Changes

Paul Feyerabend is accurately referred to as “the wild man of twentieth century philosophy of sciencescience”.” By In the 1960’s-70’s1960s and 70s, the notion of a Dynamic Method Thesis changing or dynamic scientific method (which is scarcely refuted today) first surfaced and “was - this was regarded as "one of the key tenants in both Kuhn’s Structure and Feyerabend’s Against Method.” Both philosophers of science subscribed to the point of view that there is no such thing as an unchangeable method of science (known in contemporary terms as the Static Method thesisThesis). Feyerabend’s anarchistic views of science are exemplified throughout his extensive works. His propositions developed into his conclusion that all science was irrational.

There Though Feyerabend adopted an anarchic view, there have been many other attempts to explicate the Scientific Method (a method of appraisal in light of evidence to determine which theory is better). Below are three prominent Philosophers who attempted to achieve such an explanation, and a brief description of their subjective criterion.

Karl Popper, who was renowned for his “critical rationalism",” argues that the objective probability of scientific theories is always zero, but they can have different empirical content, . Popper therefore he prefers a theory with excess empirical content. Furthermore, Popper asserts that all empirical knowledge is fallible, so the task of scientists is to compare competing theories. Popper’s assertions are reflected in his methodological rules.

Imre Lakatos built his views in regard to scientific progress based on the belief that the growth of knowledge is best determined within the framework of his ‘research programmes.’ He believed that Popper was on the right track about ‘empirical content', ‘but but he doesn’t see that scientists actually appraise entire ‘research programmes’ rather than individual theories.

Feyerabend attests that logical analysis shows that there are no “pure statements of fact,” because all propositions are theory laden. Therefore , sometimes “evidence” can be wrong. He confirms supports this claim with examples from the history of science, stating showing that new theories often come into being by reinterpreting through the reinterpretation or even rejecting some rejection of well-known facts. Feyeraband demonstrates the claim with the example of For instance, consider Aristotelian Medieval Physics, which was accepted until the end of the 17th century. This physical theory According to Aristotelian Medieval Physics, it was accepted the as a “pure statement of fact” that the earth does not rotate and therefore has no diurnal motion. The “Aristotelian viewInstead,” based on the experience, believed, as an example, that of an object moving falling straight downward (towards the centre of the centre of the universe goes straight down because ) suggested that the earth does not move. If the earth were indeed rotating, an object dropped from a high tower would still move towards the centre of the universe, however it would hit the ground far from the base of the tower. The Since the object fell right next to the tower, the conclusion is , according to Aristotelian Medieval Physics, was that Earth the earth does not rotate.

Feyerabend demonstrates, by using examples from the history of science, that there have been many instances where a new theory has been accepted without any confirmed novel predictions. Created First proposed in 1687, Newton’s four Laws (1st, 2nd, 3rd, Gravity) provided accurate predictions for a wide range of terrestrial and celestial phenomena. The Notably, the theory made a ‘novel prediction’ that the Earth was oblate (meaning that the equatorial diameter was slightly greater than the polar diameter) a claim that . The oblate-spheroid hypothesis, however, was not confirmed until 1740 by Maupertius, before which, time Newton’s theory was not accepted on the European continent. HoweverNevertheless, back in Britain, Newton’s laws had been accepted and taught at British Universitiesuniversities.

Feyerabend states that this the acceptance of Newtonian physics before the confirmation of its novel predictions was a violation of Popper’s requirement (which prescribes that in order for a new theory to be accepted, it must have confirmed excess empirical content) and in theory acceptance. Feyerabend also shows through logical analysis that said requirement is only practical when two theories ‘speak the same language’ (see Kuhn’s notion of incommensurability for further information).

Lakatos prefers modifications which are in tune with the programmes’ spirit and that introduce corroborated excess empirical content. He also states that when comparing two ‘research programmes,’ progressive ones are preferable to degenerating ones. Feyerabend, again, uses examples from the history of science to explicate flaws, this time in Lakatos’ notion of a ‘research Programmeprogramme,’ and says argues that “ad hoc” modifications have often been considered progressive.

In For instance, in 1543, Copernicus’ Astronomical astronomical theory became a would become part of the ‘Heliocentric Research Programme.’ The theory claimed that all planets in our solar system revolve around the central sun (hardcore called a "hard core" part of the theory) and that the orbits of the planets are circular (an auxiliary hypothesis to the theory). In 1609, Kepler proposed a modification to the auxiliary hypothesis (he did not touch the hardcorehard core) of the Heliocentric Research Programme, suggesting that planets orbited in ellipsesrather than perfect circles. Feyerabend questioned whether this modification was progressive of or regressive since because it decreased the empirical content, therefore claiming this and in effect claims it was an ad hoc1hoc modification. Feyerabend shows the Copernican version as having been more restrictive because it predicted a specific type of ellipse (the circle), which ultimately gave it the Copernican circle a higher level of empirical content, and yet scientists than the Keplerian ellipse. Yet philosophers of science like Lakatos would consider Kepler’s proposition to be a progressive modification.

Claiming Claims that the scientific method is universal and unchangeable, helped Feyerabend develop his main thesis. By using referring to the history of science and using logical analyses, Feyerabend shows that even the most popular methodological rules have flaws and have been violated at one time or another. He proved showed that such a the ‘fixed method’ pursued by the likes of Carnap, Popper and Lakatos does not exist. Feyerabened consequently proposes “The Dynamic method thesis” (a view that is virtually unchallenged nowadays) which claims that there are no methodological rules consistently used by scientistsacross multiple time periods. He establishes this radical position (concerning his anarchistic view of science) on page 154 of his ‘Against Method,’ where he states: “I believe that a reform of the sciences that makes them more anarchic and more subjective is urgently needed.” The “method” is merely a template for making sense of the world.

The problem Feyerabend now faced was such: without an “unchangeable method of science” we are no longer in a position to tell which theory is the best one. We are left with differing, changeable methods (with their own respective rules of appraisal and different theories and evidence). This realization is why Feyeraband agreed with Thomas Kuhn, and his notion of Scientific Revolutions, who for Kuhn had already established that each paradigm comes with its own methods, and produces its own evidence.
Feyerabend’s research concerning progress without the a method compelled him to propose the principle of proliferation to ‘guide’ science and answer the question of what happens to the notion of progress in science without universal and unchangeable criteria. Feyerabend’s notion of “progress through proliferation” states that new theories and methods should not replace old ones, but rather ‘proliferate’ by providing new perspectives and ways of perceiving things. He argues that new theories make it possible to see different facts and to notice things we would not otherwise notice, while different methods allow us to choose different theories and therefore enrich our overall worldview.

Feyerabend’s views and propositions subsequently led other philosophers to consider theories of scientific change that take the Dynamic Method Thesis into account. Below are examples that give insight into what the field of HPS was like after Feyerabend.
Larry Laudan is one example of how philosophers of science were trying to come up with different theories of scientific change that did do not utilize a ‘fixed/static method.’ Taking the Dynamic Method into account, Laudan initially creates the ‘hierarchical model,’ which preserves rationality in science by having fixed values rather than methods. Ultimately, he presents a ‘reticulated model’ where there are new/modified rules about how theories, methods and values affect one another, while still preserving the rationality in science.

David Bloor, having introduced SSK (Science in Social Contextthe Sociology of Scientific Knowledge), believes that theories, methods and evidence are all social constructs from which scientific change cannot be separated. He expands on this claim by stating that the process of scientific change is shaped by a vast array of social factors such as: psychology, politics, economics, and religion. The notion is that even our most fundamental theories reflect the social contexts in which they originate and function. Furthermore, he asserts that “statements of fact,” fact” are a product of social factors like negotiations, compromises, exhaustion, lack of money, personal interest, or national pride etc. In addition, he argues that our choice of method depends on our cultural values. Bloor concludes that the process of scientific change falls under the field of sociology and should therefore be studied as a social phenomenon.

Barseghyan, Hakob. The Laws of Scientific Change. Springer, 2015.