empirical theories to be mutually inconsistent. In other words, this community accepts that two contradictory propositions may both contain grains of truth, i.e. to be quasi-true. [[CiteRef::e Bueno et al.(1998)]]. In order to avoid triviality, this community employs a paraconsistent logic, i.e. a logic where a contradiction does not imply everything. This fallibilist community does not necessarily reject classical logic; it merely realizes that the application of classical logic to quasi-true propositions entails triviality. Thus, the community also realizes that the application of classical principle of noncontradiction to empirical science is problematic, for no empirical theory is strictly true. As a result, by the third law, this community employs criteria of compatibility very different from those employed by the infallibilist community.[[CiteRef::Barseghyan (2015)||pp.154-6]]</blockquote>
|Example Type=Hypothetical
}}
{{Acceptance Record
